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Abstract 
The global mining industry experiences a relatively high rate of accidents, injuries 
and deaths. A large number of these incidents involve interactions between people 
and mining equipment. This thesis describes the application of human factors 
methods to different parts of the design lifecycle of mobile mining equipment with the 
aim of encouraging more widespread adoption of these techniques. Three research 
studies are presented here. 
!
In the first study (Chapter 2), injury narrative data obtained from surface coal mines 
in Australia were examined for human factors design issues.  The injury narratives 
were coded using a constant comparative method that allowed categories and codes 
to be identified. A number of issues emerged, including the location of the person on 
the equipment (eg access ways) and the tasks being performed (such as 
maintenance).  Multivariable analysis in a visual diagram allowed greater and 
potentially more usable information to emerge. Three specific use cases showed the 
benefits of greater targeting for future investigation in different areas of the mining 
industry. Analysis of this type should be standard in incident analysis and the 
methods of recording incidents should be broadened to encourage richer narrative 
information to be collected to allow additional trends to emerge.  
!
The second study (Chapter 3) documented the analysis of in-depth interviews using 
the Critical Decision Method (CDM) with mining equipment operators who had been 
involved in incidents. The research found that the CDM interview method was able 
to identify many issues not contained within the original incident reports. The insights 
provided through the use of CDM could also help target redesign interventions at 
mine site, especially linked to mobile equipment redesign. Useful insights were 
frequently obtained from drawing the incident on a whiteboard.  The data from each 
of the CDM interviews were then placed on the decision ladder.  The results 
revealed that operators were very frequently ‘shortcutting’ a full decision making 
process. indicating that design solutions which address the immediate environment 
of the operator could prove more effective than interventions like knowledge-based 
retraining.  However, in a practical sense, the combining of CDM outputs with the 
decision ladder did not offer substantially greater design solutions than may have 
been gained through other approaches. 
!
Chapter 4 examined an in-cab proximity detection system installed at an 
underground gold mine.  The goal of the system was to make drivers of haul trucks 
more aware of surrounding vehicles, assist decision making and, ultimately, prevent 
collisions.  The research used a variety of human factors methods to examine the 
system usability, acceptance and effectiveness.  The results of the evaluation 
identified deficiencies with the proximity detection system and other factors of the 
operating environment. These produced a number of recommendations. An 
investigation of a subsequent collision at the site verified many of the issues 
observed. Some of the interface design recommendations were consequently 
developed and implemented with positive operator acceptance. The application of 
human factors methods can lead to positive changes in the design of proximity 
detection systems and, more broadly, help develop effective mining technologies 
from a user-centred perspective. 
!
In conclusion, the three studies described in this thesis have produced both 
practically useful benefits and a contribution to knowledge. The results will 
encourage more widespread adoption of such human factors techniques by both 
mining equipment users and designers. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Abstract 
The mining industry experiences a relatively high rate of accidents, injuries and 
deaths. A significant proportion of these involve mobile equipment.  Despite the 
success in improving safety in other industries, the take-up of human factors 
methods in mining has not been as strong and the published research is also 
relatively sparse.  This thesis treats this gap as an opportunity and describes the 
application of multiple human factors techniques to identify potential improvements 
in the design of mobile mining equipment.   
!
This chapter introduces the thesis. A review of the recent safety performance in 
mining and the involvement of mobile equipment is undertaken followed by a review 
of the history of human factors in mining.  The concept of the asset lifecycle is 
introduced and the chapter concludes with an outline of the three case studies and 
their associated research questions which will form the bulk of this thesis.  
1.1 Problem Statement 
1.1.1 Safety Record in Mining 
In spite of significant improvements over the past century, mining continues to be a 
hazardous industry with relatively high rates of accidents, injuries and deaths. For 
example, in Australia, 10 mining workers were killed in 2013 (Safework Australia, 
2014).  This represents an increased rate on the previous 5 years where 36 fatalities 
occurred which was already 70% higher than the national average (Safework 
Australia, 2014).  This is for an industry that already had a fatality rate of ten times 
that of what is considered a ‘safe’ industry (Minerals Industry Safety and Health 
Centre, 2005).  The National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety (NIOSH) 
reports that the United States of America has experienced similarly high fatality rates 
!1
in comparison to general private industry (National Institute for Occupational Health 
and Safety, 2008). On a more descriptive note the then CEO of iron ore division of 
BHP Billiton iron described the safety performance of his company and the industry 
as “abysmal” (Wallace, 2009). 
!
On a more positive note, the rates of serious but non-fatal injuries does seem to be 
reducing in sophisticated mining industries. For example in a report by the Minerals 
Industry Safety and Health Centre (MISHC) in 2005 the Australian Mining Industry 
noted that though the frequency of Long Term Injuries was decreasing between 
1994-2004 (Minerals Industry Safety and Health Centre, 2005).  Since then reports 
by Safework Australia show a reduction, albeit at a slower rate (Safework Australia, 
2014). Similar reductions in serious injuries have occurred in the USA (National 
Institute for Occupational Health and Safety 2008). Despite these reductions, the 
rate of serious injuries in mining remains high. 
1.1.2 Contribution of Mobile Equipment to Mining Accidents  
Mobile equipment used in mining has been implicated in a significant proportion of 
the industry’s incidents, injuries and fatalities. For example, in Australia 22% of all 
LTI’s in the mining industry were associated with mobile plant and transport 
(Burgess-Limerick and Steiner, 2006) and 46% of injuries in New South Walks 
underground mining were associated with equipment, most of this mobile (Burgess-
Limerick and Steiner, 2011).  NIOSH notes that in the U.S.A from 2003-2007 30.2% 
of mining fatalities and 9.6% of mining injuries were related to powered haulage 
(National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety, 2008). Furthermore, as the 
below charts indicate, those fatalities and injuries not classified as ‘powered 
haulage’ do not necessarily rule out the role of mobile equipment. It does appear 
that significant Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) issues in mining relate to 
mobile equipment. 
!
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Figure 1.1: (National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety, 2008) 
!
!  
Figure 1.2: (National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety, 2008) 
1.1.3 Transition from Technical to Human Causes 
In the early part of the past century, mining fatalities were significantly related to 
technical and engineering limitations, with issues such as underground explosions or 
surface bench collapses predominating (Cooke and Horberry, 2010). Whilst these 
traditional major hazards still remain of concern, technological advances mean that 
the science for their control is largely understood. This changed the pattern of 
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mining accidents. When analysing the emerging pattern Simpson and Widdas 
found:  
“an analysis of accidents over the past few years has not thrown up any 
uniquely mining aspect on which to concentrate… What is evident is that by 
far the most significant common element in current accident pattern is that of 
the human factor” (1992, p. 256). 
!
This result is, perhaps, to be expected, as mining design engineers have a lower 
focus on human factors than other industries, including how the equipment is to be 
used by the operator and the sequence, importance and frequency of tasks/
functions (Sanders and Peay, 1988).  Unfortunately, systematic attempts to address 
human factors problems in mining, especially preventatively, remain rare (Simpson, 
Horberry et al., 2009). Waterson and Klose (2010) suggested that this is potentially 
because of a persistent view that human factors is both common-sense, and costly.  
As noted above, the current approaches to injury prevention in mining seem to have 
had lessening effect on injury prevention and only been able to take fatalities to an 
uneasy plateau. Human factors methods could potentially be key to the next step 
change in safety performance of the minerals industry. 
1.2 The Maturity of Human Factors in Mining  
1.2.1 The History of Human Factors in Mining  
The application of human factors in mining has been described as having a ‘rich but 
uneven history’ with much of the early research difficult or impossible to track down 
(Horberry, Burgess-Limerick et al., 2011).  Much of this research was conducted at 
the tail end of the British Coal industry. These studies were often explanatory, but 
already indicate human factors issues related to design were at the core of 
remaining accidents. For example, a large review of various type of underground 
mining equipment found designed which inhibited safe and effective maintenance 
(Ferguson et. al., 1985). Another review found significant  manual tasks risks 
involving moving unsteady equipment in cramped underground mines (Sims & 
Graveling, 1988). There were some trials of risk controls easily implemented at mine 
sites, such as increasing the strength of lights on mining caps to improve detection of 
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moving objects. (Martin & Graveling, 1983).  Other attempts were made to 
systematically address human factors issues, such as the production of guidelines 
for the design of free-steered vehicles (Pethick & Mason, 1985) and better capturing 
human factors aspects in accident analysis and reporting (Graveling et. al., 1987) 
!
However, since the collapse of the British Coal industry until relatively recently the 
published human factors research in mining was particularly sparse.  During this era 
the examination of human factors in industries such as aviation, rail transport, 
petrochemical processing, road transport and nuclear power generation made 
significant advances. By contrast the implementation of human factors in mining has 
consistently come up against roadblocks, such as engineers believing they already 
know how people will act and that humans can be trained to overcome design 
related shortcomings (Dhillon, 2008).  
!
This has left human factors in mining as a significantly less mature. Human factors 
has rarely been explicitly considered in the design of mining equipment.  For 
example, Sanders and Peay (1988) reported in that mining design engineers rarely 
considered human factors including how the equipment is to be used by the operator 
including the sequence, importance and frequency of tasks/functions.  Furthermore, 
they found the typical engineer does not systematically consider the interaction 
between human beings and equipment, has an over-reliance on old designs and a 
reluctance to modify these even with new information (Sanders and Peay, 1988). 
Although there are some indications that this is changing, the lack of consideration 
continues to the present day (eg. Wester & Burgess-Limerick, 2013). 
1.2.2 Known contribution of Human Factors to Mining Accidents 
Despite the widespread lack of maturity of human factors in mining, both there has 
been an increase in the reporting of human factors issues in mining accident 
investigations.  For example Joy (2009) reported that 95% of investigations into 
serious bodily injuries had an element of active human error.  Similarly, Sanders and 
Peay (1988) noted that an expert research panel found that 93% of underground 
mining accidents had a causal factor classified as perceptual-cognitive-motor error 
related to the more common term of human error.   
!
!5
Furthermore, there is some evidence that application of human factors methods can 
be successful in reducing injuries. For example, McPhee (2004) notes that the 
application of physical human factors significantly reduces the risk of 
musculoskeletal injuries through examination of equipment and task design. Some 
published research also shows that applied participative human factors approaches 
show promise in reducing musculoskeletal injuries (Burgess-Limerick, Straker et al., 
2007; Torma-Krajewski et al., 2007). Although a variety of human factors methods 
show promise in improving safety there is potentially much more that could be 
gained from wider application of human factors techniques. 
1.2.3 The Current Mindset in Mining Obstructs the Adoption of Human Factors 
The lack of consideration of human factors methods in mining could stem from a 
widely-held belief that whilst human behaviour can be influenced by design, the 
major contributor to accidents is the erratic and unpredictable behaviour of unreliable 
people. This is what Dekker describes as the ‘Bad Apple Theory’ (Dekker, 2006).  In 
this case extra training, improving procedures or reprimanding the person involved 
are likely to be considered appropriate and effective remedial actions as they are 
perceived to be the controls that target improving human reliability. 
!
There is some evidence that this view is prevalent in the mining industry.  In fact in 
one of the most recent and significant collections of human factors work in mining 
the authors begin with addressing myths about human error having it’s root causes 
in the front line by accident prone people (Simpson, Horberry et al., 2009).  In a 
more specific example, Caterpillar, the world’s largest manufacturer of mobile mining 
equipment, indicates a view that blames people for accidents, rather than 
considering the relationship to design. They state the following as the first sentence 
in all of their safety manuals for haul trucks: !
“Most accidents that involve product operation, maintenance and repair are 
caused  by failure to observe basic safety rules or precautions. An accident 
can often be avoided by recognizing potentially hazardous situations before 
an accident occurs." (Caterpillar 2007; p.1 - emphasis added).  !
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Although mine sites are obviously much more constrained in making design changes 
than manufacturers, a focus on controlling personal failure appears prevalent.  For 
example Rio Tinto Alcan found that 25% of their significant safety events in 2004 
were related to Mobile Equipment (Laddychuk, 2008).  However, by their own 
admission, they more frequently-used controls on the lower-end of the hierarchy of 
controls, such as training for pedestrians (administrative) and high visibility clothing 
(Personal Protective Equipment), and procedures for driver (administrative) 
(Laddychuk, 2008). 
1.2.4 The Alternative Mindset that will help Human Factors Methods Flourish 
The alternative view is that human performance is significantly related to context/
workplace design and is somewhat predictable.  Dekker describes this as the ‘New 
View’ where accidents related to human factors can be related to the tools, tasks and 
other features of the operating environment (Dekker, 2006).  It is arguable that the 
maturity of the mining industry has generally not reached the New View and the 
acceptance of human factors methods to improve equipment design lags behind 
other industries. Shutte recently stated that though there is growing awareness of 
the need for the application of human factors in mining, very little has been done 
about the application (Schutte, 2005). This is further hindered by a reactive rather 
than preventative risk management type of safety culture that is found to be 
persistent in mining (Bealko, Kovalchik et al., 2008). Mining will not move to the 
New View on rhetoric. It will only be through the successful application of methods 
that lead to changed designs and prevent errors and accidents. 
!
1.2.5 Increasing human factors research in mining. 
To say that mining should consider human factors more is a very broad statement. 
Humans factors encompasses a huge number of issues and methods.  It is not 
pragmatic to expect that the mining industry would accept an entire suite of methods 
quickly.  Not only would it not be possible for an entire industry to quickly absorb 
such a large change, but the lack of success stories would support scepticism that 
change would bring benefit. 
!
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To a degree this scepticism is warranted. What is needed to propel human factors 
forwards in mining is a targeted and rigorous application of a variety of methods. The 
thesis will examine a number of methods involving human factors that could be used 
to examine and improve the safety, and in some cases reliability and productivity, of 
mobile mining equipment. This will build evidence to encourage more widespread 
application of human factors in the design of mining equipment. 
1.3 Asset Lifecycle 
The previous section suggests that the path forwards for improved safety in mining is 
through a greater focus on design especially related to mobile equipment. The next 
consideration is where, how and by whom does the design of mobile equipment 
actually occur. The answer to this question would be immediately obvious for most 
objects; the design happens prior to manufacture. If this were simply the case then 
the focus of any efforts should be with mobile equipment designers. However, 
because mining equipment is so complex and their environments of use so diverse it 
is not the case that the design of equipment simply finishes prior to manufacturing. !!
Design happens through modifications and adaptions throughout the equipment's life 
by a diverse range of people including the manufacturer, dealer and end user. 
Therefore, the opportunity to improve safety through design by applying mobile 
mining equipment exists across the entire life of the asset. Consequently, the 
research in this thesis has chosen to apply a number human factors method to key 
areas across the life of mobile equipment. As a whole, they will provide enhanced 
evidence and a framework of how industry can adopt human factors methods and 
promote safety through the design of mobile mining equipment. 
1.3.1 Introduction to the Asset Lifecycle 
The research in this thesis will apply multiple human factors techniques across the 
lifecycle mobile mining equipment.  Before proceeding, it is worth defining what is 
meant by the lifecycle. All industrial equipment follows the process from the initial 
concept through until it is eventually disposed. This is commonly known as the Asset 
Lifecycle and will be defined here as it is by Horberry, Burgess-Limerick & Steiner 
(2010, see Figure 1.3) 
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Figure 1.3: The Asset Lifecycle 
1.3.2 Responsibility of Safety and the Asset Lifecycle 
Historically, safety of equipment has been considered after the design and 
manufacturing was complete, probably beginning in the commissioning stage, with 
the responsibility primarily belonging to the asset owner (Everitt and Price, 2004). 
This has led to limited consideration of safety across the lifecycle of equipment, 
generally under a Job Safety Analysis or similar systems (Everitt and Price, 2004).  
Human factors knowledge has, traditionally, been applied following major incidents in 
the form of accident investigations. In fact the professional culture and language of 
human factors professionals often show more interest in analysis than design 
(Horberry, Burgess-Limerick et al., 2010). Whilst job safety and incident analysis is a 
valid endeavour, they do not easily describe how precursors to these incidents would 
be identified and designed-out in future (De Landre, Gibb et al., 2006).  !
A more recent perspective is to consider safety across the entire asset lifecycle. This 
perspective is theoretically linked to the Safety through Design (StD) and Prevention 
Through Design (PtD) initiatives (Howard, 2008). The primary changes to the 
historical approach is consideration of OH&S early in design stages and feeding 
back information learned about the use of previous models into future designs. As 
Sammarco et al stated: !
“The key to safety is to "design in" safety early in the design by looking at 
the entire system, identifying hazards, designing to eliminate or reduce 
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hazards, and doing this over the system lifecycle” (Sammarco, Fisher et al. 
2001, p.692) !!
This view is being reflected in changes to mining and safety regulation where 
designers are now given more duties and responsibility in relation to safety. For 
example the General Duty of Care provisions in Western Australian mining legislation 
state: !
“Designers, manufacturers, importers and suppliers must ensure that the 
design and construction of any plant in a mine is, as far as is practicable, safe 
to install and use. To ensure the safety of any person who installs or 
operates the plant the designer, manufacturer, importer and supplier must 
reduce or prevent the possibility of exposing any person to hazards by 
identifying any hazards associated with the plant, assessing the risk of 
exposure of any person to that hazard and considering possible means of 
reducing the risk of exposure" (Department of Consumer and Employer 
Protection, 2006, p24). !!
Similar provisions exist in many other jurisdictions such as the Australian state of 
Queensland (The Queensland Government, 2009; and South Africa President's 
Office, 1996). This there is also some specific regulatory recognition of the 
responsibility for designers and manufacturers to consider human factors.  For 
example, the Guideline for Mobile and Transportable Equipment for Use in Mines 
(MDG 15) produced by the mine safety regulator in the Australian state of New South 
Wales (NSW): !!
“All relevant ergonomic aspects of the equipment should be addressed by the 
Manufacturer in the design and manufacture of the equipment. A suitably 
qualified person should review the ergonomic aspects of the equipment to 
ensure compliance with good practice. A report should be prepared by this 
person and supplied to the Operator before delivery” (NSW Department of 
Primary Industries, 2002, p.14). 
!
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 As in this instance ergonomics is analogous to human factors, the NSW regulator is 
essentially stating that a manufacturer should include a Human Factors Engineer in 
design and report on this to the mine site user. The recently published Core Body of 
Knowledge for OHS professionals support this view, finding that safe design 
happens best through the application of human factors methods within a 
participatory framework (Horberry et. al., 2014). The core body of knowledge also 
notes that the obligations of designers to understand equipment's context use and 
operating task to ensure safe design is more explicitly built into the model Work 
Health and Safety, which will cover all of Australia.  
!
Additionally, there has been a slow move towards prosecuting manufacturers and 
designers of equipment.  For example in the recent case of Authority of New South 
Wales (Inspector Mulder) v Arbor Products International in the New South Wales 
Industrial Relations Commission, found that the designer of a wood chipping 
equipment was culpable for the injuries to a person employed by the purchaser of 
their equipment with the judgement stating: !
“The duty to provide a risk free work environment is a duty owed not only to 
the careful and observant employee but also to the hasty, careless, 
inadvertent, inattentive, unreasonable or disobedient employee in respect of 
conduct that is reasonably foreseeable” (Johnstone, 2003, p.58). !
In a similar example an enforceable undertaking was reached with a mining 
company, and  a manufacturing of mining equipment following a fatality related to a 
mobile roof-bolter (Department of Trade and Investment, 2008). The undertaking 
specified a 4 stage project which included identifying target area for focus and a 
resulting tool to review equipment. Both parties were 50% responsible for financing 
the undertaking. The resulting tool was incorporated into a Machine Design 
Guideline for roof bolting equipment with a heavy focus on human plant interaction, 
especially in the area of designing the control of the bolting system to prevent human 
error. This enforceable undertaking represents a move to both consider human 
factors methods necessary and the responsibility for safety being shared by the 
equipment manufacturers. 
!
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Therefore, there is now a more pressing requirement for the minerals industry to 
consider not only the safety of equipment when primarily under the control of the end 
user but also the elements under control of the manufacturer and designer.  
However, despite this imperative, there is little evidence that human factors is 
considered systematically throughout the lifecycle. In fact, it is thought that most 
engineers during manufacture and design will typically focus on technical issues, 
such as equipment reliability and payload, overlooking human factors concerns 
which are then typically passed from one phase to the next (Horberry, Burgess-
Limerick et al., 2010). A simplified relationship of the role of the end user and 
manufacturer to the asset lifecycle is depicted in figure 1.4. 
!
!  
Figure 1.4: The relationship of the end-user and manufacturer in the asset 
lifecycle 
1.3.3 Cost to Improve Safety and the Asset Lifecycle 
This approach is noted to result in increased safety and productivity, through both 
cost reduction and direct productivity increases (Sammarco, Fisher et al., 2001). 
This fits well with general consensus among Human Factors professionals that the 
earlier they are involved in a design project the greater the potential benefit from an 
optimal design.  This is because the ability to make changes becomes more 
constrained throughout the asset lifecycle (Marcus, 2005). The primary driver behind 
the reduction in the ease/ability to make changes later in the asset lifecycle is that as 
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significant design and development work has already taken place, and if serious 
human-system interface problems subsequently emerge the cost of changes and 
retro-fits is likely be considerable (Hendrick, 2003). The cost of these changes or 
retrofits are regularly several orders of magnitude larger than if they had been made 
earlier in the Asset Lifecycle (MacLeod 2003; Gambatese, 2008). !
Hendrick states claims that appropriate consideration of Human Factors consumes 
1% of the design budget when brought in at the start of the project and 12% if 
brought in after the system is in operation (Hendrick, 2003). Figure 1.5, adapted 
from the lifecycle costing guideline published by NSW Treasury (2004), depicts this 
concept: 
!  
Figure 1.5: Ease and cost to make change across the asset lifecycle 
!
Furthermore, a significant amount of the available projects funds are committed 
during the concept and design stages.  Miles and Swift (1998) contend that this is up 
to 80% of the available funds.  Therefore, if human factors is considered late in the 
design process, after strategic decisions have been made and resources committed, 
meaning that the cost to make any change will increase the required budget 
dramatically (Dul and Neumann, 2005).  This implies that if human factors concerns 
are not explicitly considered early in the design of equipment it is unlikely that there 
will be funds available for changing designs and the product will enter the 
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marketplace with many flaws unchanged.  Therefore, some human factors related 
changes later in the asset lifecycle are not just costly but financially impossible. 
!
Certainly there is a feeling within the human factors community that often human 
factors professionals are not appropriately included in the early phases of design.  
Marsot (2005) described the problem well in the following quote: 
!
“The inevitable problems that arise during these stages, combined with the 
difficulty or even absence of communication between the engineering 
specialists and those representing different disciplines such as ergonomics, 
can produce an adverse and/or unpredictable impact on satisfying such 
needs, especially those associated with occupational risk prevention. These 
needs are indeed often perceived as design constraints... and are 
consequently addressed only at the end of the design process through the 
adoption of remedial measures embodying compromises, which can 
subsequently turn out to contradict operational needs” (Marsot, 2005, p.186). 
!
Therefore, when making changes to equipment later in the Asset Lifecycle only 
minor adaptations and corrections can be made and human factors is experienced 
as a time-consuming and costly activity. In such situations, the potential of 
ergonomics to contribute positively to the design is limited (Dul and Neumann, 2009).  
This would seem to indicate that the focus of human factors methods should be early 
in the Asset Lifecycle and primarily during the concept and design stages.  
1.3.4 The Paradox of Human Factors and the Asset Lifecycle 
Unfortunately, many factors not known during design, are important for clearly 
understanding the effect of human factors related interventions (MacLeod, 2003). As 
stated by Hale et al:  !
“Many safety related decisions depend on detailed knowledge about the 
design object; knowledge which is not available until the design has matured 
to a certain degree” (Hale, Kirwan et al., 2007, p. 311). !
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Furthermore, even once the design of the object is known there is still uncertainty 
about the context of use, such as the physical working environment, the skill and 
attitude of the persons involved and other work demands such as time pressure. 
Therefore, whilst effects of appropriate human factors changes earlier in the Asset 
Lifecycle can be both more effective and less costly, it is more difficult to accurately 
predict the eventual consequence at this stage (Hendrick, 2003). This has been 
labelled the ‘paradox of design ergonomics’ where accurate expression based on a 
work situation must wait until that situation is fully designed, yet by then it will be too 
late to intervene in its design (Marsot, 2005). This concept is shown in figure 1.6. 
Therefore, for complex pieces of equipment it is timely to consider safety across 
entire asset lifecycles, including into the next generations of equipment.  
!  
Figure 1.6: The certainty of consequences and effect changes across the asset 
lifecycle.  
1.4 Research Questions  
The broad focus of this thesis is the practical application of human factors in the 
mining industry.  The goal is to learn about the effectiveness and acceptance of a 
variety of methods when applied to mobile mining equipment to help shape a future 
direction of human factors professionals working in the mining and, ultimately, deliver 
intrinsically safer equipment. In a practical sense this was done by the application of 
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a wide range of human factors methods in 3 case studies presented in individual 
chapters. Each of these case studies have specific research questions. 
!
The research questions for Chapter 2 are: 
1. What can be learnt about injuries associated with mobile mining equipment from 
recoding mining injury narratives with a focus of human tasks using the constant 
comparative method? 
2. What is revealed by transforming the recoded injury narratives as a search tool 
with a graphical output for specific areas of focus? 
!
The research questions for Chapter 3 are: 
3. When the Critical Decision Method is used with mobile mining equipment 
operators what does it reveal about incidents that were previously unknown? 
4. What is learnt by using The Decision Ladder to represent the cognitive process 
of mobile mining equipment operators at the time they were involved in an 
incident that can be used to make design recommendations? 
!
The research questions for Chapter 4 are: 
5. When human factors methods are applied to proximity detection systems in 
mobile mining equipment what design recommendations to prevent collisions 
emerge? 
6. What can be learnt about the accuracy and effectiveness of design 
recommendations to prevent collisions at mines by investigating a real collision? 
7. When design changes in a proximity detection system for mobile mining 
equipment based on human factors methods are implemented what can be 
learnt from investigating their acceptance by mobile mining equipment 
operators? 
!
The above research questions represent the application of over a dozen human 
factors methods each already applied to either different domains or issues.  The 
following sections will detail the thesis structure including the contents of each case 
study in more detail. 
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1.5 Thesis structure 
The research presented in this thesis consists of three studies that employ diverse 
human factors methods to identify and improve the safe design of mobile mining 
equipment. Together, they show that a user-centred design approach can be 
beneficial at several different stages of the mining equipment. Figure 1.7 illustrates 
the overall thesis structure. 
!
!  
Figure 1.7: Thesis Structure 
!
In Chapter 2, injury narrative data obtained from surface coal mines in Australia were 
examined for human factors issues that had not previously been coded or analysed, 
such as involvement of mobile equipment, type of equipment and task being 
performed. The codes for each category were built using the constant comparative 
method. These data were then presented using a graphical multivariable method. 
Together, the coding and visual representation showed that dominant human factors 
issues emerged with differing pieces of equipment, allowing targeted efforts to 
improve safety to occur. For example, equipment access and egress was frequently 
found to be an injury risk factor. 
!
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Chapter 3 documents the analysis of in-depth interviews with nine experienced 
mining equipment operators. The mining equipment operators were previously 
involved in mobile equipment incidents. The interviews used the Critical Decision 
Method (CDM). The subsequent analysis of the CDM data employed the use of a 
model of decision making called the Decision Ladder. These techniques were used 
to better understand the cognitive demands of operating mobile equipment in a 
complex mining environment. The chapter shows that both how these methods can 
give a deeper understanding of how mining operators make decisions, but also how 
the results of the incident investigations can easily be turned into specific and 
targeted design suggestions. 
!
Chapter 4 details a multiple-method study of prototype in-vehicle proximity detection 
technology employed in Australian underground gold mine. The goal of the proximity 
detection systems was to give operator information about the surrounding equipment 
in an attempt to improve operator decision-making and thus prevent vehicle-to-
vehicle collisions. A range of human factors methods were employed, including 
measurement of system constraints, usability audits, direct observations of operator 
behaviour, interviews and a survey regarding operator acceptance of the technology. 
The results identified deficiencies with the overall effectiveness of the prototype 
proximity detection system and other controls implemented to prevent collisions. An 
investigation of a subsequent collision at the mine site verified many of these 
revealed issues. Some of the recommendations for system improvement were 
deployed in a revised version of the proximity detection device: a subsequent 
evaluation involving drivers found the system changes to be positive. 
!
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis. It summarises the results of the three studies,and 
how the obtained findings link to, and build on, previous research. A potential path 
forwards for human factors and equipment design is then described. This path may 
help future researchers to continue to progress human factors research and 
development work in mining. More specifically, contributions to knowledge obtained 
by applying diverse human factors methods in this thesis can point towards what 
types of methods and issues should be targeted to help improve the safe design of 
the next generations of mining equipment.  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Chapter 2 
Injury Narrative Analysis as Human Factors Tool 
Abstract 
Analysis of injury narrative data obtained from surface coal mines in Australia was 
undertaken using two complimentary methods.  In the first method, the injury 
narratives were examined to look at a number of human factors issues that had not 
previously been coded, such as involvement of mobile equipment, type of equipment 
and task being performed.  The codes for each category were built using the 
constant comparative method.  Key results included that mobile equipment was 
associated with the majority of injuries in this domain; that the majority of injuries 
happened during operation; and that access/egress injuries were a significant issue. 
!
The data were then presented using a graphical multivariable method that allows the 
dominant relationships to be visually identified in the resulting figures. The variables 
can be combined in various ways to accommodate different goals. Three 
perspectives were identified to assess the utility of the visual interrogation in 
identifying specific goals. In each case, issues could be identified which included 
task and environment related information. This included specific task and location 
patterns for access and egress, task and mechanism injury patterns during operation 
and priority patterns for a team of bulldozer designers. 
!
The multivariable technique allows identification of operator-centred issues and 
consequently can be considered a useful human factors technique.  It is likely that a 
more specific focus for further investigation will lead to improved effectiveness of 
interventions.  A number of the issues identified are the subject of subsequent 
chapters.  
!
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2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 When Injuries are Routinely Recorded in Mining 
While incidents resulting in serious consequences are subject to detailed 
investigation, the reporting of less serious injuries includes a one to two sentence 
description of the circumstances.  This is referred to here as the injury narrative.  
Whilst the narratives are recorded and reported to government agencies and/or 
workers’ compensation insurers, it is uncommon for any further analysis of the 
narratives to be undertaken (although see Burgess-Limerick, 2011 for exceptions). It 
may be that analysing injury narratives to categorise variables such as mobile 
equipment, task being performed, location of equipment and injury mechanism could 
assist in identifying specific user-centred equipment design changes. To examine 
this question, five years of injury narratives reported by Australian surface coal mines 
were analysed in this chapter. A number of analytical techniques were applied with 
the goal of allowing user centred interrogation following a data coding procedure.  
2.1.2 Relationship to the Asset Lifecycle 
The incident data obtained are, by definition, from equipment in operation.  This 
means that the primary role of data analysis is to consider modifications to the 
design, operation and training in relation to current equipment.  It also provides a 
secondary role, in feeding key issues with past designs into the concept and design 
of future equipment models (Moore, Porter et al, 2009).  These roles and their 
relationship to the Asset Lifecycle can be seen in Figure 2.1: 
!  
Figure 2.1: Relationship of the injury narrative analysis to the asset lifecycle 
!
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2.1.3 Reasons to Review Incident and Injury Data 
2.1.3.1 User-Centred Classifications 
The analysis of injury data reflects the goals of the analyst. In most industries this is 
usually an insurer interested in broad trends (Maiti and Bhattacherjee, 1999).  This 
broad approach has commonly occurred in mining.  For example, Mati and 
Bhattacherjee’s (1999) review of coal mining injuries looked at individual factors 
(age, experience and occupation) as well as broad factors (mine type and location 
within mine). Government agencies typically report trends over time (eg. lost time 
injuries to different body parts). 
!
These analyses serve a purpose; however, they are not overly useful to those 
seeking to manage injury risks. Interventions based upon broad trends involve 
significant assumptions and guesswork, and their effectiveness almost impossible to 
determine (Salmon, Stanton et al., 2011). Instead, the identification of specific high 
risk sources of injuries would allow more effective intervention. A subsequent change 
in the narrative trends can also provide a measure the effectiveness of interventions.  
For example, changes to injury narrative trends were used to measure slip and fall 
injuries in hospitals due to a broad-scale intervention (Bell, Collins et al., 2008).  Not 
only was the analysis able to determine the overall effectiveness of the program, but 
also the effect the program was having on different sources of falls, allowing future 
interventions to be targeted accordingly. 
!
Despite the possible benefits, the classification of large quantities of data that 
includes human, equipment and environment interactions is under-utilised in 
occupational health and safety (Shephard, Kahler et al, 2000).  Even studies that 
have specifically considered task factors can be too broad give a specific focus to 
further analysis and intervention.  For example, Williamson et al coded the 
mechanism of occupational fatalities in Australia, New Zealand and the USA but 
were only able to give broad areas of focus such as ‘electrocution’ in Australia or 
‘drowning’ in New Zealand (Williamson, Feyer et al., 2001).  Focusing on an industry 
is likely to give a more useful result.  
!
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The injury narratives reported by mining companies typically provide sufficient detail 
to determine the equipment involved, location of person on the equipment, task 
being performed, and mechanism of injury.  These represent three components of 
the cycle of human factors: namely equipment, task and unsuccessful performance 
(Wickens, Lee et al., 2003).  The cycle of human factors is shown in Figure 2.2 with 
the components where it is anticipated that more information can be gained from 
reviewing the injury narratives underlined. 
!  
Figure 2.2: The Cycle of Human Factors with the elements available in the 
injury narratives highlighted– Adapted from Wickens, Lee et al. (2003) 
2.1.3.2 Target Further Analysis with Hazard Patterns 
From the above it can be seen that many elements of the lifecycle cannot be drawn 
from the narratives.  In fact, the elements within human and system usually require 
application of specialist analytical techniques.  Therefore, it is unlikely that problems 
and solutions can be confidently and fully determined without further analysis.  
However, it may be that by including analysis of narratives with the components of 
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the cycle of human factors that are available, it would be possible to focus the 
application of other techniques.  For example, if the narratives can target a location 
on a piece of equipment where a mechanism of injury commonly occurs within a 
particular task, any further analysis that does occur can be highly targeted and 
efficient.  Others have successfully achieved similar user-centred insights by 
reviewing the originally recorded text before it is hidden by a coding system (Lincoln, 
Sorock et al., 2004). 
!
There are some examples of injury narrative analysis in mining that have provided 
useful results.  For example, Helander et al (1983) conducted a review of 
underground hard rock mining injuries adding previously unclassified elements, such 
as machine part and body part involved, and this analysis was  successful in 
highlighting specific issues requiring priority attention (Helander, Krohn et al., 1983).  
Randolph and Bolt (1997) were similarly able to identify issues of priority in surface 
haulage accidents. However, not all the user-centred categories were considered in 
any of the previous reviews.  Additionally, the analyses that do exist in surface 
mining are now dated and not specific to Australia.  The injury profile that remains 
may be different, especially considering western mining injury rates have fallen 
significantly over the last decade and a half, especially in Australia (Poplin, Miller et 
al., 2008).  For these reasons it is timely to review the injury data in surface coal 
mining to determine if previously identified issues remain a priority or if other trends 
are emerging. 
!
Some of the most useful information comes from being able to layer multiple levels 
of information to create more specific hazard scenarios. Drury and Brill (1983) 
described these as ‘hazard patterns’, combining elements of the person, product, 
environment and task, and claimed the interrelationship of these factors means this 
type of review became a useful human factors method. Although this technique is 
under-utilised, it has been used to successfully in various high hazard occupational 
environments such as military transport (Lincoln, Sorock et al., 2004), civil 
construction (Bondy, Lipscomb et al., 2005) and farming (Bunn, Slavova et al., 
2008).  Table 2.1 shows a visualisation of how adding multiple, user-centred, layers 
when considering surface mining equipment can draw the focus for further analysis; 
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in this case falling from a side platform.  The extra layers make it obvious that if 
injuries are occurring in this area, changing the fall protection method appears an 
obvious solution. 
!
Table 2.1: Example of how layering categories focuses on a hazard pattern   
!
There are some recent reviews that looked for ‘hazard patterns’ on underground coal 
mining equipment.  Burgess Limerick (2011) identified specific priority issues by 
combining equipment type, injury mechanism and activity being undertaken.  For 
example, cable handling on bolters / continuous miners is significantly associated 
with strain injuries.  Additionally, infrequent but potentially high consequence events 
were also identified.  Most of these were around mobile mining equipment contacting 
people.  Burgess-Limerick & Steiner (2006) have found similar utility and results 
related to underground coal mining equipment in an earlier Australian Study (2006) 
and in the USA (2007).  Figure 2.3 shows how Burgess-Limerick et al previously 
layered data to reveal ‘hazard patterns’. 
1 Layer 2 Layers 3 Layers 4 Layers
Equipment:  
Haul Truck
Equipment:  
Haul Truck
Equipment:  
Haul Truck
Equipment:  
Haul Truck
Location:  Platforms/
Decks
Location:  Platforms/
Decks
Location:  Platforms/
Decks
Task:  
Cleaning
Task:  
Cleaning
Mechanism:  
Slip/Trip
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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!Figure 2.3: Hazard Patterns in Underground Mining Equipment 
!
There may even be hints in some of the narratives about what human factors 
methods or design changes could be trialled.  For example, Steiner and Burgess-
Limerick (2006) found that a significant cause of roof or rib bolting accidents came 
from ‘caught between’ injuries which, in turn, could be associated with the design of 
the operator controls.  This information could be used to inform immediate 
modification on existing equipment such as, for example, guarding controls from 
inadvertent operation, or redesigning controls to reduce the probability of selection or 
direction errors.  These findings prompted subsequent research to examine the 
effect of different variables in the design roof bolting controls, such as coding, 
spacing and directional compatibility, and mitigating control measures (Steiner, 
Burgess-Limerick et al, 2013)   
2.1.3.3 Determine if Access and Egress Remains a Priority Issue 
Previous investigations related to mining have found that getting into position to 
perform a work task (access) or exiting the area of a task performance (egress) has 
been associated with injuries.  For example, Moore, Porter & Dempsey (2009) found 
that in the calendar years 2006 and 2007 nearly half of the injuries recorded in the 
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Mine Safety and Health Administration (USA) were associated with access/egress.  
The majority of these were associated with mobile mining equipment and 
approximately three quarters during egress.  This has been a continuing issue for the 
mining industry.  For example, Randolph and Boldt (1997) found that in the USA 
mining industry from 1989-1991 more than a quarter of all accidents were associated 
with access/egress: more than all injuries associated with maintenance tasks. 
!
Therefore, it would seem likely that access/egress would be associated with mobile 
mining equipment injuries within the narrative.  However, in recent years access and 
egress from mobile equipment has received considerable attention from the industry.   
Some have noted that this attention is manifesting in design changes to the 
equipment: 
!
“Manufacturers have provided better walkways, handrails, and no-slip 
surfaces. Manufacturers have also improved access points for maintenance 
tasks that can now often be done at ground level. Some mines are even 
starting to put aftermarket stairs on their equipment. However, problems still 
exist with access around the cab (cleaning windows) and to maintenance 
areas (changing filters).” (Moore, Porter et al, 2009, p.4). 
!
It is likely that at least some these design changes have caused a drop in the risks 
associated with access and egress.  This may have resulted in a decrease in injury 
rates, to the point where it is no longer a priority issue.  There appears to be some 
preliminary indication that a drop may have occurred with one study in the USA 
showing raw access and egress injury rates in 1988-1997 more than twice as high 
as study that reviewed rates in 2006-2007 (Wiehagen & Jaspal, 2001; Moore, Porter 
et al., 2009). Whilst the methods for the two studies differ, such a large change could 
provide an indication that the circumstances may have altered. 
!
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2.1.4 Limitation of Injury Narrative Analysis 
Analysis of incident and injury reports has limitations that should be noted. 
2.1.4.1 Omissions and Inaccuracy in Data Recording 
There is no guarantee that the person who wrote the narrative was in full possession 
of the facts or did not make an error.  For example, an injured person must correctly 
recall the event and feel motivated to report it accurately.  Commonly the injured 
person may tell the story to a third party, such as a safety officer or shift manager, 
who may misinterpret the employee’s story. Even when the narrative is accurate, key 
information may be omitted or vague because the recorder was required to make a 
judgement about what information is important to record (Randolph & Boldt, 1997). 
Kletz (2009) found that injury narratives were usually accurate in their description of 
the immediate event; however, the causal information provided was inaccurate and 
incomplete, potentially leading to multiple interpretations. The possibility of this 
occurring in the injury narratives used is increased due to their general brevity and 
general lack of industry knowledge of human factors issues related to design.  
!
Primary causes/sources of accidents have been included in other injury narrative 
analysis (Lincoln, Sorock et al., 2004; Patterson & Shappell, 2010).  If detailed 
reports were to be analysed, such as fatality reports, it might be possible to use 
human error classification tools such as Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS) coding system (Patterson, 2008) or Incident Cause Analysis 
Method (I-CAM).  The application of HFACS in relation to serious incident in mining 
has shown, unsurprisingly, that various human factor issues were evident.  This 
includes organisational influences, unsafe supervision, preconditions for unsafe acts 
and, eventually, the unsafe acts themselves (Patterson, 2008; Patterson & Shappell, 
2010; Salmon, Stanton et al., 2011). 
!
However, in shorter injury narratives there is usually not enough information to 
determine a primary source or cause. It is also an oversimplification to state a single 
cause and it is often impossible to separate human performance limitation and a 
design that ‘forced’ or ‘promoted’ an error (Randolph, 1997; Dekker, 2006). Instead, 
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the analysis focussed on information, such as task being performed and equipment 
type, which is unlikely to be omitted or entered in error.   
!
Additionally, whilst the application of HFACS in mining has provided evidence that 
human factors methods would likely be useful when applied to appropriate issues, it 
provides limited guidance as to where equipment design initiatives should be 
targeted.  The proposed countermeasures in this regard are noted to be general, 
with the only recommendation specifically noting equipment stating ‘evaluation/
redesign of equipment prone to violations’ (Salmon, Stanton et al., 2011). In contrast, 
the classification of the user-centred information, as is proposed here, is likely to 
allow issues of priority for deeper analysis to emerge.  The appropriate method can 
then be matched with the issue, leading to recommendations targeted at direct 
causes and, ultimately, equipment design improvements with a greater chance of 
success. 
2.1.4.2 Overall Trends only Determine Frequency 
Another limitation is that, due to the detail involved, the method can only look at the 
overall frequency of hazard patterns without adjusting for the exposure or potential 
consequence.  Whilst knowing the overall frequency of incidents can be useful, this 
does not indicate the true risk associated with a specific occupational task (Lincoln, 
Sorock et al., 2004). Burgess-Limerick found that in his injury narrative analysis it 
was necessary to individually highlight infrequent events that have an obviously high 
potential consequence, such as fatality or permanent serious injury because they 
would be hidden by only considering incident frequency (Burgess-Limerick, 2011).   
!
However, this does not mean that the frequently occurring incidents associated with 
frequently occurring situations are less valid.  On the contrary, the incidents are 
occurring frequently and can be considered a priority.  Rather, it means that ignoring 
other major potential issues, simply because of their low frequency in relationship to 
historical injuries, is not valid.  Therefore, this method can only highlight some priority 
issues and not unequivocally rule out others from investigation. 
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2.2 Aim 
The primary aim of this chapter is to identify specific human factors issues that 
warrant further analysis.  In the following chapters some of the identified issues will 
be analysed using alternative methods that lead to design deficiencies being 
identified and addressed through redesign.  The secondary aim of this chapter is to 
reveal that exploration of more specific incident-related information, by combining 
multiple variables, allows tends to emerge that both allow specific identification of 
issues for future analysis and cater for a variety of perspectives. 
2.3 Method 
2.3.1 Dataset 
The dataset obtained for analysis was open cut injury narratives between financial 
years from 2005-2009 provided to Coal Services Pty Ltd (Coal Service), the sole 
worker’s compensation insurance provider to the New South Wales (NSW) Coal 
Industry. NSW is an Australian state which produces approximately 200 Million 
tonnes of coal a year which is approximately half of Australia's coal production (NSW 
Minerals Council Ltd, 2012). 
!
All coal industry employees in NSW must have workers compensation insurance 
cover from Coal Mines Insurance Pty Limited (CMI), a subsidiary of Coal Services.  If 
a worker sustains an injury, the employer must notify CMI within 48 hours by 
submitting an accident/incident form. On the form the employer is asked to “describe 
how the incident occurred” providing space for a short description of approximately 1 
to 2 sentences.  The box provided on the form is shown in Figure 2.5: 
!  
Figure 2.4: Box for the employer’s description of injury provided to the insurer.  
!
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The dataset is comprised of the employer’s response to the above question within 
the 5 year timeframe of analysis. The only other available data were the date of 
registration, presumably with 48 hours of the injury occurrence, and whether the 
injury resulted in time lost from work.  Table 2.2 shows a sample of incidents taken 
from the beginning of the 2008-2009 financial year:  
Table 2.2: Illustrative example from the dataset of injury narratives
!
Date 
Registered
Time 
Lost
Incident Description
1/07/2008 N
DRIVING 930E DUMP TRUCK ON HAUL ROAD WHEN HE DROVE OVER A SOFT 
SPOT. HIS SEAT BOUNCED AND HE FELT A STRAIN TO HIS LEFT KNEE.
1/07/2008 N
HE WAS SETTING UP A STEERING Y PIECE WHEN FITTING STEERING PIN HE 
WAS TAPPING IT INTO PLACE WITH A HAMMER AND A FRAGMENT FLEW OFF 
AND LODGED IN HIS NOSE – PUNCTURE WOUND
1/07/2008 N
WHILE HE WAS OPERATING  WHEEL LOADER ON COAL ROM HE STRAINED 
HIS NECK
1/07/2008 N
HE WAS OPERATING GRADER ON ROADS FOR HALF DAY AND AT END OF 
SHIFT HE STRAINED HIS RIGHT SHOULDER.
1/07/2008 N
WHILE WELDING IN A RESTRICTED AREA BENDING OVER IN A TWISTED AREA 
FOR A PERIOD OF TIME HE STRAINED HIS LOWER BACK
2/07/2008 Y
WHEN HE WAS CLIMBING DOWN LADDER ON REAR DUMP TRUCK, HE 
STEPPED OFF THE LADDER AND ROLLED HIS RIGHT ANKLE ON UNEVEN 
GROUND, CAUSING A SPRAIN TO HIS LEFT ANKLE.
2/07/2008 Y
HE WAS CLEANING TOP OF A DILUTE SUMP WITH A HIGH PRESSURE HOSE 
AND PLACED THE ONSE ON HAND RAIL. HE WAS STEPPING DOWN THE 
LADER WHEN HIS FOOT SLIPPED ON THE RUNG, STRAINING HIS RIGHT 
SHOULDER.
2/07/2008 Y
WHEN HE STEPPED OUT OF THE VEHICLE HE WAS TRAVELLING IN HE 
TWISTED HIS L/KNEE ON LOOSE GRAVEL – STRAIN                                                                                                                                          
2/07/2008 Y
HE WAS RIDING HIS MOTORCYCLE TO WORK WHEN A LARGE KANGAROO 
JUMPED OUT OF LONG GRASS INTO HIS PATHWAY HE HIT THE KANGAROO  
CAUSING A SUPERFICIAL LACERATION TO HIS RIGHT KNEE                              
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2.3.2 Data Classification Procedure 
This is the first data analysis of this type in surface mining, and consequently neither 
the categories nor the options within the categories existed at the beginning of the 
analysis.  The constant comparative method was used to develop the coding 
strategy (Glaser, 1965).  Rather than beginning with a theory, data are collected and 
marked with a series of codes (Boeije, 2002). These codes are grouped into 
categories which can be used to create a hypothesis (Ragin, 1989). 
!
From a review of the narratives it was determined that information could be extracted 
in seven user-centred categories grouped under the headings of equipment, task 
and accident, as is shown in Figure 2.6.  Those under ‘equipment’ and ‘task’ 
represent extra information with the equipment and task design elements of the 
human factors performance cycle (Wickens, Lee et al., 2003). The elements under 
‘accident’ represent extra information related to the unsuccessful performance 
element of the cycle (see Figure 2.2 for the cycle). 
   
!
Figure 2.5: Categories considered in review under appropriate element of the 
human factors performance cycle     
!
The first code was a screening question asking if mobile mining equipment was 
involved (see Table 2.3).  Injury narratives that did not relate to mobile equipment 
were discarded from subsequent analysis.  Injuries related to travel to or from work 
were also identified and discarded. 
Equipment Task Accident
1 
Type of Equipment
3 
Activity Category
5 
Body Part Injured
2 
Location on Equipment
4 
Task being Performed
6 
Injury Mechanism
7 
Lost Time 
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Table 2.3: Screening question for relevance to the scope of inquiry 
!
Under each category, a number of codes – answers to the question posed – were 
developed and iteratively refined.  This required re-checking the data on multiple 
occasions.  In the creation of the codes the author had to be mindful that they were 
specific enough to be useful in focusing attention on particular issues, but not so 
specific that trends could not emerge.  A flowchart of the coding process is shown in 
Figure 2.7. 
!
!  
Figure 2.6: Flowchart of how user-centred categories for injury narratives were 
considered including iterative changes to codes 
!
SCREENING QUESTION
Was mobile mining equipment involved?
Yes No
Travel to or from work Not Specified
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The following is the full list of categories and final codes used in the categorisation of 
the injury narratives:  
!
!
!
!
1: Type of Equipment
What type of equipment was involved?
Haul Truck Bulldozer
Grader/Scraper Water Truck
Light Vehicles (Troup Carriers, Utes, etc) Wheel Loader
Truck (not haul – smaller) Dragline
Drill Excavator
Other Unknown
CATEGORY2:  Location on Equipment
Where was the person positioned on the equipment?
Not Specified Other
Operator Cabin Platforms/Decks/Operational Controls/Mirrors
Ladder Access Stair Access
Doorway Unspecified or Implied Point Operational Access/Egress
Engine/Filters/Engine Covers/Brakes Chains/Slings/Ropes
Bucket/Blade/Supports/Trusses/Masts Cables/Hoses
Tyres/Wheels Trailer / Tray
On Tracks
CATEGORY 3: Activity Category
What Category of task?
Operation
Maintenance
Access/Egress
!33
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
CATEGORY 4: Task being Performed
What task was the person performing?
Driving or General Operation Driving – Reverse
Loading / Being Loaded Dumping
Grading/Digging/Shovelling Access
Egress Access/Egress (not specified which)
Control Operation Repair
Filling (eg Oil, Fuel, Liquids) Part Removal or Installation
Inspection Cleaning
Lifting Unknown
CATEGORY 5: Body Part Injured
What body part was most significantly injured?
Head – Face Head – Other
Lower Arm (elbow, forearm, wrist, hand) Upper Arm (Including shoulder)
Lower Leg (inducing foot) Knee
Upper Leg (Including hip and thigh) Lower back (Lumbar)
Upper Back (Thoracic) Torso – Not back
Neck (Cervical) Lungs / Respiratory System
Psychological Other
!34
!!
!
2.3.3 Single Variable Analysis 
The categories, without combination, allow some initial questions to be answered 
that can generally help prioritise further investigations.  Six basic questions were 
asked using a single category and dividing the category into a pie chart of codes.  It 
was anticipated this could determine some broad trends, some of which are user-
centred, which might warrant increased focus.  The questions, and the justification of 
asking them, are given below. 
!
Q1. Does mobile mining equipment warrant priority investigation?  If so, what type(s) 
of equipment is highest priority? 
Making changes to mobile mining equipment, and its context of operation, can be 
extremely time-consuming and costly for a mine.  Therefore, for the topic of this 
thesis to be a valid line of investigation, logically it must first be shown that mobile 
mining equipment is significantly associated with injuries in mining.   
CATEGORY 6: Injury Mechanism
What was the mechanism of injury?
Hit Rock Driving Hit Pothole/Roadway Issue Driving
Rock or Excessive Load Dropped into Tray or on 
Headboard
Contact with other Mobile Equipment
Struck By Bump Into
Overexertion Slip/Trip
Strained Caught between
Electrocuted Dust or small foreign body
Burn Loss of vehicle control – Whole vehicle
Loss of vehicle control – Part vehicle Hard surface digging jarring vehicle
Unknown
CATEGORY 7: Lost Time   
Did the injury result in Lost time?
Yes
No
!35
!
There is a variety of mobile mining equipment used on site to perform different tasks 
associated with drilling, loading and transporting soil and ore.  Each type of 
equipment has a distinct design and associated tasks.  Whilst issues may be similar, 
solutions are not immediately transferable.  Therefore, it would seem prudent to 
determine if any categories of equipment are worthy of priority, based on the injury 
narrative analysis. 
!
Q2. Does the relationship between lost time injuries and mobile mining equipment 
support investigating it as a priority? 
Of course, the above question can only help determine that mobile mining equipment 
appears heavily involved in accident.  It does not state anything about the 
seriousness of the accidents involving and not involving mobile mining equipment.  
Furthermore, as the narratives are submitted around the time claimed, they cannot 
point to the long term prognosis of any injuries.  Therefore, from the injury narratives 
it is difficult to determine absolute severity of injury. 
!
However, there is one raw measure included that could be indicative of the severity 
of accidents: whether the injury required time off work or whether the worker was 
able to continue at work.  Therefore, by dividing the narratives into those associated, 
or not associated, with mobile mining equipment and then comparing the percentage 
of incidents that resulted in lost time in each category, the narrative will give some 
indication of the relative severity of the injury.  If mobile mining equipment has a 
comparable or higher rate of lost time injuries, then this is some indication that the 
severity of injuries warrants its inclusion. 
!
Q.3 Does a person’s location on the equipment indicate any areas of priority 
investigation? 
The location on a particular piece of equipment is a category not regularly recorded 
in injury narrative analysis.  However, in the majority of cases in the narrative, the 
location can be determined directly or inferred.  By adding location on equipment to 
the analysis, the focus on specific design aspects is tightened.  If particular, if parts 
of equipment are related to trends, then they can be further examined.   
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Q.4 Do some tasks or mechanisms warrant priority review?  
Generally, the task being performed has been unclassified in analysis of injuries.  
The injury narratives appeared likely to identify a task that was being performed 
during injury.  Additionally, the individual tasks could be further classified into their 
broad association with operations, maintenance or access/egress.  If specific tasks 
emerge in each of these categories, they can be identified as warranting more 
scrutiny.  The more traditionally recorded mechanism of injury is still valid to review, 
and determine, if any mechanisms occur more commonly than others. 
!
Q.5 Does the location of injury on the body give priority areas to investigate? 
In the majority of injury narratives the location on a person’s body has been 
identified.  This is an example of a factor that, on its own does not reveal useful 
information to an equipment designer or manager.  For example, it might allow a 
person to determine that “mobile mining equipment is most commonly associated 
with back and hand injuries”.  Whist this is only a theoretical example it does show 
how, on its own, this information could lead a user to broad based initiatives, such as 
manual handling training for back injuries and glove wearing policies for hand 
injuries.  However, without more knowledge about the cause of these injuries the 
effectiveness of such programs is, at best, a guess. 
!
Rather, body location information is much more useful in combination with other 
variables.  For example, if information about task and injury mechanism is combined 
with the body part information, then the investigator would start to have useful 
information which could target some specific issues more likely to lead to design 
related interventions.   
!
Q.6 Does access/egress remain a priority issue to address? 
As noted above, previous analysis data in mining had determined that access and 
egress is a significant issue related to mining equipment.  This has resulted in 
various training, awareness and design strategies.  Both due to the time, and the 
potential for design changes to fundamentally change the tasks related to access 
and egress, historical data cannot be relied upon.  Therefore, if access and egress 
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remains an issue, this review should give some indication that access and egress 
still warrant further analysis and elevate attention. 
2.3.4 Narrative Multivariable Analysis  
The above basic methods, however useful, can only give a rather broad focus.  
Other applications using less-task based but none-the-less similar approaches have 
not given any specific issue where further investigation or design solutions would be 
warranted (Kecojevic & Radomsky, 2004; Kecojevic, Komlijenovic et al., 2007).  
Others have found that combining factors in injury narrative analysis can reveal more 
specific issues to address than when they are considered alone (Burgess-Limerick, 
2011). In fact, of the many models of human factors, all stress that it is the 
combination of a number of factors that affects real world performance. As was noted 
above, the seven codes come from three different levels of the human factors 
performance cycle. By including this level of detail, especially information about task, 
mechanism and location, the data can be manipulated to specific perspectives and 
associated investigatory goals. 
!
A multivariable analysis will be undertaken to reveal emergent trends.  In order 
demonstrate how the technique could be used, the multivariate analysis will take a 
perspective of key roles in the mining industry and follow a narrative as the data are 
examined.  Whilst the persons are fictionalised, they do represent an actual 
perspective/role in the mining industry.  Therefore, the lines of inquiry are realistic 
and possible. The persons are: 
!
A. A Safety Officer charged with reducing the risk and number of access/egress 
related injuries at surface mines through targeted initiatives. 
B. A Mine Manager at a typical mine searching for some specific initiatives to 
target for improved safety of mobile equipment. 
C. A Lead Design Engineer for a manufacturer of bulldozers who wants to learn 
specific areas where current designs could be improved in next generation 
bulldozers. 
!
With seven categories, there is a number of ways to combine the variables.  In this 
case the method was to first constrain the list of injury narratives by the selection of a 
!38
code within a category.  For example, the Lead Design Engineer would only be 
interested in injury narratives associated with bulldozers. Then, within the 
constrained narratives, two categories are selected for comparison.  
!
This comparison was done by mapping using Circos; a graphical presentation tool 
which was originally designed to visualise similarities and differences in genomes 
(Krzywinski, Schein et al., 2009). It uses a circular layout with interconnecting 
ribbons between two sets of codes.  Each set of codes is given half of the outside of 
the circle.  The area of each code around the outside of the circle represents its 
relative size.  A ribbon connects two codes in different categories with the thickness 
of the ribbon representing the relative size of the relationship.  How the chart is 
constructed is shown in Figure 2.7. 
!
!  
Figure 2.7: How a Circos graph is constructed (Krzywinski, 2011). 
!
The resulting figure displays a number of pie charts in the one image, allowing them 
to be compared immediately and relatively.  Whilst the tool is only visual, certain 
relationships appear larger and are therefore immediately obvious (Krzywinski, 
Schein et al., 2009). Larger visual relationships were selected and interpreted to 
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determine specific focus for further analysis.  If successful, it shows how multiple 
layers of injury narrative trends can be explored graphically and target future 
analysis.  This transfers from simply a reporting of broad trends into a human factors 
investigatory tool that can be used in field and participatory settings. 
2.4 Results: Basic Questions 
2.4.1 Does Mobile Mining Equipment warrant priority investigation?  If so, what 
type(s) of equipment is highest priority? 
There were 1,965 injuries claims registered with Coal Services in the five year 
period.  Of these, at least 1,112 were associated with mobile mining equipment.  Of 
these, 210 claims were registered for industrial deafness.  Though industrial 
deafness could be associated with mobile mining equipment, and in fact is likely for 
those with a long history in mining, it can rarely be attributed to a specific incident 
(major explosions excepted).  Therefore, these claims have been discarded in the 
total.  Additionally, 132 of the claims involved travel to or from work and were 
discarded.   
!
This leaves approximately two thirds (67.7%) of injuries at NSW surface coal mines 
in the period which were definitely associated with the operation or maintenance of 
mobile mining equipment at the mine site.  3.8% of injuries are possibly related to 
mobile mining equipment, but insufficient information has been provided to definitely 
include them in the count.  This leaves only 28.5% of injuries which were definitely 
not associated with mobile mining equipment.  Therefore, these raw numbers are 
supportive of investigating mobile mining equipment as the key area to improve 
safety in surface coal mining. 
!
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!  
Figure 2.8: The involvement of Mobile Mining Equipment in recorded injuries 
after excluding injuries during travel to an from work. 
!
The breakdown of equipment type is shown in the figure 2.9.  Haul trucks (31.7%) 
and bulldozers (20.8%) make up slightly over half of the injuries logged.  The other 8 
vehicle types range from 8.0% at largest (graders/scrapers) to 2.7% at the smallest 
(excavators). This does not mean that other equipment types are not worth 
investigating.  Rather, it indicates that, without any other knowledge about the 
prevalence of equipment as sites, investigating bulldozers and haul trucks as a 
priority would be justified.  This is logical as haul trucks and bulldozers are the most 
common pieces of equipment used onsite.  The bulk of this thesis has involved 
analysing haul trucks and bulldozers with some analysis of various other types of 
equipment including wheel loaders, drills, graders, light vehicles and excavators. 
!  
Figure 2.9: Injuries associated with different types of Mobile Mining Equipment 
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2.4.2 Does the relationship between lost time injuries and Mobile Mining 
Equipment support investigating it as a priority? 
The ratio of lost time injuries to non-lost time injuries for claims associated or not 
associated with mobile mining equipment are almost identical.  Whilst this measure 
is fairly blunt, it gives no indication that the injuries associated with mobile mining 
equipment are more or less severe as other injuries. This does not weaken the case 
for focusing on mobile mining equipment related injuries. 
!
!
Figure 2.10: Was the claim a Lost Time Injury? 
!
2.4.3 Does a person’s location on equipment indicate any areas of priority 
investigation? 
The first and most obvious note is that nearly half the injuries occurred when the 
injured person was in the operator’s cabin.  Because it is rare for maintenance tasks 
to occur in the cabin, it may be inferred that a significant proportion of injuries occur 
during the operation of equipment.  This is shown in Figure 2.11.  Some information 
is revealed when considering only those injuries outside the operator’s cabin.  Figure 
2.12 illustrates the proportions of all other locations when the operator’s cabin is 
excluded.  The darker shading indicates areas design for access and egress that 
would be required for operations but also used commonly in maintenance.  The light 
shading indicates areas accessed for maintenance where it is less common to have 
designed access and egress points on the equipment.  The white are points that do 
not fit into these categories. 
Claims Associated with  
Mobile Mining Equipment
Claims NOT Associated with  
Mobile Mining Equipment
! !
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!  
Figure 2.11: Injuries in Relation to Operator’s Cabin 
!
!  
Figure 2.12: Injuries for all vehicle locations other than operator’s cabin  
!
One clear result is the seemingly high number of injuries on ladders as opposed to 
stairs.  This difference is interesting as ladders and stairs of industrial equipment are 
usually listed under the same code (Rautiainen, Ledolter et al., 2009; Copley, 
Burnham et al., 2010) even though the tasks involving ladders have been highlighted 
a large cause of injury in previous studies (Moore, Porter et al., 2009). It is difficult to 
determine if this is just the prevalence of stairs compared to ladders. However, 
ladders have been previously determined as relatively riskier than stairs on mining 
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equipment based upon injury rates and time spent in the locations (Albin, Adams et 
al., 1990). 
!
It is for this reason that in recent times many forms of mobile mining equipment, 
especially haul trucks, have changed from access via ladders to access via stairs.  
On the surface this would appear to be indicative that this is warranted and 
investigating ladders and stairways is a justified focus.  When considering 
maintenance tasks those associated with the engine are heavily represented (19%).  
However, the reality is that the tasks and mechanisms across different types of 
equipment are so varied in this area that, on its own, neither this nor any other 
maintenance code give a good indication of where to focus further analysis. 
!
2.4.4 Do some tasks or mechanisms to warrant priority review?  
The mechanism of injury was also determined for each of the narratives.  Figure 2.13 
shows the proportion of associated injury mechanisms that appeared in the 
narratives.  The light shading portion represents mechanisms most likely associated 
with operation while the darker shading represents those associated with access/
egress or maintenance.  Slip and trip appears as the primary mechanism.  Issues 
causing equipment to jerk and bounce, such as hitting potholes or rocks, also appear 
prominently. 
!
Figure 2.14 shows the classification of mobile equipment related narratives into 
tasks.  The tasks in dark-shading are most commonly associated with the operator of 
the equipment from the cab or controls.  The tasks in mid-shading are associated 
with access and egress.  The tasks in light shading are associated with 
maintenance. 
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!  
Figure 2.13: Mechanisms of Injury 
!
!
!  
Figure 2.14: Mobile Equipment Narratives By Task  
!
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In tasks associated with operations there is a relatively even split with only driving 
and grading/digging/shovelling standing out in raw numbers.  However, these are the 
general operational tasks associated with different classifications of equipment.  
Therefore, it may be more specific tasks, such as reversing or loading/being loaded 
which relatively take up much less operational time, which significantly contributed to 
the tasks usually within the operational category.  In short, no specific area of focus 
in operations is gained. 
!
Of the tasks almost exclusively associated with maintenance, part removal/install 
and repair stand out as those worthy of most attention.  This is perhaps unsurprising, 
as they would intuitively be associated with more hazards, especially moving parts 
and manual handling.  This will somewhat assist the analysis but it is suggested that 
more information is needed to identify specific issues that can be addressed through 
design. In tasks commonly associated with access/egress, egress is involved in 
twice as many reported injuries as access.  This is consistent with the previous 
findings of Moore et al (2009). who also found that egress was significantly more 
prevalent which justifies a particular focus on equipment egress. 
!
2.4.5 Does the location of injury on the body give priority areas to investigate? 
Figure 2.15 illustrates the division of injury narratives into specific regions of the 
body.  The darker shading slices are injuries to the lower limbs.  The mid-shading 
slices are injuries to the upper limbs.  The lighter shading slices are injuries around 
the spine.  The white represents all other injures.  The only piece of information that 
is directly taken from the chart is that lower back injuries remain significant in mining.  
However, injuries to other areas are also common.  As noted above, matching these 
body parts with other variables, like task and/or mechanism, will give a clearer 
indication of how the injuries occurred.  However, by itself, information about the part 
of the body which is injured is not a very useful, indicating that combining the 
analysis with other variables is needed. 
!
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!  
Figure 2.15: Injuries to Body Areas with Colour Linking 
2.4.6 Does access/egress remain a priority issue to address? 
When looking at the classification of injuries, access and egress was involved 25.2% 
of the time, compared to 20.1% for maintenance and 54.7% for operational tasks.  
Access and egress injuries resulted in lost time injuries in 42.1% of cases.  The 
majority of the access and egress injuries (62%) were associated with egress.  
Whilst tasks in the maintenance and operations category are still of interest, there is 
remains justification in reviewing access/egress.  This is particularly true as the total 
number, environmental variability and complexity of tasks in operations and 
maintenance are likely much greater than those with access and egress.  Therefore, 
a focus on improving access and egress still seems a likely path to reducing injury 
rates associated with surface mobile equipment. 
Figure 2.16: Access/Egress, Operations and 
Maintenance as the Task Category at Injury
Figure 2.17: Tasks Associated with Access 
Egress
! !
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2.5 Results: Multivariable Inquiry 
The following sections describe an investigation of three realistic scenarios using the 
coded injury narrative data to investigate a particular issue, written from the 
perspective of three different industry roles.  
2.5.1 Safety officer 
In this scenario, a safety officer has been tasked with reducing risk related to access 
and egress of surface mobile mining equipment, especially through equipment 
design.  
!
Logically, the first step is to constrain tasks by the code ‘Access/Egress’ within the 
Activity Category, seen in Table 2.4 (category 3).  This leaves 280 injury narratives 
for investigation.  As the safety officer has specifically been tasked with looking at 
design issues, it is logical that the location of the persons injured would provide 
some focus.  
!
Table 2.4: Selected code to ‘constrain’ the search for the safety officer 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
CATEGORY 3: Activity Category
What Category of task?
Operation 
Maintenance 
Access/Egress
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Therefore, the relationship between the type of equipment (category 1) and the 
location on equipment (category 2) was explored, as highlighted in red in Table 2.5. 
!
 Table 2.5: ‘Access egress’ within the category ‘Activity Category’ was 
 selected to constrain the search (red).  Within this constraint ‘type of  
 equipment’ and ‘location on equipment’ were combined (blue).   
!
!
Looking at the data visualization of the relationships between the categories of 
‘equipment’ and ‘location on equipment’ the safety officer determined that five 
relationships appeared more prominent than the others and warranted further 
investigation.  The original data visualisation is shown in Figure 2.18 and the 
relationships warranting priority investigation are shown in Figure 2.19. 
!
The most frequent combination of equipment type and location was of ladders and 
haul trucks which, with 39 injuries, accounted for 14% of all access and egress 
related injuries.  Ladders associated with bulldozers and excavators were also found 
to be relationships worthy of investigation.  The other relationships between 
equipment and location within access and egress which were more prominent were 
light vehicle doorways and the tracks of bulldozers.  The safety officer consequently 
decided to focus on these locations.  Table 2.6 show these relationships and the 
percentage of the total of access and egress related injury narratives. 
!
Equipment Task Accident
1 
Type of Equipment
3 
Activity Category
5 
Body Part Injured
2 
Location on Equipment
4 
Task being Performed
6 
Injury Mechanism
7 
Lost Time 
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!!  
Figure 2.18: Frequency combinations of codes for ‘location on equipment’ and 
‘Type of Equipment’ within ‘access and egress’ 
!
!  
Figure 2.19: Frequency combinations of codes for ‘location on equipment’ and 
‘Type of Equipment’ within ‘access and egress’ selected for priority 
investigation 
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Table 2.6: Percentages of visually selected frequency combinations of codes 
for ‘Location on Equipment’ and ‘Type of Equipment’ within ‘access and 
egress’ selected for priority investigation 
!
!
Now knowing the physical location targets – where the injuries are occurring – the 
safety officer was also interested in knowing more about how the injuries were 
occurring.  To do this, the officer decided to examine the combination of the task 
being performed and injury mechanism (Table 2.7).   
!
Table 2.7: ‘Operations’ within the category ‘Activity Category’ was selected to 
constrain the search (red).  Within this constraint ‘Task Being Performed’ and 
‘Injury Mechanism’ were combined (blue). 
!!
Equipment Location
%  of Access Egress 
Related Injury 
Narratives
Haul Trucks Ladders 14%
Light Vehicles Doorway 9%
Bulldozer On Tracks 7%
Bulldozer Ladders 4%
Excavators Ladders 5%
TOTAL 39%
Equipment Task Accident
1 
Type of Equipment
3 
Activity Category
5 
Body Part Injured
2 
Location on Equipment
4 
Task being Performed
6 
Injury Mechanism
7 
Lost Time 
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When the relationships are plotted, it is immediately obvious that one is dominant; 
slipping or tripping during egress which represents 40% of all incidents.  There are 
other relationships that are worthy of note, such as slip/trip during access or strained 
during egress.  All of the relationships can be seen in Figure 2.21 and the selected 
relationships in Figure 2.22. However, the safety officer concludes that, though these 
should be considered, prevention of slipping and tripping during egress must be 
central to any further prevention efforts. 
!
These results cannot tell the safety officer what to change about the design to 
reduce injuries related to access and egress of mobile equipment, or even if design 
changes are the best control option.  However, it does give focus to begin 
investigations.  The officer decided that the initial focus should be ‘non-stair’ access/
egress points (ladders, tracks etc.) of haul trucks, bulldozers and excavators.  When 
reviewing these physical areas, slipping/tripping and straining during access or 
egress will be considered.  A specific focus will be placed on slipping/tripping during 
egress. 
!  
Figure 2.20: Frequency combinations of codes for ‘Task being Performed’ and 
‘Injury Mechanism’ within ‘access and egress’ – (Note: Best viewed in colour) 
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!  
Figure 2.21: Frequency combinations of codes for ‘task being performed’ and 
‘injury mechanism’ within ‘access and egress’ selected for priority 
investigation 
!
Table 2.8: Percentages of visually selected frequency combinations of codes 
‘task being performed’ and ‘injury mechanism’ within ‘access and egress’ 
selected for priority investigation 
!
!
!
Task Mechanism %  of Access Egress Related Injury Narratives
Egress Slip/Trip 40%
Egress Strained 12%
Access Slip/Trip 14%
Access Strained 8%
Access Bump into 8%
TOTAL 81%
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2.5.2 Mine Operations Manager 
In this example of using the injury narrative analysis classifications as a multi-layered 
tool, a Mine Operations Manager aims to find some issues to address to reduce 
injury risk whilst people are operating mobile mining equipment.  Therefore, this is a 
larger scope than the above example which focused on access and egress. 
!
The first step is to constrain tasks by the code ‘Operations’ within the Activity 
Category (Table 2.9) to leave only the injury narratives that are relevant to the 
manager’s scope.  This leaves 608 injury narratives for investigation.  The mine 
operations manager first wanted to know which equipment in the fleet she should be 
focusing on reviewing. Therefore, she selected type of equipment (category 6) as 
one of the codes to combine.  She then selected ‘body part injured’ (category 2) for 
comparison to see if specific injury types emerged with different equipment.  This 
was to identify which equipment and where her workers are likely to experience an 
injury. 
!
Looking at the data visualisation, seen in Figures 2.22 and 2.23, the mine operations 
manager was able to identify four relationships between ‘equipment’ and ‘body part’ 
which warranted further investigation.  These were the four between the equipment 
of haul truck and bulldozers and the body part of the neck and lower back.  Table 
2.11 shows that when combined these accounted for 46% of injuries related to 
operations.  Therefore, the mine manager decided to initially focus on how haul 
trucks and bulldozers may cause injuries the spinal column. 
!
Table 2.9: Selected code to ‘constrain’ the search for the Mine Operations 
Manager 
!
CATEGORY 3: Activity Category
What Category of task?
Operation 
Maintenance 
Access/Egress
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!
Table 2.10: ‘Operations’ within the category ‘Activity Category’ was selected to 
constrain the search (red).  Within this constraint ‘Type of Equipment’ and 
‘Body Part Injured’ were combined (blue). 
!
!  
Figure 2.22: Frequency combinations of codes for ‘Body Part Injured’ and 
‘Type of Equipment’ within ‘Operations’ 
Equipment Task Accident
1 
Type of Equipment
3 
Activity Category
5 
Body Part Injured
2 
Location on Equipment
4 
Task being Performed
6 
Injury Mechanism
7 
Lost Time 
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!  
Figure 2.23: Frequency combinations of codes for ‘Body Part Injured’ and 
‘Type of Equipment’ within ‘Operations’ 
!
Table 2.1: Percentages of visually selected frequency combinations of codes 
‘Type of Equipment’ and ‘Mechanism of Injury’ within ‘operations’ selected for 
priority investigation 
!
!!
Equipmen
t Involved Body Part Injured
%  of Total Injuries 
Associated with Operations
Haul Truck Lower Back 15%
Haul Truck Neck 13%
Bulldozer Lower Back 10%
Bulldozer Neck 6%
TOTAL 46%
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However, investigating operational injuries to the spinal column occurring with 
bulldozers/haul trucks is still quite a large focus.  Investigating further, the Mine 
Operations Manager combined the constrained injury narratives categories of task 
being performed (category 4) and injury mechanism (category 6).   
!
Table 2.12: Operations’ within the category ‘Activity Category’ was selected to 
constrain the search (red).  Within this constraint ‘Task Being Performed and 
‘Injury Mechanism’ were combined (blue). 
!
Six relationships, seen in Figures 2.24 and 2.45, emerged as being larger than 
others and therefore a priority for investigation.  Two of these related to trucks being 
loaded with the injuries being caused by either contact between truck and shovel or 
the shovel overloading the truck.  There also appeared to be mechanisms during 
driving and movement of soil/ore that could have been related to overuse, such as 
vibration, or unexpected jerky movement.  All of these are consistent with the above 
finding that the spinal column is the most prominently injured body area.  This 
suggests that the Mine Operations Manager should begin further analysis with 
driving, loading/being loaded, as it is an easily constrained environment.  Sources of 
vibration and jerking will also be reviewed such as potholes and equipment 
maintenance, and design changes to reduce the effect of these sources on the 
driver, such as improve suspension and seating will be assessed. 
Equipment Task Accident
1 
Type of Equipment
3 
Activity Category
5 
Body Part Injured
2 
Location on Equipment
4 
Task being Performed
6 
Injury Mechanism
7 
Lost Time 
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!  
Figure 2.24: Frequency combinations of codes for ‘Injury Mechanism’ and 
‘Task Being Performed’ within ‘Operations’ 
!
!  
Figure 2.25: Frequency combinations of codes for ‘Injury Mechanism’ and 
‘Task Being Performed’ within ‘Operation’ selected for priority investigation 
!
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Table 2.13: Percentages of visually selected frequency combinations of codes 
‘Injury Mechanism’ and ‘Task Being Performed’ within ‘Operations’ selected 
for priority investigation 
!
2.5.3 Bulldozer Equipment Designer 
In this example of using the coded injury narrative analysis, a person leading a team 
designing a new bulldozer model was interested in determining areas of focus for 
improved safety in design. The first step is to include only the injury narratives with 
bulldozers in the ‘type of equipment’ category, as shown in Table 2.14.  In designing 
mobile equipment, individual persons or small teams are primarily responsible for 
subsections of the equipment.  Therefore, the lead designer determined that location 
on equipment and task being performed would give an indication of the human 
machine interaction points that are worthy of further attention in each specialist area. 
!
From the visualisation, see in Figures 2.26 and 2.27, five relationships accounting for 
73% of incidents were identified for further investigation.  Three of these related to 
the general operational tasks in the operator cabin, two to egress and one to 
installation or removal of engine parts.  These three distinct sets of problems were 
provided to the teams designing each area of the equipment for consideration. 
!
Task Mechanism %  of Total Associated with Operations
Driving Hit Pothole/ Roadway Issue Driving 18%
Grading/Digging/Shovelling Overexertion 7%
Loading/Being Loaded Rock Or Excessive Load Dropped Into 
Tray Or On Headboard
7%
Driving Reverse Hit Rock Driving 6%
Driving Overexertion 5%
Grading/Digging/Shovelling Hit Rock Driving 5%
Loading/Being Loaded Contact With Other Mobile Equipment 5%
TOTAL 52%
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Table 2.14: Selected code to ‘constrain’ the search for the Bulldozer 
Equipment Designer 
!
Table 2.15: ‘Bulldozer’ within the category ‘Type of Equipment’ was selected to 
constrain the search (red).  Within this constraint ‘Location on Equipment’ and 
‘Task being Performed’ were combined (blue). 
!
1: Type of Equipment
What type of equipment was involved?
Haul Truck Bulldozer
Grader/Scraper Water Truck
Light Vehicles (Troup Carriers, Utes, etc) Wheel Loader
Truck (not haul – smaller) Dragline
Drill Excavator
Other Unknown
Equipment Task Accident
1 
Type of Equipment
3 
Activity Category
5 
Body Part Injured
2 
Location on Equipment
4 
Task being Performed
6 
Injury Mechanism
7 
Lost Time 
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!  
Figure 2.26: Frequency combinations of codes for ‘Location on Equipment and 
‘Task Being Performed’ within ‘Bulldozer’ 
!
!  
Figure 2.27: Frequency combinations of codes for Location on Equipment and 
‘Task Being Performed’ within ‘Bulldozer’ selected for priority investigation 
!
!
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Table 2.16: Percentages of visually selected frequency combinations of codes 
Location on Equipment and ‘Task Being Performed’ within ‘Bulldozer’ selected 
for priority investigation 
!
!
Whilst this information gave the teams some distinct information that was relevant to 
their area, it did not explain how task performance in a specific location lead to an 
injury.  The designers have an indication of where to look, but not what they should 
be looking for in these areas. Fortunately, the three categories of location, as set out 
above, neatly divide into the three activity categories: operations, maintenance and 
access/egress.  Consequently, the lead designer decided to use activity category 
combined with injury mechanism.  This would give an indication to each of the teams 
designing the parts of the equipment of the specific hazards that should be given 
particular attention. 
!
When this combination was examined, four mechanisms emerged from the 
visualisations shown in figures 2.28 and 2.29. Two of these, overexertion and hit 
pothole, are likely to be related to acute jolts and long term exposure to whole body 
vibration. The others, hit rock while driving and loss of whole vehicle control, point to 
specific causes such as visibility and stability.  As would be expected, the access/
egress designers are pointed towards slipping and tripping being the major issue.  
However, straining was also noted in a large number of cases indicating that some 
manual tasks assessment, to review the forces and postures required, would be 
Location Task %  of Total Associated with Bulldozers
Operator Cabin Grading/Digging/Shovelling 34%
Operator Cabin Driving Reverse 21%
Operator Cabin Driving 4%
On Tracks Egress 6%
Ladder Access Egress 4%
Engine/Filters/ 
Engine Covers/Brakes Part Removal or Installation 3%
TOTAL 73%
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valid.  Overall, the combination of variables was able to provide specific issues to the 
designers responsible to address in relation to different parts of the equipment. 
!
Table 2.17:  ‘Bulldozer’ within the category ‘Type of Equipment’ was selected 
to constrain the search (red).  Within this constraint ‘Activity Category’ and 
‘Injury Mechanism’ were combined (blue). 
!
!  
Figure 2.28: Frequency combinations of codes for ‘Activity Category’ and 
‘Injury Mechanism’ within ‘Bulldozer’ 
Equipment Task Accident
1 
Type of Equipment
3 
Activity Category
5 
Body Part Injured
2 
Location on Equipment
4 
Task being Performed
6 
Injury Mechanism
7 
Lost Time 
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!  
Figure 2.29: Frequency combinations of codes for Activity Category’ and 
‘Injury Mechanism’ within ‘Bulldozer’ selected for priority investigation. 
!
Table 2.18: Percentages of visually selected frequency combinations of codes 
‘Activity Category’ and ‘Injury Mechanism’ within ‘Bulldozer’ selected for 
priority investigation 
!!
Activity Category Injury Mechanism %  of Total Associated with Bulldozers
Operation Hit Rock 21%
Operation Overexertion 15%
Operation Hit Pothole / Roadway Issue 8%
Operation Loss of vehicle control  (Whole vehicle) 8%
Access/Egress Slip Trip 15%
Access/Egress Strained 6%
TOTAL 73%
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2.5.4 Summary of multivariable findings 
Issues that the above three examples were trying to address could have been 
approached by looking at variables individually, as was done in the previous section.  
However, this would have resulted in the commencing an on-site investigation with 
too broad a focus.  It is difficult to obtain the appropriate resources to apply human 
factors tools in mining environments. Without a more targeted approach, it is likely 
that further investigation would be compromised, and considered particularly time-
consuming in relation to benefit.  By combining the variables into a hazard pattern 
which is relevant to a specific scope, all of the case studies included evidence-based 
specific focus areas at the commencement of the investigation.  In summary, 
creating hazard patterns, using multiple layers of variables, is a useful way to 
commence the application of human factors methods in mining. 
!
2.6 Discussion 
2.6.1 Main findings 
There were three main findings. Firstly, it was demonstrated that detailed 
consideration of narratives describing injuries associated with surface mining 
equipment allows user-centred issues, such as task, specific location and 
mechanism, to be identified.  This finding is comparable to results of similar analysis 
of underground coal mining injuries (Burgess-Limerick, 2011). 
!
Secondly, there was sometimes sufficient specificity in the extracted coding to allow 
some key issues to emerge when only looking at a single variable (eg. equipment 
access).  However, it is more common that a single category could only show broad 
trends.  
!
Thirdly, it was shown that by simultaneously considering multiple layers of the task-
related information, more specific issues emerged for closer examination.  This 
layering can be done graphically, allowing issues to be identified visually.  This mode 
of data analysis could lead to design changes that will efficiently and effectively 
reduce the risk of injury when interacting with surface mobile mining equipment, at 
least from sources that have been significant in the past. The categories noted 
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above could serve as a model for future injury narrative analysis of surface mining 
equipment. 
2.6.2 Inferred Global Use 
For this study the use of inferential statistics was not appropriate because the data 
consistent of the whole population of injuries occurring at NSW surface coal mines 
within a 5 year interval.  It cannot be treated as a random sample of worldwide 
mining industries.  However, human factors practitioners have identified that mining 
in advanced economies has significant commonalities in equipment, mining methods 
and workforce skills (Horberry & Cooke, 2012). Although there are some differences 
in legislation and culture, in the absence of other measures it can be inferred that the 
injury pattern is likely to be similar in other surface coal mines and, in fact, surface 
mines in general.  Therefore, the findings can be used as a cautious estimate of 
global issues, and the methods developed could certainly apply to different incident 
populations.  
2.6.3 Accuracy and Specificity of Data Extracted from Injury Narratives 
It was noted in the introduction that methods involving injury narratives have heavily 
rely on the accuracy and content of the data which is recorded by multiple third 
parties.  In regards to accuracy, it is unknown how much error may occur in 
reporting, though with non-causative issues it is logically likely that the information 
that is included is accurate enough for the aim of identifying key trends. 
!
However, a greater problem exists with the information that is not present.  In a 
minority, but significant, number of cases the narrative did not contain enough 
information to provide a code.  For example, location on equipment during access 
and egress was unknown for 15% of cases.  However, perhaps more importantly, 
many codes were required to be quite general.  For example the category of 
‘strained’ in injury mechanism and ‘engine/filters/engine covers/brakes’ needed to be 
broad otherwise a significant amount of data would have remained un-coded.   
!
Alternatively, the use of very specific categories can give low rates of coding making 
the data practically unusable.  For example, Williamson et al found this was a 
problem when coding narratives investigation of industrial fatalities across three 
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countries with the successful coding in some categories as low as 16% (Williamson, 
Feyer et al., 2001).  This limits the granularity of further investigation, and may bias 
towards issues that were more easily identified. 
2.6.4 Recommendations for future work 
2.6.4.1 Improve Method of Collecting and Coding Injury Narratives 
In future work it is recommended that the method for recording injury narratives be 
revisited, in order to maximise accuracy and usefulness.  It is unlikely, in a practical 
sense, that the skill and knowledge of those collecting data can be improved.  
Therefore, addressing the method of data collection seems the most expedient route 
to this goal.  Bondy et al (2005) suggest: 
!
“Forms guiding investigators to explicitly consider human, organizational, and 
environmental factors could foster more complete descriptions of factors 
contributing to… injury" (Bondy, Lipscomb et al., 2005). 
!
In these data, the injury narrative is derived from the answer to the question: 
“describe how the incident occurred” with space for 1 to 2 sentences.  Revisiting this 
instruction is recommended, with trials to see what instructions or method gain the 
richest and most accurate information.  Traditionally, this revisiting has seen a 
reductionist method where multiple questions are asked and the reporter can pick 
from a pre-existing list of codes.  However, this limits the flexibility and richness of 
the information to only the codes that were predicted to be useful.  Therefore, it is 
specifically recommended that lengthening the instruction to the narrative be 
considered.  The altered instructions would include reference to the minimum 
information required in an injury narrative, such as equipment type and injury 
mechanism, without discouraging the reporter from including other information.  
2.6.4.2 Develop the Multivariate Method and Test Use 
The multivariate method was demonstrated to be an effective data exploration 
approach to identify issues for detailed examination.  It is recommended that this 
method be trialled from more perspectives than merely those specified here such as 
regulators, training managers and maintenance managers.   However, the workload 
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to construct the multi-variable graphs, and lag time in data classification, is currently 
a significant barrier to widespread and effective use of the technique in industrial 
settings. 
!
To overcome this problem, it is recommended that interactive software be developed 
to construct the graphs and perform the analysis.  This may include re-thinking the 
visualisation format, such as altering the output to be in rows rather than in a circle 
as seen in Figure 2.31.  It is also recommended that coding of narratives be 
undertaken as they are submitted with a database across multiple jurisdictions.  It 
may be possible, over time, to automate some of the coding through keyword 
matching. Previous efforts in this have indicted some success, though manual 
coding is still needed in a significant number of cases (Lincoln, Sorock et al., 2004).  
Regardless of how the data are coded, a database would transform a one-time 
narrative analysis classification into a human factors tool that could be interrogated 
from a variety of perspectives using up-to-date information.  Observing how this tool 
was used by industry professionals, and any resultant decisions, could then form a 
future path of research.  This could, ultimately, include longitudinal studies detailing 
the effectiveness of using this method to target strategies. 
!
!  
Figure 2.30: Possible change of visualisation in ‘row’ rather than circle format 
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2.6.5 Conclusion 
Mobile equipment was associated with the majority of surface coal mining injuries 
and the largest proportion of injuries happened during operation and access/egress. 
The utility of a multivariate graphical analysis technique was demonstrated through 
three scenarios. The technique was demonstrated to allow identification of operator-
centred issues and can therefore be considered a useful human factors technique.  
The resulting increase in specificity for further investigation can lead to improved 
effectiveness of interventions.  A number of the issues identified (eg vehicle collisions 
and warning systems) are targeted in later chapters of this thesis.   
!
!
!
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Chapter 3 
Cognitive Task Analysis for Incident Investigation 
with Mobile Mining Equipment Operators 
Abstract 
The analysis of injury narratives in Chapter 2 revealed that incidents involving 
operation of mobile mining equipment were prevalent.  Little is known about the 
decision making strategies of operators which might contribute to these incidents. 
The Critical Decision Method (CDM), from the broader discipline of Cognitive Task 
Analysis (CTA), uses specific interviewing techniques to understand in detail how 
key decisions are made in complex or fast-paced environments.  The Decision 
Ladder is a decision model used in Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) to directly 
support design decisions.  These techniques were used to attempt to understand the 
cognitive demands of operating mobile mining equipment. 
!
Data were collected from nine experienced mining equipment operators on two visits 
to surface coal mines. The subject matter was an incident where the operator was a 
central decision maker.  The CDM was deployed on-site and later interpreted using 
the Decision Ladder.  Results were compared to existing incident investigations 
where they could be obtained.  This could then be translated into Decision Ladders 
and specific design suggestions.   
!
Overall, all of the trials were able to provide a rich, operator-centred narrative. Extra 
information, and subsequent recommendations, was revealed in all of six incidents 
where an investigation report was available. Jumps on the Decision Ladder 
appeared naturalistic, giving some indication that explicit and simultaneous 
consideration of multiple options is probably uncommon for equipment operators. 
Overall this is a much deeper description of the incident event than the standard 
investigation techniques used in much of the minerals industry today.  It is 
recommended that further work be done to standardise the combination of the 
methods into a toolkit and this be more widely investigated in mining incident 
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investigation processes. Applying the method proactively is an attractive topic for 
future research. 
3.1 Introduction 
The review of injury narratives in Chapter two identified that a significant number of 
injuries occur while surface mobile mining equipment is in operation. Frequent 
injuries were related to loading, driving, grading and shovelling.  Serious injuries and 
deaths have also occurred related to issues such as collision, rollover and other 
losses of control (Kecojevic & Radomsky, 2004; Kecojevic, Komlijenovic et al., 
2007).  There have been some industry attempts to reduce these issues, such as the 
introduction of physical risk controls, such as rollover protection in cabs, and 
technological solutions such as proximity detection systems.  Without an appropriate 
understanding of the tasks involved, the introduction of risk controls requires 
significant assumptions.  This is especially so for those which hope to avoid an 
initiating event from an operator error.  The absence of investigation could lead to the 
introduction of ineffective, even harmful, controls. 
!
Mobile mining equipment operation is largely a cognitive task, with safety depending 
on operators continually scanning the environment and making decisions to avoid 
hazards (Horberry, Burgess-Limerick et al, 2010). Any tools that will aid design 
should reveal this cognitive work in a way that is usable.  It is quite similar to the 
cognition involved with on-road driving, which has previously been described as 
principally a cognitive activity where the drivers are searching for disturbances that 
could signal an emerging hazard even whenever the system is stable (Klein, Pliske 
et al., 2005).  CTA aims to reveal these non-observable, mental components of work 
tasks including how information is gained from the environment (Roth, 2008).   
!
In this chapter, the aim was to attempt to use CTA to elicit and represent the 
experiences of mobile mining equipment users in a way that could be used to 
influence design.  The knowledge elicitation was performed using methods adapted 
from CTA, because these techniques are regarded as being the best developed to 
understand real-word (naturalistic) decision making.  The CDM was selected for use.  
Methods from Cognitive Work Analysis were adapted for knowledge representation 
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because these methods are well regarded in their use in system design.  The 
Decision Ladder was selected for use.  
3.1.1 Relationship to the Asset Lifecycle 
CDM has generally being applied to the investigation of actual incidents with existing 
equipment.  Therefore, its primary use in the Asset Lifecycle is at the operation and 
training stage, with the potential to lead to modifications or retrofits.  However, the 
use of information gained from CDM has been commonly used to help design 
training programs intended to help novice decision makers become experts rather 
than design changes.  The Decision Ladder is used to make a clearer link to how the 
design of mobile mining equipment might be modified to facilitate improved decision 
making.  This may be through, for example, greater relevance of audible and visual 
information given by in-cab displays to haul truck operators or how to better reveal 
the information which maintainers can use to diagnose equipment faults. 
!
There is also the potential to use CDM within concept and prototyping stages of 
design.  Designers may use the CDM process to engage experts in a forwards-
looking CDM in a conjured situation to anticipate how design changes might affect 
their decisions.  It could also be used in conjunction with actual human performance 
on a prototype or simulator to predict how decisions will be made in the field.  O’Hare 
et al have done work in this area in a variety of fields including decision making for 
pilots and emergency ambulance dispatchers (O'Hare, Wiggins et al., 1998).  
Similarly, to the above noted application, the Decision Ladder can be used to help 
understand how decisions are likely to be made.  These two applications are shown 
in Figure 3.1. 
!  
Figure 3.1: CDM & the Decision Ladder can be applied now and in the future 
!
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3.1.2 Cognitive Task Analysis for Incident Investigation 
3.1.2.1 Naturalistic Decision Making 
CTA is heavily reliant on the paradigm of Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) which 
is the study, and theories, of how people make decisions in real world settings (Klein, 
1997). It has its beginnings in the rejection of Subjective Expected Utility theory 
where people are thought to make decisions by analysing all possible outcomes of a 
situation in a very rationalistic manner and selecting the most desirable option (Gore, 
Banks et al., 2006).  Early researchers in NDM, including Gary Klein, found that in 
real situations people generated a very limited number of possible courses of action, 
sometimes only one, and then compared them to the constraints of the situation for a 
reason to reject the course of action (Klein, 2008). The first course of action not 
rejected is taken.  People often use mental shortcuts or ‘rules of thumb’ or heuristics 
to make these decisions. Experts have developed heuristics with experience that are 
usually efficient and effective (Dew, Read et al., 2009). This makes experts more 
sensitive to environmental cues for problem detection as they attempt to understand 
and sense the environment (Klein, Pliske et al, 2005).  More shortcuts are taken 
when there is less time available.  This theory of decision making is summarised in 
the Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) model (Klein, 2008) shown in Figure 3.2. 
3.1.2.2 Knowledge Elicitation in Complex Sociotechnical Systems  
Mining can be described as a Complex Sociotechnical System.  Decisions in 
Complex Sociotechnical Systems are often made using tacit or inert knowledge: 
knowledge that persons have but have not previously, explicitly, considered or 
expressed (Hoffman, 2008). Therefore, simply asking persons what they were 
thinking at the time of an incident is unlikely to be enough.  For example, classic 
studies from Nisbett and Wilson (2005) and Bainbridge (1999) found that people can 
learn to control and make decisions in complex situations without being able to easily 
verbalise their thoughts and actions. Consequently, in complex situations, knowledge 
has to be specifically elicited from the persons involved.  This is commonly called 
Knowledge Elicitation. CTA methods attempt to provide scaffolding for Knowledge 
Elicitation.  The underlying goal, and assumption, of CTA is that an increased 
understanding of how people actually make decisions within various complex 
domains through eliciting tacit knowledge will allow future improvement of these 
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decisions either through training or changes to environment, including equipment 
design. 
!
!  
Figure 3.2: A model of naturalistic decision making (from Naikar, 2010) 
!
3.1.2.3 Incident Investigation using Cognitive Task Analysis 
Traditional incident identification techniques deal mainly with the identification of a 
sequence of events, hoping to identify unsafe acts or conditions: what happened 
(Doytchev & Szwilus, 2009).  Some go beyond looking at causal analysis to identify 
the relationship between incident events and the breakdown of any controls: how it 
happened (Simpson, Horberry et al., 2009).  However, it has been suggested that 
new techniques are required to better understand what factors influence and 
predispose the decisions of mining equipment operators (Horberry, Burgess-Limerick 
et al., 2010). It is suggested that alternative investigation techniques are needed to 
help understand the incident, and decisions, from the perspective of the person 
making those decisions to give an appropriate representation of why the incident 
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occurred. They would be particularly useful in real world situations where people 
made critical decisions that significantly contributed to the occurrence or prevention 
of an incident. 
!
CTA techniques go further than the knowledge elicitation noted above, and also 
analyse and represent decision making in real world contexts (Crandall, Klein et al., 
2006).  It is particularly useful in situations where people made critical decisions that 
significantly contributed to the occurrence or prevention of an incident.  CTA 
assumes that persons were attempting to make sense of the information at hand 
(Crandall, Klein et al., 2006). Therefore, the investigation aims to understand the 
incident, and decisions, from the perspective of the person making those decisions: 
why it happened. CTA methods have been described as having four stages; 
identifying expertise, elicitation of knowledge, codifying it representing knowledge 
and, finally, application of that knowledge (Klein, 1996; Crandall, Klein et al., 2006).  
This application can then be used to alter environmental cues to improve decision 
making. 
3.1.2.4 Cognitive Task Analysis in Mining 
CTA appears very suited to understanding incidents related to mobile mining 
equipment where the decisions of experienced operators and maintainers in a 
complex environment are often related to causing, or preventing, accidents.  
However, a review of the literature indicates that no systematic investigation of CTA 
has been undertaken in mining equipment operation.  Perhaps the closest study in 
the minerals industry of CTA application was performed by Dal Santo (2005). This 
work investigated ground control decisions made by mining engineers working in 
underground mines to prevent rock falls. There were two main findings.  Firstly, the 
ability of mining engineers to be able to ‘read the ground’ and make assessments 
with visual inspections was extremely important.  Secondly, the characteristics of 
decision making changed not only with experience, but also with motivation, 
expectation and specific hazard knowledge. The key focus of Dal Santo’s work was 
improving the design of ground control education and training, where it appeared 
that CTA and related approaches could be of considerable benefit.  It also indicated 
that the method could potentially be applied to other issues in mining where people 
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are actively making operational decisions.  It appears valid to trial CTA based 
methods to reduce injuries related to decision making. 
3.1.3 The Critical Decision Method 
3.1.3.1 Background 
There are a variety of knowledge elicitation methods within CTA which vary in 
maturity, efficiency and effectiveness (Hoffman, 2008).  The Critical Decision Method 
(CDM) is perhaps the most mature and has been found to be effective in revealing 
expert knowledge, especially tacit knowledge, reasoning, sense-making and decision 
strategies (Crandall, Klein and Hoffman, 2006).  CDM is a structured interview 
process that can be used to elicit information and knowledge from experienced 
operators about their decision-making, understanding and problem-solving 
processes during non-routine critical incidents (Crandall, Klein et al., 2006).  
!
Critical incidents are targeted as they are believed to reveal more about decision 
making that occurs within complex sociotechnical systems than routine events.  This 
is because they have potential to show how the systems fail, or could fail, and how 
experts respond to prevent this from occurring.  Additionally, as CDM relies on 
memory, it has been argued that experts mostly have clear memories of salient or 
unusual safety-related incidents (Crandall, Klein et al., 2006).  The method involves 
the use of ‘probe’ questions to uncover the kinds of knowledge on which critical 
decisions are based. The technique allows interviews to shift interviewees thinking 
from operational and general accounts of an incident into a more descriptive re-
telling of their problem solving processes during the critical incident.  In its current 
format, it has been applied and documented in various domains including, intensive 
care nursing, fire fighting and the United States military (Roth, 2008). 
3.1.3.2 History of the Method 
The CDM builds on the earlier Critical Incident Technique that was first developed 
during World War II and applied to a variety of situations through the study of near 
misses in the US Airforce (Flanagan, 1954). The Critical Incident Technique is 
flexible, and represents a more generalised approach to investigating incidents 
rather than a specific tool (Chell, 2004). CDM is based on this approach, but is a 
more structured and detailed method.  Previous work has examined CDM in other 
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fields such as nuclear power, aviation, healthcare (Gore, Banks et al., 2006) and 
intelligence analysis (Hutchins, Pirolli et al, 2004). It was used primarily to identify 
perceptual and cognitive needs for aiding decision making, and to investigate 
incidents by reconstructing and understanding how operators made sense of the 
emergent situations (Klein, 2008). In one particularly relevant example, Tichon 
(2007) successfully used CDM to elicit knowledge from train drivers, identifying 
environmental cues, actions to be taken and possible errors. 
3.1.3.3 Description of the Method 
CDM is a semi-structured interview process usually undertaken by two researchers; 
one primarily an interviewer and one primarily a note-taker.  The participant is 
preferably an expert in the work domain, though interviews with people of various 
degrees of experience can be undertaken. The time required varies considerably, 
being longest in fields with significant expertise in judging extremely complex 
systems, such as weather forecasting (Hoffman, Coffey et al., 2002). However, in 
most fields, interviews have been noted to take approximately two hours per 
participant with significantly more time for the preparation and post-interview 
analysis.  This makes CDM convenient for use in mining as it is usually possible to 
obtain experts for this length of time at mine sites. Obtaining them for longer periods 
of time or offsite is very difficult, which would be necessary to apply other tools used 
in expert systems (Weitzenfeld, Freeman et al., 1990). 
!
The CDM process used in this research occurs in four stages, also known as 
‘sweeps’, with a series of structured probes to re-construct the incident. The multiple 
‘sweeps’ are made to progressively deepen understanding of the challenges faced 
and strategies employed by decision makers to cope with the situational, 
environmental and domain demands (Roth, 2008).  The four sweeps are described 
below: 
!
Sweep 1: Incident Identification and Selection 
This stage is focused on selecting an appropriate incident which would benefit from 
greater understanding.  This will depend on the goals of the project.  For example, if 
CDM is to be used in an incident investigation, then the incident is, obviously, 
already selected.  However, CDM is commonly used to understand more deeply a 
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work domain without a trigger from a specific incident.  In these situations it is 
recommended to select ‘tough cases’: those involving non-routine tasks/situations 
and complex decisions.  This is because these tough cases are noted to be more 
likely to assist in the elicitation of relevant tacit knowledge (Shadrick, Lussier et al., 
2005).  Furthermore, the participant must be a decision maker or ‘doer’ in the 
situation (Crandall, Klein et al., 2006).  A review or screening of multiple incidents 
might be required in order to find one that is appropriate.  Once an appropriate 
incident has been identified the participant is asked to give a brief account of the 
story from start to end.  The participant may need to be guided through the process.  
Notes are taken whilst the person talks to provide the ‘bones’ for the subsequent 
sweeps. 
!
Sweep 2: Timeline Construction and Verification 
The second sweep of the incident aims to gain a clear structure of the incident that is 
refined and verified with the participant.  During this sweep the initial account of the 
incident is expanded.  It begins with a merge from sweep 1 where one of the 
interviewers repeats what they have recorded and understood of the participant’s 
brief account of the incident.  The participant is encouraged to correct faults and add 
relevant information to ensure the account is consistent, accurate and appropriately 
detailed (Crandall, Klein et al., 2006).   
!
The researchers then construct a timeline of the incident in relevant chunks: distinct 
occurrences, actions or decisions.  The timeline constructed should be visible to the 
participant.  This has been done in the past simply using Post-itTM papers (Wong, 
Daiper et al., 2003), whiteboards (Riedl, Weitzenfeld et al, 1990) or simply large 
pieces of paper (Crandall, Klein et al., 2006).  Following construction of the timeline, 
the critical junctures, or decision points, are highlighted to show where a situation 
could have been understood several ways.  The understanding of the participant 
held at this point, when compared to the alternatives, should effect the eventual 
outcome (Crandall, Klein et al., 2006). Once the timeline has been constructed and 
the critical junctures highlighted, the CDM moves to the next sweep. 
!
!
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Sweep 3: Deepening Understanding 
In this sweep of the incident the researchers attempt to understand the participant’s 
sensemaking in the situation or, as stated by Crandall, Klein and Hoffman:  
!
“get inside the expert’s head and see the world through his or her eyes... 
What is the story behind the story? Based on the first two steps (the 
researchers) know what happened... but what did (the interviewee) know, 
when did they know it, how did they know, and what did they do with what 
they knew?” (p.72) 
!
To gain this information the researchers sweep over the critical junctures again 
asking the participant a series of deepening probe questions.  The probes used will 
depend on the event but are generally aimed at determining the information available 
in a situation, the meaning this information as interpreted by the participant, and the 
thoughts and issues they provoked.  Ideally at this stage, the participant will provide 
a rich understanding of the event, though occasionally, a participant may be unable 
or unwilling to share their experience.  A regular pitfall is for participants to drift into 
generalisations.  Whilst this might reflect their experience skills and knowledge, it is 
important that the participant give information on the selected incident.  The CDM 
deepening probe questions, developed by Crandall, Klein and Hoffman (2006) from 
their experience of the technique, are listed in Table 3.1.  These probes are not a 
complete list of what could be asked, nor are they necessarily relevant in all 
situations, but rather they provide a starting point for researchers to begin the 
deepening process. 
!
Sweep 4” “What if” Queries 
The last sweep involved in a CDM interview involves the interviewer posing a 
number of hypothetical changes to the event in the form of ‘what if’ questions.  The 
participant is asked how their responses would have altered and/or if the outcome of 
might have changed.  This is to gain a deeper understanding of the experience, skills 
and knowledge of the interviewee.  It is also useful in seeing if the information gained 
is generalizable.  The CDM “what if” probes, developed by Crandall, Klein and 
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Hoffman (2006) from their experience of the technique are listed in Table 3.2.  Again, 
they may not all be necessary in all situations. !
Table 3.1: CDM deepening probes used in the 3rd sweep (adapted from 
Crandall et al, 2006) 
!! !!
!
Cues
!
What were you seeing, hearing, smelling, noticing etc.?
Information What information did you use in making this judgement? 
How, where and from whom did you get this information? 
What did you do with the information?
Analogues Where you reminded of any previous experience? 
What about that previous experience seemed relevant to this case?
Standard Operating 
Procedures
Does this case fit a standard or particular scenario? 
Is this a type of event you are trained to deal with?
Goals and Priorities What were your specific goals and objectives at the time? 
What was the most important thing to accomplish at this point?
Options What other courses of action were considered or available to you? 
How this option chosen or others was rejected? 
Was there a rule you were following in choosing this option?
Experience What specific training or experience was necessary or helpful in making this decision?
Assessment Suppose you were asked to describe this situation to some else at this point.  How would 
you summarise the situation?
Mental Models Did you imagine the possible consequences of this action? 
Did you create some sort of picture in your head? 
Did you imagine the events and how they would unfold?
Decision Making What let you know that this was the right thing to do at this point in the incident? !
How much time pressure was involved in making this decision? 
How long did it actually take to make this decision?
Guidance Did you seek any guidance at this point in the incident? 
How did you know to trust the guidance you got?
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Table 3.2: CDM ‘What if’ probes used in the 4th sweep (adapted from Crandall et 
al, 2006) 
!
3.1.3.4 Limitations and Reliability 
One major limitation of the method is that the interviewer(s) is necessarily affected 
by what they have been trained to see (Wong & Blandford, 2002).  Additionally 
because only one incident is commonly explored with each participant, the data 
obtained will only be an accurate representation of the broader system if the 
disturbances investigated are actually representative of real world scenarios (Wong 
& Blandford, 2002). Of course, because experts are used then the knowledge 
elicited may not be valid when novices are involved.  However, eventually, with 
enough experience most persons eventually operate as experts in their specified 
domain. Therefore, it has been argued that understanding expert reasoning and, if 
necessary, working backwards to novice reasoning is a valid way to investigate real 
world complex sociotechnical systems (Hoffman, Coffey et al., 2002). 
!
This can be further complicated as the participant, rather than the researcher, largely 
determines the situation that will be investigated, making it more difficult to target a 
single issue.  However, this can be seen as a positive, in one sense, as it means that 
the issues emerge from the investigation rather than a pre-selection of issues that 
the interviewer assumes are important (Weitzenfeld, Freeman et al, 1990).  In a 
similar way, it also relies on the interviewer to be aware of the influence of the 
environment on their behaviour.  Whilst they may be aware of this, or it can be 
!
Expert Novice 
Contrast
!
If a novice had been in charge at this particular point in the incident, what type of error 
might she or he have made and why?   
Would they have noticed what you noticed?  
Would they have known to do [key feature]?
Hypotheticals If [key feature] of the situation had been different, what impact would it have had on your 
decision/assessment/actions/plans?
Experience What training might have offered an advantage in this situation?
Aids What knowledge, information or tools/technologies would have been useful/helped in this 
situation?
!81
elicited, it is not always known, especially if it is beyond their control or observation.  
Therefore, CDM is better at describing behaviour than causes (Weitzenfeld, 
Freeman et al, 1990). 
!
Despite these issues CDM has shown strong reliability. Klein investigated inter-coder 
reliability of CDM by examining the identification of decision point and coding of 
strategies by different researchers.  It was found that agreement on the 29 decision 
points of the situation varied from 81-100% and coding of strategies at 67%, or 88% 
with slightly looser criterion (Klein, 1987).  Furthermore, as has previously been 
described, CDM has led to elicitation of knowledge perceived to be useful in various 
domains.  Therefore, whilst it is wise to remain mindful of the noted limitations they 
do not diminish the potential usefulness of CDM in mining. 
3.1.4 Decision Ladder 
3.1.4.1 Background 
For the information obtained by a CDM to be useful it must be converted into mental 
models which inform design (Clake, Feldon et al., 2008).  Historically, the mental 
models proposed a normative ideal of decision making.  The judgement for a 
success was that it was able to successfully guide an intervention, such training or 
decision aids, which reduce departure from the normative ideal proposed.  These 
models were heavily rationalistic where a decision maker identifies a set of options, a 
way to evaluate the options on multiple dimensions, performs the evaluation, and 
selects the highest weighted option (Lintern, 2001). These models are described as 
normative and interventions based on them called analytically based prescription 
(Lipshitz & Cohen, 2005) . Interventions include such measures as modelling 
options, option determination and formal prediction of various results. 
!
Critics of rationalist models note that this representation of decision making is often 
not reflected in reality. The critics of rationalistic models are more interested in 
explaining what does or did happen in real life decision-making, especially in time 
pressured environments where expert judgement is involved (Lipshitz, Klein et al., 
2001).  It has been argued that in these environments naturalistic models such at 
RPD model provide more appropriate normative models on which to base 
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interventions (Cohen & Freeman, 1996). This is principally because they better 
reflect actual decision making in organisations especially at the level of front line 
operators (Gore, Banks et al., 2006; Horberry, Cooke et al., 2011).  These critics of 
rationalistic models have commonly turned to CTA methods that use descriptive 
research where the ideal pattern of decision making is not described.  Interventions 
based on this evidence are termed empirically based prescriptions (Lipshitz & 
Cohen, 2005).   
!
However, the validity of interventions emerging from naturalistic models and 
techniques is not without its critics, especially the claims that descriptive research 
cannot distinguish between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’ in a cognitive process 
(LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2001; Gore, Banks et al., 2006). Decision aids derived from CDM 
methods, especially those for non-experts, still require validation (Horberry, Cooke et 
al, 2011).  In addition, though it is now accepted that most decisions in organisations 
are naturalistic, there are still decisions that are better described by rationalistic 
processes (Lipshitz, Klein et al., 2006).  For example rationalistic decision is more 
likely in such novel situations, when novices are involved or in the absence of time 
pressure (Randel, Pugh et al., 1996).  In these situations the RPD model cannot be 
used to represent decisions.  Therefore, there is an uncomfortable overlap between 
‘rational’ and ‘natural’ decision models.  The Decision Ladder offers a solution as it 
appears to be the most complete and tested model that can accommodate both 
approaches. 
3.1.4.2 Accommodation of Naturalistic and Rationalistic Decisions 
The decision ladder has been demonstrated to accommodate both naturalistic and 
rationalistic decisions.  With regards to naturalistic decision making, there are 
typically three ways experts move through the RPD model; a simple match of a 
situation to an action, a variation where a pattern matching loop occurs during 
problem diagnosis and a variation where a mental simulation loop occurs to test 
various action strategies. Naikar (2010) has shown that all of these decision types 
can be accommodated by the Decision Ladder.  In practice, Lintern (2011) has 
recently shown that naturalistic decisions elicited using CDM, that would traditionally 
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have been represented in the RPD model, can be represented onto a Decision 
Ladder or series of ladders.   
!
However, Rasmussen’s original observations in thermal power stations noted that 
sometimes people appeared to act spontaneously, similar to NDM, whilst others 
performed a more detailed rationalistic analysis (Naikar, 2010).  The original intention 
of the Decision Ladder was, therefore, to accommodate both these types of 
decisions.  All of the representations of NDM using the Decision Ladder will not enter 
a value judgement process that is required in rationalistic decision making.  If this 
does occur it can be represented by Decision Ladder and could not be represented 
by the RPD model.  This broader accommodation of available decision methods 
means the ladder not only captures what does or should happen in decision making, 
but also other possibilities: what could happen (Jenkins, Stanton et al., 2011).  
Therefore, using the Decision Ladder appears more flexible because it can include 
broader types of decision making strategies than the RPD or rationalistic models. 
3.1.4.3 Description of the Method 
The Decision Ladder is a model of decision making created by Rasmussen which 
represents how people make decisions.  Rasmussen states that the original ladder is 
not a model of how decisions are, or should be, made.  Rather it is a useful aid for 
representing decisions (Rasmussen, 1986).  It is now most commonly associated 
with Cognitive Work Analysis (Lintern, 2009) (Lintern, 2009).  There are multiple 
versions of Decision Ladders as it has been iteratively designed to make it more 
useful and understandable.  The version of the Decision Ladder to be used is shown 
in Figure 3.3.  This is the latest iteration by Lintern that has been adapted to better 
link with NDM models.  It is a slight update on the ladder published in the Journal of 
Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making (2011). 
!
Each arrow represents a cognitive data processing activity – a process for short 
(Vicente, 1999). Each box represents a state of knowledge – a state for short.  In 
what is termed ‘rational’ decision making, the ladder will either go all the way to the 
top if multiple options are available, possibly including multiple loops, or skip from 
future state awareness to desired state awareness if only one option is available.  
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This is roughly equivalent to what is proposed by subjective expected utility theory, 
where all outcomes that a decision maker can identify are expressly included in 
decision-making. 
!
The Decision Ladder can be divided into three main sections: 
1. Situation Awareness: At the bottom left of the ladder the decision maker is 
gaining information from the environment and beginning to anticipate the 
future changes. 
2. Value Judgement: At upper section of the ladder the decision maker is 
consciously scrutinising possible general courses of action. 
3. Planning and Execution: The bottom right of the ladder the plan of action is 
formed and ultimately executed. 
!
!  
Figure 3.3: Lintern’s Version of the Decision Ladder with the three sections 
highlighted 
!
The theory of the Decision Ladder is that it is possible for a decision making process 
to go all the way up the ladder.  When this occurred it would be seen as a ‘rational’ 
decision path very similar to the style of decision making described by Subjective 
Expected Utility theory.  This would be most likely to occur in novel situations 
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experienced by non-experts.  However, when the ladder is used to represent real 
word decisions, it is noted that ‘jumps’ across the ladder occur.  In the previous 
Decision Ladders there are two types of jumps: shunts and leaps. These can be 
seen in Figure 3.4.  Shunts connect a process to a non-connected state.  Leaps 
connect two states together (Jenkins, Stanton et al., 2010).  A direct transition 
between states implies a cognitive process, thereby meaning that a jump is a 
cognitive process (Lintern, 2011). 
!  
Figure 3.4: Example of a shunt and a leap on the Decision Ladder (adapted 
from Lintern, 2011) 
!
Leaping from a process to a non-connected state is disconcerting as it implies 
connecting a process with a new process, breaking the model of the Decision 
Ladder.  Therefore, most recent use of the Decision Ladder only uses leaps, allowing 
the user to describe a cognitive state in-between.  As there is only one type of 
cognitive translation occurring, there is no need to term the process a ‘shunt’ but 
simply a jump.  These jumps have been termed shortcuts or state transitions 
(Lintern, 2011).  These jumps represent the heuristic transitions that are expected to 
more readily occur with experts in familiar circumstances. Two jumps can be seen on 
!86
Figure 3.5.  Whist the jumps on the figure are forwards Naikar showed that to 
represent some NDM patterns on the Decision Ladder backwards jumps must be 
used (Naikar, 2010).  Backwards jumps were not included in previous uses of the 
Decision Ladder.   
!
In order to code the jumps, each process has been given a number.  This coding of 
the processes is a novel innovation to make the Decision Ladder easier to use.  For 
example a jump from ‘future state awareness’ to ‘plan outcome understanding’, with 
a presumed cognitive process in between, can be shortened to the annotation 3-7.  
Similarly, a jump from one state to a previous state can be coded by the order of the 
numbering.  For example a jump from ‘future state awareness’ to ‘understand 
information and goal’, which could occur if a decision maker realises that they need 
more information to predict a likely future state, would be represented as 4-3.  ‘Jump-
codes’ is proposed as an appropriate term for this annotation.  A jump between 
states can also be easily drawn on an actual ladder and made into a small 
representative pictogram.  The numbering system for states and an example of a 
jump with the associated pictogram is illustrated in Figure 3.6. 
!  
Figure 3.5: Jumps on the Decision Ladder  (Adapted from Lintern, 2011) 
!87
!  !  
Figure 3.6: Numbered Cognitive States with a Jump coded by numbers  
(Adapted from Lintern, 2011) 
!
3.1.4.4 Design Implications 
Ultimately, the Decision Ladder will prove useful addition to CDM in the domain of 
mining equipment safety if it positively alters risk controls, especially those that are 
based on equipment design or modification.  Currently, CTA has been noted to be 
primarily a domain of research and rarely used by designers (Clarke, Feldon et al., 
2008).  This is also true of the Decision Ladder.   
!
The specific leverage of CTA in the design of systems has been termed Decision 
Centred Design.  In this process CTA is used to elicit how key decisions are made, 
and representing these for use consideration during design (Horberry, Cooke et al, 
2011). In this respect it has been described as an adjunct version of user-centred 
design, where the focus is specifically on the decisions of users (Hoffman, Feltovich 
et al., 2002).  
!
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The originators of Decision Centred Design give an overview of the process and 
included the following stages:  
1. Analysis 
a. Background preparation and domain familiarisation 
b. Observations and knowledge elicitation using CTA 
c. Definition of decision requirements and decision strategies 
2. Design 
a. Transformation of decision requirements and decision strategies into 
design concepts 
b. Development of key design recommendations 
3. Test and evaluation 
a. Development of evaluation scenarios and contexts 
b. Development of context-sensitive metrics 
c. Development of real-world outcome evaluation criteria 
!
The developers of the technique, however, do not strictly state what is to occur inside 
each of these stages, stating that it is difficult to provide a ‘cookbook recipe’ for the 
method (Hutton, Miller et al., 2003). Decision Centred Design has been described 
more as an approach rather than mechanical procedure (Klein, Kaempf et al., 1997).  
Therefore, the representation of decisions elicited using CTA methods is not tied to 
particular model of decision making.  Rather the model that best suits the purpose 
should be used.  The model of representation used will be important in the eventual 
success.  
!
The previous section noted that the Decision Ladder clearly reveals cognitive 
shortcuts and, in the process, other alternative routes.  It is for this reason that Elix 
and Naikar (2008) claim that the Decision Ladder is especially suited to use in 
design as it can not only represent past decisions as they occurred, but also 
alternative paths of future decisions.  This consideration of alternative decision 
making is not accommodated by either the rationalistic models or the RPD model as 
these were largely developed for descriptive purposes.  By showing all possible 
routes the ladder clearly reveals a modelled path of the remaining decision including 
state, processes and heuristic jumps.  After understanding this, the various options to 
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support decision making can be considered. An intervention could improve the speed 
and accuracy of the current path.  It could alternatively aid or force a user to take 
another path, whether that me more rationalistic or making heuristic jumps across 
the current decision path.  It may also automate some of the decision making as the 
Decision Ladder can accommodate decision making by non-human elements of the 
system.  The ultimate interventions may be highly technological or simple.  As 
Lintern states: 
!
“Whether any form of technological support is desirable for any particular 
cognitive state or process will depend largely on whether that state or process 
offers a particular cognitive challenge that could be eased by the form of 
intervention being proposed… The decision centred perspective promotes 
judicious application of knowledge elicitation tools to identify problem areas in 
current work practices and to isolate leverage points that offer high value (but 
often low cost) interventions” (2001, p.310). 
!
Lintern argues that every different state or process on the Decision Ladder could be 
supported by some form of technology, process or training (Lintern, 2011). Figure 3.7 
shows suggested categories of support at some states and processes on the 
Decision Ladder. This can be used to design how information can be given to 
decision makers in a meaningful, structured and timely manner (Jenkins, Stanton et 
al., 2010). By targeting an intervention in a modelled decision pattern, it is hoped that 
the interventions will have an increased likelihood of positive effect and wasteful, 
perhaps even harmful, interventions are avoided. 
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!  
Figure 3.7:  
Suggested categories of support for some stages and states  
(adapted from Lintern, 2011)  
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Scope and Goal 
Following CDM’s successful use in other domains, it was envisaged that capturing 
and analysing information related to critical incidents during the operation of surface 
mining, and the decision making around these incidents, would result in valuable 
new information for the industry.  The initial goal was therefore to investigate if CDM 
could provide such information. To help establish if CDM would be of value, it was 
compared to the results of other current incident investigation methods. The 
secondary goal was to investigate if the Decision Ladder provides an effective 
representation of the elicited knowledge that aids design.  This is not only to 
understand the decisions made, but also to aid the evaluation and design of future 
interventions.  
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3.2.2 Participants 
Data were collected from nine participants during two visits to surface coal mines in 
central Queensland, Australia.  Eight of the interviews were for specific incidents 
used as an accident investigation method. One final participant was interviewed 
about an error prone task to trial the predictive power of the method.  The 
participants were experts in the work domain (i.e. experienced mining equipment 
operators) but who had previously been involved in an incident.  It was a requirement 
for the research that the participant be an active decision maker in the incident.  The 
interviews all involved mobile equipment operators who were operating equipment at 
the time of the incident. 
3.2.3 Procedure 
3.2.3.1 Decision Identification and Analysis Procedure 
The research employed the ‘classic’ CDM method, as outlined above, with slight 
adaptations, where required, to the mining context (e.g. in the terminology used). 
The CDM interview process was undertaken by two researchers.  The interview took 
up to two hours, though significantly more time was needed for preparation and post-
interview analysis. It took place in an office or other location that was suitably quiet 
and largely free of interruptions.  At all times the participants were encourage to draw 
diagrams on whiteboards as it was quickly established that this helped their 
expression (see bottom left of Figure 3.8).  They often needed to be guided through 
the process and directed towards talking about other aspects of the task which 
appeared particularly relevant to the purpose of this work. 
!
In the first stage of CDM, the participant described the incident to one of the 
interviewers, who provided prompts and questions for clarification, whilst the other 
interviewer took notes on a laptop computer.  It was a requirement that the 
participant had been a decision maker or ‘doer’ in the incident.  A review or 
screening of multiple incidents was often required in order to find one that was 
appropriate for the purpose of this research. Once an appropriate incident had been 
identified, the participant was asked to give a brief account of the story from 
beginning to end.  
!
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In the second stage of CDM, the interviewer who was taking notes repeated the 
incident back to the operator, who provided clarification and additions.  At this stage 
the other interviewer started to ‘chunk’ the incident on a nearby whiteboard into 
distinct actions, occurrences or decisions to create a timeline.  Chunking the 
incidents on the whiteboard proved to be less distracting than using Post-itTM notes.  
The participant was encouraged to correct errors and add relevant information to 
ensure the account was consistent, accurate and appropriately detailed.  Following 
construction of the timeline the critical junctures, or decision points, where a situation 
could have been understood several ways or altered, were identified by the 
interviewers and circled on the timeline (see bottom right of the Figure 3.8). 
!
In the third and fourth stages of CDM, both interviewers asked probe questions 
modified from the list above.  At each stage questions were asked repeatedly until it 
was clear that no new information would emerge. The probes used depended on the 
event but were generally aimed at determining the information available in the 
incident, the meaning of this information as interpreted by the interviewee and the 
thoughts and issues they provoked. At this stage the participant usually gave a rich 
understanding of the event, though occasionally, they may have been unable or 
unwilling to share their experiences. A regular pitfall was for participants to drift to 
generalisations and, whilst this might reflect their experience, skills and knowledge, it 
was important that the participant gave information on the selected incident. 
3.2.3.2 Decision Representation Procedure 
Following the interview, the key decisions identified were represented on the 
Decision Ladder.  The represented decision, as the other elicited knowledge, was 
then used to generate design decisions. This was done using the information 
recorded in the CDM, especially the deepening probes, and expert judgement. The 
use of expert judgement is the established method with the Decision Ladder (Jenkins 
and Salmon, 2009) which has some emerging evidence of inter-rater reliability 
(Rehak, Lamoureux et al., 2006). In this study, the scope was limited to trialling the 
representation of the method to determine if it appeared to aid design decisions. 
!
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!  
Figure 3.8: Whiteboard use for sketching, timeline construction and key 
decision selection 
3.2.4 Comparison to Implemented Method 
In addition to purely analysing the data for the nine incidents, in six a formal local site 
incident investigation had previously taken place using the standardised Incident 
Cause Analysis Method (I-CAM).  I-CAM is a prevalent incident investigation method 
used in the Australian mining industry (De Landre, Gibb et al., 2006). It is based on 
James Reason’s models of organisational accident causation (1997) and Jens 
Rasmussen’s skill/rule/knowledge model of human error (2005).  I-CAM provides a 
classification system for various local or latent factors that may be involved in an 
incident (De Landre, Gibb et al., 2006).  
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Whilst there is some overlap between using CDM with the Decision Ladder and I-
CAM, the latter does not include a structured interview process or detailed model for 
representing decisions.  Therefore, the findings of I-CAM investigation were 
reviewed to determine if any key points identified by the structured interview CDM 
were omitted.  This was seen as possible because whilst I-CAM does include an 
interview stage, it is only guided by broad principles rather than the formalised 
process to elicit specific knowledge of key decisions offered by CDM.  Additionally, 
the recommendations of I-CAM were reviewed to determine if they differed from 
those that emerged after using the decisions ladder. The judgement of success in 
this case is that the application of CDM and the Decision Ladder was able to 
successfully elicit information and/or design changes that were not contained in the 
original analysis. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Detailed Case Study 
To illustrate the detail of applying the process, an incident where a haul truck drove 
into an overheard chute for soil that has been rejected from the process plant is 
explained in detail.  A flowchart of the incident is shown in Figure 3.9.  This flowchart 
is the chunks created from CDM sweeps 1 and 2.  This shows the major stages of 
the event, in text boxes, and the points where risk controls were defeated, as 
rectangles – after boxes 3, 6, 11 and 13. 
!
The key decision areas were noted to be the electrician deciding not to test the 
repair and the driver commencing driving with the tray up, forgetting to pull the lever 
that brings the tray down.  These decisions were noted to occur just prior to the 
second last and last potential risk controls being defeated.  These key decision 
points were further explored in Sweep 3. 
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!  
Figure 3.9: The timeline of the incident with points of defeated risk controls 
!
Notable information, none of which was subsequently found in the I-CAM report, 
included: 
• The driver had rarely previously started the truck with the tray up. 
• ‘Idiot Balls’ were placed around the mine, but the park up bay was past the 
last idiot ball. These are large plastic balls dangling from wire that would be 
hit if equipment is entering an area above the height were it will strike 
equipment or power lines. 
• The display for ‘tray up’ was only visual and was possibly obscured by sun 
glare. 
• The driver was talking to the electrician during the drive. 
• There was no visual feedback to the driver that the tray had, or had not, 
started lowering. 
!
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Similarly, example findings from the “what if” inquiries (Sweep 4) that were not noted 
in the previous I-CAM investigation report were: 
• An audible signal might have alerted the driver to the fact that the tray was 
raised. 
• If the driver was not a friend of the electricians, the driver may have noticed 
the tray (due to him being partially distracted by their conversation). 
• If the park up bay was further from the reject bin or the road conditions were 
better, the driver would have reached 8km/h and set off the tray up alarm. 
!
Following the CDM the two decisions were mapped on the Decision Ladder.  The 
decision not to test the tray involved a jump from ‘future state awareness’ (3) to ‘plan 
awareness’ (8) as depicted by Figure 3.10.  This was determined because the 
electrician appears to have determined that the problem was fixed, predicting a 
future state, and then jumped to driving away without any evaluation or further 
thought.  It then appears that any intervention would be best to force the decision to 
go through more evaluation actions after a breakdown of this type.  An infield post 
maintenance checklist for the driver and the maintainer to complete is suggested to 
force the decision through the stage ‘plan evaluation’ on the decision ladder. 
!
The decision by the driver not to push the tray up lever appears to have been almost 
automatic.  The operator performed exactly the same movements that he would in a 
normal start up.  This indicates a skill based behaviour jumping straight from 
‘Awareness (Task and Context Information)’ (1) to ‘plan awareness’ (8) as depicted 
in Figure 3.11.  Therefore, it is suggested that any intervention would help a driver 
perceive that the situation is abnormal and the tray is up.  The design suggestion is 
to insert a tone to indicate that the tray is up on start-up and continue as a warning 
until it is lowered.  Therefore, in this case CDM was able to uncover extra information 
not obtained in the current incident investigation and the decision ladder was able to 
successfully represent key decisions in a way that aided design suggestions. 
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Figure 3.10: 1st Key Decision. 3-8 jump. Figure 3.11: 2nd Key Decision. 1-8 jump 
Electrician does not check fault is fixed. Driver does not lower the tray 
3.3.2 Decision Analysis and Representation Summary Tables 
A summary of the data collected from the nine CDMs is presented in the following 
tables.  This includes the description of the incident, the main notes and findings 
from CDM and the key decisions, including a representation on the decision ladder, 
and design suggestions.  Overall, all of the trials were able to uncover key decisions 
and environmental influences.  This could then be translated into Decision Ladders 
and novel and specific design suggestions.  Extra information was revealed in each 
of the six incidents where an investigation report was available directly or through 
operator account. 
!
!
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Incident 1:  
Uncontrolled drop of shovel bucket that collided with a reversing haul truck. 
!!!
Critical Decision Method Summary
Short Description from CDM Main CDM Findings!
Interviewee was operating a shovel and loading 
haul trucks when there was an uncontrolled drop of 
the bucket. 
At the time a haul truck was backing under the 
shovel.   !
The bucket dropped just before the haul truck was 
under the shovel but it could not stop before 
reversing into it.   !
Had the drop happened later it could have fallen 
into the tray of the haul truck.
!
There is a tendency for the bucket to ‘drift’ downwards if not actively 
pulled back.  This might have caused the operator to pull back on the 
lever when the bucket fell, rather than pressing the emergency stop 
button. !
Operator noted that a fault error displayed on the screen that he had 
not previously seen, and was not in the instruction manual.
Decision Representation and Design Suggestions
Major Decision Jump 
Code
Jump Icon Suggested Design Interventions
!
When the bucket started to fall the 
operator pulled back the lever rather than 
press emergency stop  
!
1-8.
!
Consider placing an emergency stop 
function on the shovel controls/ joystick 
rather than as a separate button.
Rationale
Decision was immediate physical 
action in response to the 
environment.
Comparison to I-CAM
Compared 
to I-CAM
Findings compared with I-CAM
!
YES
!
The I-CAM report does not note how the driver attempted to halt the bucket. !
Error message that the driver claims to have seen is not noted. !
It also has only a very short description of the incident and one word answers to I-CAM questions, which 
would make it difficult to ascertain a pattern should a similar event reoccur.
!
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Incident 2: Rollover of bulldozer whilst pushing/cleaning overburden (top soil) 
!
Critical Decision Method Summary
Short Description from CDM Main CDM Findings!
Interviewee was a trainee bulldozer driver pushing 
back overburden alongside a trainer operator. !
The trainer was working on the overburden in 
another bulldozer and paying only little attention to 
the trainee. !
At the point of the rollover he was working in a ‘cut’ 
directly next to the trainee and creating a lower 
level. !
Trainee was attempting to reverse straight back, but 
was actually going at an inaccurate angle and the 
vehicle fell into the trainer’s ‘cut’, causing it to 
rollover onto its roof.
!
The lack of awareness by the trainee that he was not reversing in a 
straight line was a key cause of this incident. !
Factors increasing the likelihood of this error included the limited rear 
vision, the lack of light (night shift) and perceived pressure to keep up 
with the trainer’s pace. !
The trainer’s lack of intervention (e.g. by radio communication) in this 
was also a key cause. !
Additionally, having another bulldozer working in close proximity 
created the conditions (i.e. the ‘cut’) where the bulldozer could roll.
Decision Representation and Design Suggestions
Major Decision Jump 
Code
Jump Icon Suggested Design Interventions
!
The trainee bulldozer operator decides 
that he needs to reverse, looks over his 
shoulder to diagnose the situation and 
then reverses.  
!
2-8
!
A reverse facing camera to let the 
trainee see out the rear. !
Coloured light to the ground out of the 
rear to indicate heading in relation to 
other objects. !
Raised cab position in future models to 
improve view to rear. !
Potential to use remote control.
Rationale
After ‘diagnosing’ the state of the 
ground the trainee immediately 
reversed.
Comparison to I-CAM
Compared 
to I-CAM
Findings compared with I-CAM
!
YES
The supervision of the trainee was the key factor noted in the I-CAM and the practice of having a trainer work 
next to a trainee was ceased. !
Key factors relating to the error reversing were not identified, such as the low lighting, perceived time 
pressure and lack of vision out of the cab.
!
!
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Incident 3: Fire at a fuelling station 
!
Critical Decision Method Summary
Short Description from CDM Main CDM Findings!
The fire occurred at the fuelling station when the interviewee 
was working as an offsider (helper) to a fuelling serviceman. !
Sometime after connecting a ‘wiggins fitting’, which 
automatically fills the fuel station using the engine of the 
pump, both participants noticed that fuel was spraying out of 
the top of the fuel station. !
This fuel landed on the top of the turbocharger of the 
refuelling truck and caught fire immediately, at which point 
both the serviceman and the interviewee fled the area and a 
large fire ensued.
!
The serviceman attempted to cancel pumping using the 
control system, indicating that an emergency stop was not 
fitted or available near the operator’s position. (The 
interviewee thought this was likely, but it would require 
confirmation.) !
Vehicle movement was isolated using the park break.  In 
another case this might have prevented the vehicle being 
moved which would have stopped the fuel hitting the fire. !
There was no protection/barrier between the hot engine and 
the fuel landing on it from the pump.
Decision Representation and Design Suggestions
Major Decision Jump 
Code
Jump Icon Suggested Design Interventions
!
Potential Error in truck placement 
recognises goals but skips anticipation of 
future state (failure) and jumps to plan 
awareness.
!
2-8
!
Place greater protection/guarding over 
the turbocharger. !
Place an emergency stop on the pump 
controls.
Rationale
The driver ‘diagnoses’ a flat area to 
park near the fuel station and then 
immediately parks.
Comparison to I-CAM
Compared 
to I-CAM
Findings compared with I-CAM
!
YES
The I-CAM noted a corrective action was fit a ‘deflector’ on the fuel tank to assist in preventing fuel heading in 
the direction of the pumping vehicle.  Additionally, a cover was placed over the engines. !
The difficulty in cancelling the fuel flow, and the emergency stop, was not noted. !
The potential issue of unengaging park brake isolation in an emergency was not addressed.
!
!
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Incident 4: Drove Haul Truck with Dump Tray Up Striking the Reject Bins 
Critical Decision Method Summary
Short Description from CDM Main CDM Findings
Whilst working as a haul truck driver the interviewee 
noticed that after dumping a load and driving away 
from an area whilst the tray descended the truck was 
able to shift up to second gear and pass 8km/h 
without an alarm sounding.  Shifting up gears should 
be prevented automatically and an alarm set off if the 
truck passes 8km/h without the tray fully descended. !
The driver called maintenance to notify them of the 
issue.  After some time they notified him that an 
electrician was available and to park the truck. The 
driver did this on his way collect a load from the reject 
bin; an overhead chute which transfers waste from 
the process plant into the truck. !
The electrician worked on the issue, thought it was 
solved, and sat in dicky (spare) seat to catch a ride to 
the maintenance shed. The driver forgot to pull lever 
to take tray down, the alarm does not sound, as the 
issue had not been fixed or speed not yet exceeded 
8km/h, and the upright tray strikes the reject bin.
The reject bin is surrounded by ‘idiot balls’:  large balls on wire that 
would normally be contacted before entering the area of the reject 
bin if a tray is in the upright position.  However, the park up bay that 
the driver selected was past these idiot balls. !
The electrician felt he had fixed the issue of the lack of tray alarm, 
but this was not tested or the test was accidently missed. Other than 
the tray alarm, there may have been a display showing the driver 
that the tray was in the upright position.   !
The alarm may actually have been working but the truck not at 8km/
h before striking the reject bin. !
The driver and the electrician knew each other and were friendly.  
They may have been distracted whilst chatting leading to the above 
oversights. !
It is extremely unusual for a driver to start a truck with the tray in the 
upright position. Therefore, the automatic pattern of behaviour on 
start-up does not include putting the lever to bring the tray down.  
The driver said he performed ‘exactly what I normally do’.
Decision Representation and Design Suggestions
Major Decision Jump 
Code
Jump Icon Suggested Design Interventions
!
Decision error by the electrician not to test 
the tray, assuming that it worked.  He had 
awareness of the future state but didn’t 
appear to evaluate the plan of action 
before acting on the plan to drive.
!
3-8 
Add a maintenance checklist for the 
driver and the maintainer to complete 
following jobs in field to be reviewed by 
the driver.
Rationale
The electrician anticipated the likely 
fix but did not consider any other 
options.!
The driver made a decision error to start 
driving with the tray up.  The driver started 
to drive, not thinking there would be 
issues but perhaps checking for them.  He 
reports to have viewed dashboard 
indicators and not seen the tray up 
indicator.
!
 1-8
Move park up bay the other side of idiot 
balls. !
Insert a tone to indicate that the tray is 
up on start-up and continue as a 
warning until it is lowered.Rationale
When the driver was informed of the 
fix he immediately acted to start the 
truck.
Comparison to I-CAM
!   
!
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!
Compared 
to I-CAM
Findings compared with I-CAM
!
YES
The I-CAMs corrective actions were re-enforce the need for walk around inspections, the installation of 
sacrificial devices close to the reject bin to soften/lessen collisions. The I-CAM did not note that the roadway 
was designed such that a park-up bay was past the ‘idiot balls’.  !
I-CAM did not investigate how the driver may have missed pulling the lever to lower the tray.  However, the 
CDM found it was probably because he usually does not pull the lever at start-up and preformed his usual 
start-up movements whilst talking to the electrician.
Critical Decision Method Summary
Short Description from CDM Main CDM Findings
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Incident 5: Rollover of troop-carrier 
!
Critical Decision Method Summary
Short Description from CDM Main CDM Findings!
Rollover occurred on a 10% grade ramp.  Just prior 
to the rollover a water truck had watered one side of 
the ramp. !
Driver was moving off the ‘rough’ road and skidded 
when one side of the vehicle hit wet but hard and 
slippery clay. !
Vehicle had 4-wheel-drive but was engaged in 2 
wheel drive at that time. !
The vehicle was not exceeding the designated 
speed limit.
!
The watering of the ramp was an important primary causal factor. !
Subsequently, the judgement of the road conditions and speed was 
an important causal factor in the rollover. !
This was, potentially, made more likely by the type of vehicle and non-
engagement of 4WD.
Decision Representation and Design Suggestions
Major Decision Jump 
Code
Jump Icon Suggested Design Interventions
!
It appears that the driver was reacting to 
the rough road and almost automatically 
moved to the other side of the road, 
moving straight from awareness to plan 
awareness or understanding the issue 
and to plan awareness.
!
1-8
!
Review the skid/steer/stability systems 
of the troop carriers. !
Introduce GPS speed monitoring 
systems. !
Review watering and road management 
strategy – the road may have been too 
wet.
Rationale
The driver felt the rough road and 
automatically responded by moving 
towards smoother road.
Comparison to I-CAM
Compared to 
I-CAM
Findings compared with I-CAM
!
Results of I-CAM reported 
by interviewee, but not 
confirmed in writing.
!
Main result of the I-CAM was to re-write watering policy on ramps, changing from continuous to 
spot watering.  Input of troop carrier factors appears overlooked: such as speed, driver 
judgement and the engaging 4WD.
!
!
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Incident 6: Collision between Bulldozer and Grader 
!
!
Critical Decision Method Summary
Short Description from CDM Main CDM Findings
A grader, driven by the interviewee, was parked in a line of trucks waiting 
for a shovel load, meaning that the grader could not move significantly. !
The bulldozer that was cleaning up the face where the shovel had been 
backed to within 10-20m of the grader.  At this time the grader operator 
radioed the bulldozer operator and at the same time the bulldozer moved 
forwards. !
The bulldozer subsequently reversed again, to make the next cut.  As the 
bulldozer reached the same zone the grader operator did not radio the 
bulldozer operator believing the previous radio contact had made the 
bulldozer operator aware of his location. !
However, the bulldozer operator had never seen the grader and the fact he 
moved forwards on the previous radio call was a coincidence.
The grader operator perceived that the 
bulldozer operator had heard him because of 
the timing of change in direction.  But this 
turned out to be a coincidence. !
The bulldozer involved had limited rear vision 
which likely caused the inability to see the 
grader even though it was parked directly 
behind the bulldozer. !
The bulldozer also has significant noise. This 
can mask radio calls, which was likely in this 
case. !
The design of roadways and vehicle 
separation may have also played a role.
Major Decision Jump 
Code
Jump Icon Suggested Design Interventions
!
The decision to consider the bulldozer 
operators movement away on radio as a 
receipt of the call, when in fact it was 
coincidental.
!
3-8
!
Vehicle proximity detection or collision 
avoidance systems. !
Replace/modify the radio system in the 
bulldozer to make it more audible (e.g. 
wireless headset.Rationale
The grader operator radioed was the 
bulldozer operator anticipating had 
not seen him – the only action 
available.  However, on movement 
away the no other options were 
considered.
Comparison to I-CAM
Compared to 
I-CAM
Findings compared with I-CAM
!
Results of Investigation 
reported by interviewee, but 
not confirmed in writing.
The interviewee noted that the investigation attributed the cause of the accident to be 
primarily due to lack of confirmation that a radio call had been heard. The CDM 
investigation found that the incident was much more complex, and continued radio calls by 
the interviewee was unlikely to have prevented the collision. No design suggestions appear 
to have been considered, let alone noted or implemented.
!
!
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!
Incident 7: Engine Fire in Digger 
!
Critical Decision Method Summary
Short Description from CDM Main CDM Findings
Machine was an older model with existing issues. Operators stated that the 
engine was ‘surging’ during driver ‘hot seat’ change.  
  
At this stage, a general/informal inspection was conducted for ‘something out of 
the ordinary’.  However, a driver would not necessarily know the specific cause 
for surging- it is up to the judgement of the operator to notify maintenance. !
Operator continued to operate the equipment after the fire began, as it was at the 
rear of the machine and not visible to the driver.  He was notified of smoke by a 
haul truck driver – had this not occurred the incident could have been significantly 
worse. !
In this case he manually pressed the fire suppression immediately because of the 
urgency conveyed by the driver.  Usually operators would not press the fire 
suppression unless they saw flames, as it was known to be costly.  Newer 
equipment automatically sets off fire suppression on smoke/fire detection.
!
The driver of equipment must informally 
check equipment in the field, making 
judgements on the seriousness of 
issues.  This is solely based on their 
experience and instinct. !
The communication between equipment 
operators can be key to identifying if 
smoke is abnormal and the presence of 
fires in their early stage. !
The high financial cost of falsely 
pressing the fire suppression system 
does influence the operator’s decision to 
engage the system.
Decision Representation and Design Suggestions
Major Decision Jump Code Jump Icon Suggested Design Interventions
The positive decision to press the 
fire suppression was an unfamiliar 
situation seemingly requiring more 
formal cognitive processes of 
understanding.  However, he 
didn’t have to formulate a plan as 
only one was available.
!
3-7.
In this case, the design decision 
already exists: automatic fire 
suppression systems. !
This incident indicated that 
situations could exist where the 
digger operators could react too 
late to a fire if it is not noticed by 
another mobile equipment 
operator. !
This supports the 
implementation of automatic 
systems.
Rationale
The decision included some interpreting of the 
meaning of smoke detected by the haul truck driver.  
The driver did not need to go through a cognitive 
process to determine that fire was unwanted, 
jumping over identification of desired state. The only 
option considered was to press the fire suppression. 
He indicated he paused to consider the financial 
consequences releasing the system indicating the 
plan was evaluated before enacted.
Comparison to I-CAM
Compared to 
I-CAM
Findings compared with I-CAM
!
No. 
No I-CAM available
!
__________
!
!
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Incident 8: Loss of control of haul truck down a ramp 
!
Critical Decision Method Summary
Short Description from CDM Main CDM Findings!
The loss of control took place on a wet ramp in rainy conditions.  The operators 
had been discussing the conditions, and whether they warranted ‘parking up’. !
Loss of control took place when the vehicle was unloaded it descending the ramp 
on approximately the 30!
Usually a slip is more likely when descending unloaded, and whilst a driver may 
notice some issues when ascending loaded they are generally committed to an 
entire run once loaded. !
The road was ‘cambered, seemingly encouraging higher speeds to the 
interviewee driving the truck. !
The driver skidded when going around the corner, and ended up facing ‘up’ on 
the down side of the ramp having spun approximately 180-270 degrees.
!
The judgement of when rain causes the 
roads to become dangerous is a key 
decision made by the team.  This 
decision is not black and white and 
would have external influences, such as 
production pressure/competition. !
The misjudgement of safe speed, set by 
the auto-retarder, down a ramp was a 
key cause of the accident worthy of 
further investigation. !
The roadway design, with a ramp that 
included a banked corner, could have 
also been a cause of the accident.
Major Decision Jump 
Code
Jump Icon Suggested Design Interventions
!
The decision not to park up seems like it 
is a 5-8 jump.  The decision gets all the 
way to a value judgement of the 
environment, but in the absence of an 
overriding reason, with all incentives to 
keep productions going, not to halt they 
decide to continue. 
!
3-8
Feedback from the tire grip/spinning 
could be used to inform the driver. !
Centralise the park up decision to a 
person who has access to weather 
information and contact to drivers.
Rationale
The decision appeared to involved 
repeated and conscious evaluation 
of the situation, involving steps 1-3, 
with the decision not to park up 
jumping directly from an anticipation 
of the future state.
Comparison to I-CAM
Compared to 
I-CAM
Findings compared with I-CAM
No. 
Investigation was not conducted. 
Incident prior to site I-CAM use.
!
__________
!
!
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!!
Incident 9:  
Missing Alignment when Reversing Haul Truck to Shovel for loading 
!
Critical Decision Method Summary
Short Description from CDM Main CDM Findings!
This interview was regarding the 
general issues with alignment of the 
haul truck when backing into a shovel.   !
The driver had not been involved in 
an incident, such as a collision with 
the bucked of a shovel.   !
However, this is known to happen and 
the interviewee (a driver) was asked 
to describe in detail how this task is 
typically achieved.
!
The driver used a number of ‘tricks’ and cues when reversing.  This included using 
just the left mirror, past tracks of haul trucks, horn or radio from the shovel operator 
to correct positioning. !
If the first truck to reverse to a particular position of the shovel lines up poorly there 
is a tendency for future drivers to use their tracks as a guide and repeat the 
mistake. !
The reversing camera is not very useful in lining up correctly but may help the driver 
pick up any rocks dropped by previous drivers. !
Glare from the sun in the side mirror, causing the driver to lose vision of the shovel 
for a short time, was thought to be the most common cause of lining up incorrectly.
Decision Representation and Design Suggestions
Major Decision Jump 
Code
Jump Icon Suggested Design Interventions
!
Decision to follow the ‘failed’ repeat paths 
of the driver was determined to be the 
most likely cause of lining up incorrectly. 
!
2-8
!
Insert down-lights on shovels that 
indicate the zone, visible during the day 
and night, where truck should not park.   !
This offers guidance to the operator that 
can correct previous incorrect paths 
made by other trucks.
Rationale
In a situation where this failure 
occurs the decision jumps straight 
from recognition of the previous 
tracks to following them without any 
evaluation of other options or the 
plan.
Comparison to I-CAM
Compared to 
I-CAM
Findings compared with I-CAM
No. 
Not a specific incident.
!
__________
!
!
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3.4 Discussion 
The key findings of the research can be condensed into five discussion points.  
3.4.1 Mining equipment incidents have complex causes 
The CDM revealed many of the incidents related to mining equipment to be complex 
in nature involving the alignment of a number of events and the failure of numerous 
barriers of defence, commonly triggered by local atypical conditions.  This aligns well 
with the James Reason model of the dynamics of organisational accident causation 
(Reason, 1990; Reason 1997) and supports the view that CDM could be a valuable 
tool to add to incident investigation.  For example, in the above-reported incident 
where a bulldozer struck a grader, the immediate causes of unsafe acts involved the 
parking of the grader and loss of situational awareness by the bulldozer operator.  
However, upstream the local workplace factor of the design of traffic flow on site and 
the organisational factor of production pressure made the unsafe acts more likely to 
result in an incident. 
3.4.2 CDM and the Decision Ladder increases in value with incident complexity 
In general, the CDM interview process was able to establish a good understanding of 
the incident in most applications.  In all situations CDM was able to establish a 
narrative of an incident.  In each of these narratives there did appear to be a key 
decision or decisions made by human operators that were central to the eventual 
outcome.  From this information, the Decision Ladder was able to be used to 
represent the decisions which aided the generation of seemingly appropriate design 
suggestions.  In complex situations, the interview was successful not only in 
establishing the story of what happened, but also the critical decisions made and the 
operator’s sense making related to these decisions.  For example, the incident 
where a haul truck lost control whilst descending a ramp at first appeared to be a 
simple case of excessive speed for the conditions.  However, further probing in the 
CDM found the decisions were significantly more complex, such as the complex 
team decision on judging when wet weather makes conditions too dangerous.  Even 
the driver’s choice of speed descending the ramp used significant environmental 
cues. 
!
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With less complex events, involving simpler decisions the first two stages of the 
CDM were helpful in establishing the circumstances surrounding the incident.  
However, if the decisions made were relatively straightforward using obvious 
environmental cues then the ‘deepening’ and ‘what if’ probes did not add significantly 
to the understanding of the event.  From this information, the Decision Ladder was 
able to be used to represent the decisions which aided the generation of seemingly 
appropriate design suggestions. For example, the latter stages of CDM for the fire in 
the digger example (#7 in the results list) did not gain significant information because 
the cue of smoke and the action of pressing the fire suppression system was not a 
complex decision. 
!
However, the Decision Ladder does have a limit to the representation of complex 
decisions.  In this instance the decisions were able to be represented on single 
Decision Ladders.  However, this may not be the case for more complex scenarios, 
especially those involving multiple decision makers and sequential decisions.  In 
these cases, however, the use of a series of Decision Ladders could offer a solution.  
For example, Higgins (2003) found that in production controlled manufacturing, 
which has very tight timeframes and complex inter-related decisions, a series of 
ladders was required because a discovery in one decision triggered a connection to 
the ‘alert’ stage in another. This is depicted in Figure 3.12.  As the introduction of 
new techniques and technologies in mining is likely to make systems more tightly 
coupled and complex, it is recommended that any future application of the Decision 
Ladder be designed in such a way that multiple Decision Ladders can be used. 
!
Figure 3.12: A sequence of Decision Ladders in a complex environment 
(Adapted from Higgins, 2003)  
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3.4.3 CDM uncovers important details not in site investigation reports 
Upon reviewing the incidents it was evident that the CDM interviews identified 
information not contained in the I-CAM report.  For example, in the incident where an 
overhead chute was impacted by a haul truck with the tray in the upright position (#4 
in the results list), large colourful balls on wires – locally known as ‘idiot balls’ – were 
set below the height of the chute in the surrounding area.  These serve as height 
indicators for drivers, similar to chains on low bridges or entrances to suburban car 
parks.  They would have usually been contacted, prior to the chute, if a tray was in 
the upright position.  However, a designated park up position for the haul truck was 
located past these balls.  In this park up location, the operator raised the tray for a 
maintenance task and either forgot to lower it or did not notice that it had failed to 
lower before driving towards the reject bin.  The location of the park-up bay and the 
idiot balls were not included in the incident investigation report. 
!
In another example, the I-CAM report of the incident involving a road grader and a 
bulldozer (#6 in the results list) found that breaching procedures and not establishing 
radio contact between operators was the primary ‘cause’ of the accident.  Therefore, 
a reminder to operators to follow procedures about radio contact was the sole action 
taken to prevent a repeat collision. However, the CDM identified that the background 
noise of the bulldozer and the hearing protection worn by the operator meant that it 
was likely that the operator could not hear the supplied radio and positive radio 
contact would not be established in this situation if repeated.  Therefore, the 
provisional conclusion is that using the CDM method could assist in data gathering 
and building a rich incident narrative for I-CAM or similar investigation processes. 
3.4.4 Site culture and hindsight need to be managed 
During a number of interviews, it appeared that the site culture affected the 
interviewee’s perspective of the incidents.  Specifically, the interviewees generally 
appeared reluctant to consider the influence of a system and more likely to blame 
the actions of people, including their own.  They were often heard to use phrases like 
‘I should have’ or ‘he should have’ and drift into generalisations about what was 
required by a specified procedure.   
!
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In one case, the participant noted that he and another employee shared the blame 
for a collision by not establishing positive radio contact when, in fact, it is likely that 
the radio system was unusable in the situation. This reflects Dekker’s ‘Bad Apple 
Theory’ of human error where failures are introduced into a system due to unreliable 
persons and corrected by tightening procedures (Dekker, 2006). Therefore, 
occasionally it was necessary to prompt participants to investigate alternatives rather 
than using phrases like ‘that would never happen’. This was especially so when 
investigations had already been undertaken and the findings had been widely 
disseminated. 
3.4.5 Jumps in Decision Ladder revealed decisions were naturalistic 
Jumps in the Decision Ladder occurred at levels that Rasumussen would describe 
as skill or rule-based (Rasmussen, 1986). Whilst this is only a sample of decisions, it 
does give some indication that explicit and simultaneous consideration of multiple 
options is probably uncommon for equipment operators.  Rather, as would have 
been expected, operators appear to be making decisions in ways that are more 
congruous with naturalistic models.  In the absence of other evidence, mobile 
equipment designers should, in general, avoid interventions that are time-consuming 
and require comparing multiple options in favour of those that improve the accuracy 
of heuristic jumps. The design ladder was able to display a decision path that is 
clearly explainable to managers. Therefore, it might be an effective tool in moving 
from a mindset of operator blame to design solutions that support naturalistic 
decisions. 
!
However, whilst the Decision Ladder appeared a useful way to represent these 
decisions in a way that aided the selection of effective design solutions it would 
benefit from validation in mining.  The current representations are only based on an 
interpretation by one researcher.  The reliability of the ladders between users must 
therefore be verified.  Additionally, whilst the ladder has been found to reliably lead to 
improved designs in other domains, the design recommendations described above 
remain unimplemented.  Therefore, taking the design recommendations through to 
full concepts and implementation would be necessary to allow verification that the 
method can lead to improved designs.   
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3.5 Conclusions and Recommendations  
3.5.1 Overall Value 
The use of the CDM technique in the analysis of mining equipment incidents has 
shown that the knowledge elicited can provide a rich, operator-centred narrative.  
Also, it can provide valuable ‘extra’ information compared to the incident analysis 
methods currently in use (e.g. I-CAM).  By focusing on the key decision points for 
operators, and unpicking the cues, information, goals, prior experience and related 
probes, the research was able to obtain a much deeper description of the incident 
events than the standard narratives used in much of the minerals industry today. 
Additionally, Decision Ladders can help represent the decisions and identify where 
redesigns could be of value. 
3.5.2 Recommendations for Method Development 
The use of CDM and Decision Ladders in mining could be beneficial to understand 
and document a wide variety of decisions.  However, to date, it has largely been 
seen as a tool to be used by professionals.  If their usefulness is to be tested in any 
widespread sense, then they must be packaged together as a single tool which could 
be more easily used with limited training.  It is recommended that any packaging of 
the two methods into a single tool should include altering the language, especially of 
the Decision Ladder.  Furthermore, it is recommended that the Decision Ladder be 
included in the interview with the participant directly involved in recording the 
decision path and making any design suggestions.  Likewise, suggestions from other 
authors include attaching elements of the Decision Ladder to locations/objects/
artefacts with the system (Jenkins, Stanton et al., 2010).  This can be simply 
achieved by adding notes on each process of the ladder. 
!
More widespread application could ultimately uncover common themes in critical 
decisions in mining.  Such common themes have been used to successfully 
categorise event specific findings in healthcare after widespread application of CDM 
(Patterson, Render et al, 2002).  The themes may be able to be matched with 
appropriate control suggestions.  However, this would require widespread application 
of CDM in mining before enough reliable information is gained. 
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3.5.3 Recommendations for further research 
Overall, by focusing on decision making in real mining environments, it is contended 
that this research successfully modified and applied the CDM technique to this 
domain. Once a toolkit has been established to allow efficient and consistent 
application, further work to now integrate it into mining incident investigation 
processes is strongly recommended. Additionally, the potential to apply CDM and the 
Decision Ladder proactively is an attractive topic for future research. Work with an 
underground gold mine was completed to test the technique’s use when introducing 
a proximity detection system.  This will be explored in the next Chapter. 
!
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Chapter 4 
Evaluating the Effectiveness of an Underground 
Vehicle Proximity Detection System to Designed 
to Prevent Collisions 
Abstract 
Proximity detection technology is increasingly being employed in mining equipment 
in an attempt to prevent collisions.  Such proximity detection systems rely on 
operator decision-making and action. To improve system usability, acceptance and 
effectiveness, a proximity detection device installed at an Australian underground 
gold mine was evaluated, redesigned and deployed using a range of human factors 
methods. The results of the evaluation of the proximity detection system identified 
deficiencies with the usability of the interface and limitations with the overall 
effectiveness of the system to help prevent collisions. An investigation of a 
subsequent collision at the mine site verified many of these observed issues.  
Interface redesign recommendations were made, and a new system was 
consequently developed and deployed.  The subsequent change in operator 
acceptance after the implementation of the new interface was positive. It was 
concluded that the application of human factors methods can lead to positive 
changes to the design of proximity detection systems and, more broadly, to develop 
effective mining vehicle technologies from a user-centred perspective.  
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Equipment Visibility and Injuries  
Restricted operator vision from mobile mining equipment has been noted as an 
unresolved issue for safety in surface and underground operations (Bhattacherya, 
Dunn et al., 2006; Ruff, Coleman et al., 2011; Sammarco, Gallagher et al., 2012).  
The issue is most serious in underground environments where the requirement for 
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equipment to fit in small spaces severely restricts lines of sight from operating 
positions (Godwin, Eger et al., 2007).  In this environment there is often less than 
one metre clearance between the vehicle, on both sides, and the walls (Simpson, 
Horberry et al., 2009).  There are often situations where it is necessary for the 
operator to use the roof and walls, rather than the ground or road, as a guide.  For 
example, Boocock and Weyman (1994) found that drivers of Load-Haul-Dump (LHD) 
vehicles have their vision restricted so much that they steer by looking along the 
near side of the equipment, concentrating on keeping the front corner as close to the 
wall. To make matters worse, pedestrians are often working in close proximity to the 
mobile equipment (Ruff, Coleman et al., 2011).  Figure 4.1 shows a visibility 
assessment of an LHD. 
!
!  
Figure 4.1: Visibility from an LHD. Black marks no operator line-of-sight (from 
Eger, Godwin et al. 2010) 
!
The combination of these factors makes the interaction between mobile mining 
equipment and other equipment or persons intrinsically dangerous and collisions at 
underground mines have been noted to be a prevalent cause of serious injury or 
fatality (Eger, Salmoni et al., 2004; Burgess-Limerick, 2011). For example, recent 
Australian data suggest that approximately 35% of mining fatalities are due to 
vehicle interactions (Bell, 2009). Burgess-Limerick identified 41 fatalities occurring 
between 2000 and 2011 from collisions in underground coal mines operating in the 
U.S.A. (Burgess-Limerick, 2011).  
!
!116
4.1.2 Improving Line of Sight to Prevent Collisions 
One obvious solution to the issue of limited visibility is to improve direct lines of sight 
from the driver’s cabin. This could be paired with improving environmental 
impediments to visibility.  On equipment currently in operation, this is unlikely to be 
possible.  However, on new designs visibility can often be improved.  For example 
one study found that a relatively simple human simulation software could be used to 
identify various design modifications to improve visibility on an underground Load-
Haul-Dump vehicle (Godwin, Eger et al., 2008).  Design modifications included as 
thinning light posts, lowering mudguards and adding windows.  Some of these can 
be seen in Figure 4.2. 
!  
Figure 4.2: Design modification to improve visibility that note minimal 
improvement (from Godwin, Eger et al. 2008) 
!
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However, there are competing incentives in design which can limit visibility. This 
especially includes ensuring the cabin provides an operator with appropriate 
protection during equipment rollover and maximising load and haul capacity (Tyson, 
1997).  Additionally, underground mines still have restrictions on space and 
environmental limitations on visibility such tunnel walls.  Therefore, even on new 
designs, vision from the operator’s position will remain limited to some degree.  In 
fact, in the study by Godwin, Eger et al cited above, the design modifications on new 
equipment did not improve visibility as substantially as they anticipated and they 
recommended that other safety strategies be concurrently pursued (Godwin, Eger et 
al., 2008). 
4.1.3 Technological Support to Overcome Line of Sight Restrictions 
Various technological aids to reduce collision risk have been trialled.  The ultimate 
aim of these technologies is to prevent vehicles colliding with other vehicles, persons 
and infrastructure.  They aim to assist the driver determine the location of equipment, 
people, or other obstacles  in the surrounding environment and supplement other 
information sources such as radio communication, mirrors and direct line of sight.  
The most widely implemented aids are cameras that display blind spots of the 
vehicle to the driver via an in-cab display (Godwin and Eger, 2009).  More recently, 
proximity detection, collision detection and collision avoidance systems have been 
deployed in mobile mining equipment such as haul trucks, trains and light vehicles 
(Horberry, Burgess-Limerick et al. 2010).  These systems draw on a variety of 
technologies, which have been implemented to varying degrees, including radar, 
radio frequency tags, ultrasonic sensors, laser detection and GPS (Ruff, Coleman et 
al., 2011). 
!
The common defining feature of these systems is that they all detect the presence of 
defined objects within an area around the equipment.  Objects can be other pieces of 
equipment, defined pieces of infrastructure or even individual persons.  However, a 
variety of actions post detection are possible, from leaving total responsibility for 
taking action to the equipment operator, to completely automated vehicle response.  
A graphical representation of the spectrum for the locus of controls of technology, 
adapted from Van der Laan et al (1997), is shown in Figure 4.3. 
!
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!  
Figure 4.3:  Locus of control spectrum of in-vehicle systems such as proximity 
detection (adapted from Van der Laan, 1997). 
!
The technologies which automate actions based on detection either partially or fully 
restrict the choice of the operator.  They are referred to as Collision Avoidance 
Technology (CAT) technologies and would fall to the right of the centre on the locus 
of control. The most common automated action is automatic machine braking or shut 
down.  There are also technologies which simply provide information to operators, 
such as warning lights/alarms, and give them complete choice of the appropriate 
course of action.  These are referred to as Proximity Detection Technology (PDT) 
technologies and are represented on the left on the locus of control. Some systems 
fall in the middle such as those that assess and communicate collision potential and 
those that suggest or restrict some actions.  In mining, proximity detection 
technology is vastly more researched, available and implemented than collision 
avoidance technologies. 
!
Other technologies to prevent collisions have been trialled.  For example a lighting 
system which indicates vehicle movements to pedestrians has been found to 
improve the speed at which people detect vehicle movement, with the intention of 
increasing the time to take evasive action if necessary (Sammarco, Gallagher et al., 
2012).  However, the research and development effort to avoid collisions in mining 
has recently been extremely focused on proximity detection and collision avoidance 
systems.  Its use is being pursued, and even compelled, in a number of jurisdictions 
(Horberry, Burgess-Limerick et al., 2011).   
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4.1.4 Relationship between Technology and Domain of Use 
There are a variety of scenarios in mining in which proximity detection may be 
employed.  This includes low speed vehicles operating underground, through to high 
speed driving on public surface roads.  Therefore, it seems unlikely that a specific 
system, or for that matter a specific technology, will be suitable for all scenarios 
(Horberry, Burgess-Limerick et al., 2011).   
!
In mining, collision detection and proximity warning systems cover a wide variety of 
technologies.  However, each differs in where, when and how they can be used with 
the primary split between surface and underground operations. Despite huge 
differences in the equipment design, the operating environment technology 
developed for road transport can often be adapted for surface mining, including 
aspects of the human machine interface.  This includes radar, Wi-Fi, camera, Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID), GPS or Ultrasonic systems.  However, in 
underground mining many sensor types used in road transport will not work and the 
operating environment is so different that human machine interface styles may not 
be applicable.  Promising technology for underground proximity detection includes 
low frequency magnetic field markers and RFID. 
4.1.5 Previous Research into Proximity Detection 
Many proximity detection systems are currently subject to intensive research and 
development work by major equipment manufacturers, smaller enterprises, research 
institutes and mining companies.  Overall, the current research has largely been 
from a technology-centred perspective, focused on ensuring appropriate sensitivity, 
accuracy and reliability to work in a specific environment.  It also focuses on whether 
the systems can reliably detect selected objects in defined locations and transmit this 
detection to the driver.  This appears to be the limit of published research on various 
proximity detection technologies such as RFID (Kloos, Guivant and Nebot, 2005), 
electromagnetic field generation (Jobes, Carr et al., 2011; Li, Carr et al., 2012) and 
radar (Ruff, 2001).  There are some noted issues with the reliability of these 
technologies, especially their susceptibility to false positives suitability to 
environments (Horberry, Burgess-Limerick et al., 2011). However, broadly speaking, 
it does appear that proximity detection systems can now reliably detect and transmit 
information to the driver with considered implementation and maintenance.  
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4.1.6 Potential Issues with Proximity Detection 
Unfortunately, the reliable automation of detecting and transmitting relevant 
information to the driver does not ensure that the system will be effective in aiding 
driver decision-making and, ultimately, reducing the risk of a collision.  The most 
cursory analysis would note that proximity detection adds an in-cab interface, which 
has been noted to have the potential to distract rather than aid operators (Regan, 
Hallett et al., 2011).  More broadly, proximity detection is an attempt at partial 
automation which often makes systems more complex and difficult to predict, 
especially where human behaviour is important.  Despite this, designers are known 
to frequently fail to foresee or underestimate adaptations people will make with the 
introduction of automation. This is best encapsulated in the landmark paper Humans 
and Automation; Use, Misuse, Disuse & Abuse by Parasuraman et al which 
describes various ways that human adaptations can undermine or even reverse the 
benefits of automation on safety and efficiency (Parasuraman and Riley, 1997).  
Misuse refers to over-reliance, disuse to neglect or under-utilisation and abuse to 
automation of complex functions in a simplistic manner.  All are possible downsides 
from the introduction of proximity detection. 
!
Perhaps the most serious of the above negative consequences is misuse, which 
implies that the display of vehicle positions to drivers could result in behavioural 
adaptation to engage in riskier behaviours.  This negative adaptation is termed ‘risk 
compensation’ (Hedlund, 2000).  It has been documented to occur in various 
industries where automation is more advanced than mining, such as aviation, road 
transport and process control (Summala, 1996; Itoh, Sakami et al., 2000; Hartman, 
Dabipi et al., 2012).  For example, the introduction of anti-lock braking has reported 
to have been met with driver adaptations to braking later (Evans, 1999) which could 
explain the difficulty in finding a correlation with a reduction in traffic accidents 
(Cummings and Grossman, 2007).   There are even some documented cases of the 
introduction of proximity detection technology leading to unwanted adaptations.  For 
example, the adaptation to over-reliance on a GPS shipping technology to monitor 
position caused a cruise ship to run aground when it silently failed (Lützhöft and 
Dekker, 2002).  
!
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This possibility of unwanted adaptation is especially likely where the automation 
occurs during co-operative work which relies on the exchange of information.  Co-
operative systems are usually seen in continually changing environments and 
respond to failures through self-adjustment and self-regulation (De Keyser, 1997).  
Loading and hauling in mine sites, where the routes, roads, environmental conditions 
and tasks are constantly fluctuating and drivers are continually communicating via t-
way radio, can be considered a cooperative system. Increasing the level of 
automation in mining vehicle operation may not be the answer to collision prevention 
as there is possibility of over-reliance (Itoh, Sakami et al., 2000).  Proximity Detection 
will succeed if it aids co-operation without other unwanted adaptations, but it will fail 
if it reduces co-operation or is associated with negative adaptations. 
4.1.7 Research Gaps with Proximity Detection 
Research into the human element considerations is necessary to determine the 
optimal presentation of proximity information to improve safety, or even if improving 
safety is achievable with a system using this technology.  Unfortunately, in contrast 
to the technological side of proximity detection, there has been extremely limited 
research into human element considerations.  There appears to have been an 
assumption in the mining industry that proximity detection systems will improve 
safety.  However, this is not the case and it is simply not known if proximity detection 
information, once transmitted to the operator, can be appropriately interpreted in a 
timely manner to prevent collisions.   
!
The most obvious area lacking research is the ability of human machine interface of 
the proximity detection system to optimally deliver information detected by the 
system so that it is correctly interpreted by the driver.  As with road vehicles, a variety 
of interface types are possible for this technology, including warning lights/alarms 
through to automatic machine shut down when a likely collision is detected.  No 
single interface type fits all application areas in mining, so a careful understanding of 
the differing user requirements, analysis of the different tasks and user-centred 
evaluation of prototype technologies is required (Horberry, Larsson et al., 2004).  
Furthermore, no single interface is applicable to all mining environments.  Each 
context demands a careful, user-centred understanding in order to effectively 
implement the technology (Horberry, Larsson et al., 2004).  Contextually appropriate 
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interface design will heavily affect the eventual effectiveness of proximity detection 
systems in preventing accidents (Sheridan, 2002). 
!
But even more broadly than the interface, it is worth considering the context of 
potential collisions to determine where proximity detection could intervene and avoid 
collisions.  Proximity detection systems can only be considered a low level on the 
hierarchy of control as they only offer warnings that the operator has to interpret 
expediently and correctly before any appropriate action can be taken.  Therefore, it is 
possible that proximity detection would be limited in the effectiveness.  Burgess-
Limerick (2011) provides some evidence that simply providing information of vehicle 
location to drivers may not prevent collisions in underground mining.  A review was 
undertaken of accident reports describing fatalities occurring due to collisions at 
underground coal mines in the U.S.A. in the ten years up to 2011.  Of the 41 fatalities 
reviewed, in 56% of cases, the operator of the equipment was either aware of the 
location of the person was killed, or the operator was the person killed. It was 
concluded that a technology that merely detects the presence of vehicles and 
persons is unlikely to be adequate in many cases.   
!
As collision prevention is the ultimate aim, ideally research would take holistic 
approach and consider how proximity detection works in concert with other risk 
controls.   This will allow proximity detection systems to be effective in cases where it 
can assist, whilst highlighting the circumstances where proximity detection would be 
unlikely to or cannot provide adequate risk control. 
4.1.8 Practical Considerations for Implementation 
As proximity detection systems represent a change to existing mining practices, a 
number of practical considerations cannot be overlooked.  Primarily, the technology 
should address a previously identified issue in a cost-effective manner without 
requiring extensive retrofitting to vehicles already in operation and extensive 
technological support to keep the system robust.  It should be integrated with other 
equipment so that any information is a reliable reflection of the environment and 
intuitive enough to use during the complex operation of mobile mining equipment.   
!
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, proximity detection must be accepted by 
operators.  In order to be reach its potential, proximity detection technology not only 
has to useful but also satisfying to use (Lynas and Horberry, 2011).  Otherwise the 
technology will not be accepted and instead used in a manner not intended, disabled 
or even sabotaged.  This issue has been a noted risk in other vehicle automation 
systems (Horberry, Larsson et al., 2004).  There is some evidence of it in mining 
automation. For example, a state of the art man-tracking system in a German 
underground coal mine designed to manage proximity to various hazards failed 
because the staff suspected an ulterior motive leading to sabotage (Macfarlane, 
2001).  It is also likely that operator acceptance of a technology is indicative of its 
value.  The underlying assumption is that, because the operators are the experts, 
their acceptance is generally related to whether the technology aids them in driving.  
Operators will not sabotage technology which they feel is useful (Horberry, Larsson 
et al., 2004).  Therefore, careful consideration of involving the end-users in at least 
the implementation and, ideally, the design of proximity detection systems will lead to 
the maximum chance of effectiveness. 
!
4.2 Research Site  
4.2.1 Description of the mine site and proximity/detection system 
The study site was an underground gold mine in Queensland where a prototype 
proximity detection system was in use.  A variety of mobile mining equipment were 
operated underground, including loaders/shovels (to load the ore onto a vehicle for 
removal), haul trucks (to remove the ore to the surface) and light vehicles (for a 
variety of maintenance and technical purposes, including setting charges for rock 
blasting). Figure 4.4 shows some haul trucks and loader used to load these trucks. 
!  !  
Figure 4.4: Examples of vehicles used underground: a) haul trucks, b) loader 
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4.2.2 Description of proximity detection system at the site 
The mine installed a RFID-based system primarily to improve the monitoring of 
production.  Tablet PCs attached to tag readers were installed in haul truck and 
loaders at the mine.  The tablets automatically read a number of tags around the 
mine to assist in tracking production including cycle times, delays, dump position and 
load weight consistency.  However, though the tracking of production was the 
primary driver for the installation of the system, the mine management saw the 
opportunity to add a proximity detection system with the aim of reducing the risk of 
collision between vehicles.  The following are some of the notable features of the 
proximity detection system: 
· When another vehicle is detected, the code for that vehicle is displayed on 
the screen.  Part of the code indicates the type of vehicle (e.g. LV403. 
TORO141).  Codes are displayed in a list with the most recent 
unacknowledged vehicles at the bottom. 
· Six vehicles can be displayed on the screen.  If the number of vehicles 
detected is greater than six these will be displayed on subsequent screens, 
which can be accessed with a scrolling feature. 
· A timer starts next to the code, following the initial detection of the vehicle, 
indicating how long it has been continually detected.  The timer will continue 
until the vehicle is no longer detected.  
· A sound is emitted from the PC and the code flashes upon initial detection 
(the colour varies on the colour scheme used).  The sound tone is alterable 
by the operator, and can be significantly turned down.  It was reported by an 
operator that with hearing protection and the volume set low, the sound could 
no longer be heard. 
· When the presence of the vehicle is acknowledged, by the operator touching 
the code on the screen, the sound ceases and the vehicle code changes 
colour and stops flashing.  When the vehicle is no longer detected it is 
removed from the screen whether or not the driver has acknowledged its 
presence by touching the screen.  
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Figure 4.5 shows an example of proximity detection screen in a vehicle cab (the 
screen is shown in upper left hand side) and Figure 4.6 shows an example of the 
system interface. 
!
!
The following are some of the developer-acknowledged limitations of the proximity 
detection system: 
· No direction of the detected vehicles is given to the operator.  In an 
underground environment it is unlikely that directional capacity will work with 
an RFID system other than ‘forwards’ or ‘rear’ with the use of two antennas. 
· There is no set distance for when a vehicle will enter and exit detection.  For 
example, the detection distance was thought to be much greater when on 
high ground on the surface than when underground.  This was reported to be 
many hundreds of meters on the surface, down to less than 20 metres, or 
even missed detection, underground. 
· The system only acknowledges the presence of a vehicle but not that it is 
necessarily dangerous or requires action.  The driver must still interpret the 
necessary course of action based on this information and other features of 
the environment. 
Figure 4.5: Screen position in cab Figure 4.6: The first system interface
! !
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4.3 Research Objective 
The general objective of the research was to determine whether human factors 
methods could predict (and help improve) the issues with the complex cognitive 
tasks associated with proximity warning systems in mobile mining equipment.  This 
was achieved through a series of methods at the above site, some of which have 
been used in previous chapters (such as CDM).  The more specific purpose of the 
research was to provide recommendations for future system development and, 
where possible, implement and evaluate these changes.  
4.4 Methods 
The research approached the issue from both a problem and a user-centred 
perspective, rather than from a technology-centred position.  Therefore, a variety of 
methods were used to explore the issue which are described below.  This took place 
in three distinct phases.  
4.4.1 Research Phase 1: Investigation Methods 
Investigation methods were used to holistically explore system risk controls and 
failure modes with the hope of recommending improvements.  This included but was 
not limited to the proximity detection system and determined some recommended 
changes. The methods employed are listed below. 
4.4.1.1 Exploration of System Constraints  
At the onset of the research it was evident that the mine site was aware that 
detection distance may vary considerably depending on the scenario.  However, it 
was unknown how much distance varied; equally, it was unknown what the effects of 
different variables such as underground road position were.  A logical starting point 
was an exploration of the constraints and detection reliability of the system. Without 
this, it was difficult to determine if the system could effectively assist operator 
decision making in respect of other vehicles. 
!
Detection distances at different locations at the mine (surface and underground) 
were analysed.  Whilst underground, the truck was approached with a hand held 
RFID tag attached to an antenna (like those installed in light vehicles working 
underground), from different locations.  The truck was also placed facing towards 
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(forwards) the tag or away from the tag (backwards).  The measurements were 
recorded three times for each scenario, to determine variability and accuracy of the 
measurements.  As the system used RFID, there were sections where the radio 
waves would need to bounce around corners.  However, line of sight was possible 
on a long straight section of the mine.  The different types of corners examined are 
depicted in Figure 4.7 below. 
!
Figure 4.7: Different types of underground corners investigated 
!
4.4.1.2 Ergonomic audit of the collision/proximity system interface  
Two researchers with postgraduate qualifications in Ergonomics/Human factors 
reviewed the interface. The primary tool used (after suitable adaptation to the exact 
context of this research) was the TRL Safety Checklist for the Assessment of In-
Vehicle Information Systems (Stevens, Board et al., 1999). Both experimenters 
separately viewed the interface in a haul truck at the mine and later compared their 
assessments to determine significant usability defects.  The goal was to determine 
any generic user interface design errors. 
!
4.4.1.3 Naturalistic field study 
The small-scale naturalistic field study recorded operator behaviour whilst using the 
proximity detection system in a large mobile mining vehicle. In particular, two 
measures were recorded: a) filming the operator whilst driving the vehicle 
underground, and b) proximity data collected by the system. This second element 
included other vehicles detected and operator responses to acknowledge these 
vehicles to assess whether major changes in driving behaviour occurred after 
another vehicle had been detected.  Data from one operator were recorded.  Due to 
S Bend U Bend T Intersection Corkscrew Corner
!! !
!
!
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this low number, the data collected here were used to verify and further explore 
driver reports about the use of the system that were obtained from the below-
mentioned interviews. 
4.4.1.4 Cognitive Tasks Analyses and Structured Interview Methods 
Knowledge and experiences were elicited from operators involved in previous mobile 
equipment collisions or who used the current proximity detection system. This 
allowed a detailed user-centred perspective of equipment operation tasks and the 
current controls in place. Initially, it was planned to use the Critical Decision Method 
(CDM) to elicit knowledge about vehicle incidents and near misses, on the basis that 
these represented ‘tough cases’ which has previously been found to be an efficient 
way of eliciting knowledge from experts (Crandall, Klein et al., 2006; Klein, 2008).  
However, the interviewees were unable or unwilling to recall real incidents to analyse 
(partly because of the newness of the system). 
!
Instead, the operators were asked to consider where they felt the more complex 
areas of road and vehicle interaction were in a mine and construct a fictional, but 
possible, scenario of a collision occurring.  This included the position of the vehicles 
in the mine and the other barriers that would need to fail in order to for proximity 
detection to be useful.  Though not real scenarios, it did show a logical path to 
failure, and helped determine what features a proximity detection would need for it to 
be effective.  These features could then be compared to the current prototype RFID 
proximity detection system in place.   
!
Eight operators were interviewed by two experimenters. In every interview, the 
operator was able to construct plausible scenarios where a collision could occur and 
a proximity detection system could be useful should other controls fail.  This included 
scenarios in the underground, on surface haul roads and around workshop areas.  
This method was then repeated in a group setting and applied to key operational 
scenarios encountered at a mine. 
4.4.2 Phase 2: Accident Investigation 
Serendipitously, after the above methods had been applied and were being 
analysed, a collision occurred between two vehicles at the mine.  A load-haul-dump 
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(LHD) was waiting in the underground workshop for a service vehicle to arrive for 
refuelling. When the service vehicle arrived, upon seeing the loader in the service 
bay, it backed up the main decline to allow the loader to exit. Upon exiting the 
workshop, the LHD struck a light vehicle (LV) ascending the main decline. The 
loader bucket struck the bonnet of the vehicle causing equipment damage. No 
persons were injured, but there was the potential for fatal injury. All vehicle operators 
involved in the incident were interviewed using the Critical Decision Method (as 
described earlier in the thesis). Additionally, movements of the vehicles were 
reconstructed in-situ to assist in reviewing the incident. This involved placing a LV in 
the decline at approximately the impact point and approaching it with a LHD. Also, a 
LV was driven up the decline and down the decline past the Loader in the workshop 
to test proximity detection system. Full details of the incident investigation are shown 
in Appendix 1. 
4.4.3 Phase 3: Evaluation of Modifications 
Following the accident investigation, a number of changes were made to the 
proximity detection system. In order to gauge the success of the interface changes 
that were made, the equipment operators were surveyed. 18 of the 20 operators who 
worked at the mine completed the survey. The survey was conducted primarily to 
determine how accepting the drivers were of the initial system and, in comparison, 
the altered system. Drivers were also asked to rate the effectiveness of the 
system(s), the importance of other controls, and their opinions about further 
proposed changes. 
4.4.3.1 Operator Ratings of Acceptance of the Proximity Detection System  
An established method for measuring driver acceptance has been developed by Van 
der Laan et al. (1997). This technique was selected because it had been frequently 
applied in several different studies of measuring the acceptance of in-vehicle 
systems, including collision avoidance systems with auditory feedback in a variety of 
environments (Hoedemaeker and Brookhuis, 1998; Brookhuis and de Waard, 1999; 
Vlassenroot, Broekx et al., 2007). In these studies, it was found to be a good 
measure of both absolute acceptance and was sensitive enough to determine 
relative/comparative acceptance amongst groups or technology options.  
!
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Using this technique, a five-point rating scale was used for nine questions rating 
acceptance of the initial and altered interface of the proximity detection system. 
Drivers selected between five boxes placed between two opposing qualitative words. 
The position of the positive and negative words is sometimes reversed. The positive 
words are shown in bold italics in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 
Acceptance of technology ratings (based on Van der Laan et al, 1997) 
!
The sum of all questions made up a score for ‘acceptance’. Additionally, the odd 
numbered questions (i.e. 1, 3, 5, 9) are a rating of ‘usefulness’ and the even 
numbered questions (i.e. 2, 4, 6, 8) are a rating of ‘satisfaction’. Drivers were all 
initially asked to make a rating of the current proximity detection system. Those 
drivers who were working at the mine with the previous system were also requested 
to make a rating of the previous system. In the scoring system for the scales 
determined by the Van der Laan, the middle box represented a score of 0, the boxes 
either side represented -1 to +1 and the outer boxes +2 or -2. However, in this case, 
Van der Laan’s scoring system was adapted here to be positive numbers only (1- 5) 
to allow shape plotting on a radar graph. By joining up each of the ratings, an 
irregular polygon is formed and these types of radar graphs are particularly useful to 
visually communicating the overall change. This change does not alter the analysis 
in any other way. The original and adapted scoring can be seen in Table 4.2 !!
1 Useful  Useless
2 Pleasant  Unpleasant
3 Bad  Good
4 Nice  Annoying
5 Effective  Superfluous
6 Irritating Likeable
7 Assisting Worthless
8 Undesirable  Desirable
9 Raising Alertness  Sleep Inducing
!
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!
!
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!
!
!
!
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Table 4.2 
Acceptance of technology scoring scale !
4.4.3.2 Relative Effectiveness of Proximity Detection to Other Risk Controls 
As stated in the above section, the research considered not just the proximity 
detection system in isolation, but all the risk controls preventing collision.  Through 
discussions with a Subject Matter Expert (the mine manager), a list of these controls 
that are relevant to the operator’s decision making was compiled.  It was given to the 
operators to rank in terms of its effectiveness.  The reason for this was to determine 
the perceived effectiveness of all of the controls and potentially check the importance 
of proximity detection as compared to other collision prevention measures. 
!
The following eight risk controls were presented to the operators: 
1. Two Way Radio 
2. Naming Locations Around the mine 
3. Knowledge of mine roads/intersections 
4. Forwards Direct vision out of your vehicle 
5. Horns to communicate presence to others 
6. Headlights of other vehicle approaching 
7. Proximity Detection System 
8. Reverse Camera and / or Rear Mirrors 
They ranked each control on a 4 point scale of:  Not – Somewhat – Quite - Very 
The questions about the relative effectiveness of proximity detection relative to other 
risk controls were part of the survey about driver acceptance. So, 18 of the 20 
operators who worked at the mine gave their options. 
Van der Laan’s Score -1 -2 0 +1 +2
Adapted Score +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
!! !!!
!132
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Research Phase 1: Investigation Methods 
4.5.1.1 Exploration of System Constraints  
Results regarding detection are shown below. As seen in Figure 4.8, they show, for 
example, that backwards detection was less that forwards detection, and was non-
existent around S or U bends backwards underground. 
!
!  
Figure 4.8: Detection distances at different locations underground and on the 
surface  
!
Additionally, it was found that different equipment (eg different model RFID tags and 
longer connecting leads) significantly influenced detection distances. Finally, as 
hypothesised, detection distances were longer on the surface compared with 
underground. 
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4.5.1.2 Ergonomic audit of the collision/proximity system interface  
The researchers independently applied a checklist developed by the Transport 
Research Laboratory to serve as a structured aid to assist the experts in the 
evaluation of In-vehicle information and communication systems.  The checklist 
primarily looks at simple usability issues, such as menu structure, glare, reach and 
distraction.  No significant usability issues were identified, but some of the more 
minor issues were: 
• the potential to distract from driving when acknowledging multiple vehicle 
detections, 
• auditory feedback being able to be reduced to where is can no longer be 
heard, and  
• the possibility of glare making the screen difficult to read.   
!
Of course, the audit was not detailed enough to conclude if the information given by 
interface would aid driver decision making, reducing the risk of collisions.  However, 
some issues for further investigation were noted, such as the lack of distance and 
direction of vehicles, the variability in detection distances and the possibility of large 
numbers of detections at one time. 
4.5.1.3 Naturalistic field study 
The naturalistic field study showed that the driver used for the study never 
acknowledged the detected vehicles by touching the interface, but appeared to 
glance at the screen on detection indicating they have cognitively acknowledged the 
detection.  All the equipment codes continued flashing on the screen until they could 
no longer be detected. In some cases this was for minutes, indicating a vehicle was 
following behind. The screen appeared very bright in a dark cab when the vehicle 
was underground, consistent with operator interview reports the screen can produce 
glare (see Figure 4.9).   There was no notable change in driving behaviour on 
detection, though this would have been difficult to determine unless a non-routine 
situation occurred. 
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!Figure 4.9  
Vehicle cabin underground, showing proximity detection screen 
!
4.5.1.4 Cognitive Tasks Analyses and Structured Interview Methods  
The interview findings regarding operator opinions of the technology were broadly 
similar to many of the ‘classic’ human factors issues with automation and new 
technologies identified in other domains (Bainbridge, 1983; Sheridan, 2002). These 
include shorter term issues such as non-optimal interface/warning design, plus 
longer terms challenges such as technology acceptance, trust and skills fade. 
Additionally operators stated that there might be unanticipated side effects related to 
over-reliance on the technology. 
!
The interviews were successfully able to determine scenarios where proximity 
detection, if effective, may prevent collisions.  Each scenario was represented using 
Energy Trace and Barrier Analysis (ETBA) to qualitatively show how the moving 
mass of a truck (the energy) could avoid control.  In all scenarios, additional controls 
that assist operator knowledge of the location of other vehicles were required to fail; 
most notably radio communication, where drivers are required to regularly ‘call’ their 
position and direction, and visual location of the vehicle, either directly or through a 
reverse angle camera mounted in the cab.  The schematic images in Figure 4.10 
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show an example of where a proximity detection system may act as a control should 
other controls fail.  
!
!
Figure 4.10 : Proximity detection system acting as a control where other 
controls fail 
!
Overall, it was found that proximity detection normally acted as a valuable extra 
control, in addition to the others already utilised by drivers. However, several 
operators thought the system could reduce the effectiveness of other controls, 
especially radio contact, through over-reliance on the system.  Furthermore, a 
number of failure modes were detected for the proximity detection system.  All the 
controls that prevent collisions and their failure modes are included in Table 4.3. 
!
1 2 3 4
Truck 1 has reversed into 
a stockpile and dumped a 
load of waste and waiting 
until the roadway is clear 
to descend the mine.
Truck 2 is ascending the 
mine’s main drive with a 
full load of ore and a 
light vehicle (LV) 
following.
Radio communication has 
failed and Truck 1 is not 
aware that the light 
vehicle is following 
Truck 2.
Truck 1 exits the 
stockpile after Truck 2 
has passed
!!!!
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Table 4.3: Failure Modes of Controls that Prevent Collisions 
!
Control Description Failure modes
Radio 2 way radio between all light 
and heavy vehicles operating. 
When driving underground, 
operators are instructed to 
regularly call their location and 
direction.
A driver has radio on a different channel.
Radio ‘dead spots’.
Radio electrically fails.
Radio calls of heavy volume, spacing out or blocking 
calls.
Radio is not or infrequently used.
Radio volume is turned very low or off.
Location 
Signage/ 
Naming
The naming of locations 
throughout the mine either by 
names (eg. ‘Haul Road’, 
‘Workshop’) or depth 
underground spray painted on 
mine wall (eg. ‘600’). 
Location name hard to interpret
Location can be easily confused with another 
location (eg. Similar name).
Location is not named at all.
Location name is large, making exact location non-
specific.
Location has multiple names, or colloquial name that 
could be confused or not known.
Location 
Mental Model
The mental model drivers have 
of the mine allowing them 
interpreted their location and 
radio calls of others.
Inexperienced drivers lack mental model
Experienced driver over interpret a location to usual 
route, when unusual route is being taken.
Complexity and frequency of calls makes it difficult to 
remember locations of all vehicles.
Direct Vision Driver of vehicles can directly 
see vehicles approaching out 
the vehicle window.
Blind spots, particularly from heavy vehicle.
Driver is looking in direction other than vehicle 
approaching
Mud/Dust on windscreen 
Vehicle is hidden from direct sight by obstruction (eg. 
around corner.)
Headlights In the underground 
environment, seeing headlights 
approaching, especially around 
corners and intersections.
Headlights are not on.
Headlights on approaching vehicle are obscured by 
headlights of driver’s vehicle.
Backlit area prevents headlight being seen.
Interaction is on surface in the daylight, where 
headlights do not assist.
Roadway 
Design
Roadways designed to 
eliminate or minimise head on 
vehicle interaction
Roadway is not wide enough to allow two vehicles to 
pass.
Roadway does not physically separate vehicles, 
either by signs/markings or physically.
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4.5.2 Phase 2: Accident Investigation 
Many of the predicted/operator reported issues identified by the above-mentioned 
failure modes analysis of the controls were validated following a collision at the mine 
between a LHD and a LV. In general, the controls failed in a way that was predicted 
and no unpredicted failure modes occurred. The failure modes that occurred in this 
incident are italicised and shown in bold in the Table 4.4. Notably, 8 controls needed 
to fail with 12 distinct failure modes. Full details of the incident investigation and the 
distinct failure modes are shown in Appendix 1. 
!
Control Description Failure modes
Proximity 
Detection
RFID proximity detection 
system with readers in large 
vehicles and tags on all 
vehicles. Direction is not 
included.  Distance is variable 
on location.
Driver not aware of detection and it not alerted by 
sound (eg. looking other direction)
Driver misinterprets detection of a vehicle for an 
alternative in a different direction.
Driver misinterprets detection direction (eg. that a 
vehicle is detected in front but interprets it to the 
rear.)
Too many detections to interpret
Detection is on subsequent screen (only 6 on home 
screen, and new ones added at rear).
Detection does not occur in time
Horns Driver uses horn to alert other 
vehicle and halt movement. 
Horn cannot be heard (eg. engine noise.)
Horn misinterpreted (eg source, meaning).
Horn is used too late.
Horn is not used
Evasive Action Drivers notice a collision is 
about to occur and take 
evasive action driving actions.
Driver cannot take action in time.
Driver does not have the available room to take 
action (eg. backed into stockpile).
Driver takes evasive action, but then becomes 
blocked (eg. wall/ ditch/ embankment/ vehicle).
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Table 4.4: Controls that failed in the Accident 
!
Control Failure modes
Radio A driver has radio on a different channel.
Radio ‘dead spots’.
Radio electrically fails.
Radio calls of heavy volume, spacing out or blocking calls.
Radio is not or infrequently used.
Radio volume is turned very low or off.
Location 
Signage/ 
Naming
Location name hard to interpret
Location can be easily confused with another location (eg. Similar name).
Location is not named at all.
Location name is large, making exact location non-specific.
Location has multiple names, or colloquial name that could be confused or not known.
Location 
Mental Model
Inexperienced drivers lack mental model
Experienced driver over interpret a location to usual route, when unusual route is 
being taken.
Complexity and frequency of calls makes it difficult to remember locations of all vehicles.
Direct Vision Blind spots, particularly from heavy vehicle.
Driver is looking in direction other than vehicle approaching
Mud/Dust on windscreen 
Vehicle is hidden from direct sight by obstruction (eg. around corner.)
Headlights Headlights are not on.
Headlights on approaching vehicle are obscured by headlights of driver’s vehicle.
Backlit area prevents headlight being seen.
Interaction is on surface in the daylight, where headlights do not assist.
Roadway 
Design
Roadway is not wide enough to allow two vehicles to pass.
Roadway does not physically separate vehicles, either by signs/markings or physically.
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Table 4.4 Continued: Controls that failed in the Accident 
!
Perhaps the key finding here was therefore that many controls failed in the accident 
analysed here, and that one of these was the proximity detection system. 
4.5.3 Phase 3: Evaluation of Modifications 
4.5.3.1 Recommended Modifications  
From the phases 1 and 2, a number of changes to the touch screen computer 
interface were suggested. The following changes were made to the system (see 
Figure 4.11): 
!
1. Making the audio alarm a short sharp sound, rather than continuing until the 
computer interface was touched. 
2. The detected vehicle flashes on the computer screen for a short period of 
time and then stops flashing, rather than ongoing flashing until the computer 
interface is touched. 
3. Adding new vehicles to the top of the list on the computer screen, rather than 
to the bottom of the screen, where they were added previously. 
Control Failure modes
Proximity 
Detection
Driver not aware of detection and it not alerted by sound (eg. looking other direction)
Driver misinterprets detection of a vehicle for an alternative in a different direction.
Driver misinterprets detection direction 
Too many detections to interpret
Detection is on subsequent screen (only 6 on home screen, and new ones added at rear).
Detection does not occur in time
Horns Horn cannot be heard (eg. engine noise.)
Horn misinterpreted (eg source, meaning).
Horn is used too late.
Horn is not used
Evasive Action Driver cannot take action in time.
Driver does not have the available room to take action (eg. backed into stockpile).
Driver takes evasive action, but then becomes blocked.
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In addition, the research recommended the following changes. In discussion with the 
technology manufacturer these were planned to be included in the next full proximity 
detection system upgrade: 
!
4. Turning off the proximity detection system when vehicles are on the surface, 
due to reports of too many tag readings being registered on the computer 
interface to make the system useful.  
5. Indicating if a vehicle is detected from the front or rear of the existing vehicle. 
!
!  
Figure 4.11: Revised proximity detection screens with and without direction. 
!
4.5.3.2 Operator Ratings of Acceptance of the Proximity Detection System  
Driver acceptance of the changes made to the proximity detection system was 
examined. Two polygons were plotted and layered to reveal acceptance of the 
drivers with the initial and revised proximity detection systems. The 1 to 9 around the 
polygon represents the questions asked of the drivers. A ‘maximum’, shown with a 
solid line, represents a score of 5 by all drivers on all measures. This shows how far 
the system is from the ‘theoretical’ maximum, though the capacity of the technology 
may well be lower. A ‘positive negative line’, shown with a dotted line, represents the 
average score of 3 on all measures.  
!
In Figure 4.12, the acceptance of the first interface is shown in the lighter grey. The 
acceptance of the altered (new) interface is shown in darker grey. Parts of the 
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interface polygons below the ‘positive negative line’ represent a negative view of the 
interface. 
!  
Figure 4.12:  Operator acceptance ratings (original and revised interface) 
!
The results show that before the small numbers of changes to the system were 
made drivers, on average, were not accepting the system, finding it useful or 
satisfying. After the system changes, all measures saw an increase. On all of the 
measures, except Q4 and Q6, the drivers gave overall positive ratings of the revised 
system. Both these measures are in the ‘satisfying’ portion of the survey. This 
indicates that, on average, the drivers have mildly positive ‘acceptance’ of the 
system, are mildly positive about its ‘usefulness’ and neither positive not negative 
about ‘satisfaction’ with the system. As seen in Table 4.5, inferential statistics (t test) 
applied these results to and all reached margins of statistical significance. 
Table 4.5: T-test results for operator acceptance 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
New Interface 3.62 3.28 3.50 2.83 3.06 2.94 3.22 3.28 3.33
First Interface 2.25 2.08 2.58 2.08 2.58 2.33 2.67 2.42 2.75
Significance
0.0003
6 0.0015 0.09 0.026 0.05 0.037 0.05 0.047 0.0295
Usefulness
0.051 (marginally significant)- ie the current interface is significantly more useful than the 
old one
Satisfying
0.013 (statistically significant) - ie the current interface is significantly more satisfying 
than the old one
Overall
0.0056 (statistically significant) ie the current interface is significantly more acceptable 
than the old one
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4.5.3.3 Relative Effectiveness of Proximity Detection to Other Risk Controls 
The four point scoring system (of ‘not’, ‘somewhat’, ‘quite’ and ‘very’) was converted 
into a scale of 1-4 (with 4 therefore being a measure high relative effectiveness. 
Figure 4.13 shows the results. 
!
!  
!
Figure 4.13: Relative effectiveness of proximity detection to other controls 
!
The differences between the nine different controls were not statistically significant. 
In general, all controls were rated as relatively effective. With the proximity detection 
system, this is perhaps surprising as some resistance to change and negative 
opinions of new mining technologies has previously been reported (eg Lynas and 
Horberry, 2011). As such, a well-designed proximity detection system may be 
effective as part of a suite of controls. 
4.6 Discussion and Recommendations 
The multifaceted research approach with significant involvement of system end-
users not only assisted in determining the effectiveness of the currently installed 
system but also redesigned and evaluated a revised system. The results of the 
evaluation of the initial proximity detection system identified deficiencies with the 
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usability of the interface and limitations with the overall effectiveness of the system to 
help prevent collisions. These included: 
!
• varying detection distances underground (especially to the rear of the 
vehicle),  
• poor interface design (potential to distract from driving when acknowledging 
multiple vehicle detections, and a driver never acknowledged the detected 
vehicles by touching the interface),  
• operator perceived issues with trust, acceptance and skills fade, and 
• how proximity detection can act as an extra control, and how this could fail 
(eg driver misinterprets detection of a vehicle for an alternative in a different 
direction). 
!
The investigation of a collision at the mine site confirmed many of these observed 
issues and failure modes for controls.  From this, interface redesign 
recommendations were made, and a new system was developed and deployed.  
This revised system was then tested for operator acceptance. 
!
The results show that before the system changes drivers, on average, were not 
accepting of the device: finding it neither particularly useful nor satisfying.  After the 
system changes, all measures saw a more positive rating.  On 7 of the 9 measures 
with the revised interface, drivers gave overall positive ratings for the system.  Both 
the two negative measures are in the ‘satisfying’ component of the Van Der Laan et 
al (1997) acceptance construct.  This therefore indicates that drivers have mildly 
positive overall ‘acceptance’ of the revised system, are mildly positive about its 
‘usefulness’ and are neither positive not negative about its ‘satisfaction’. 
!
Due to the nature of this trial, it was not possible to counter-balance the before and 
after conditions. Consequently, the procedure might have been a source of bias – for 
example, due to the drivers ‘expecting’ improvements. Nonetheless, this possible 
criticism does not account for the nature of the mining industry, where the drivers 
were generally sceptical about both the technology and the research (so were in no 
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way inclined to give ratings simply to appease the researchers or the mine’s 
management) (Simpson et al, 2009). 
!
Acceptance of new technology is extremely important in subsequent technology 
utilisation. In isolated mine site environments, operators sometimes have the 
opportunity to choose to avoid using new technologies even when they are 
mandated.  Therefore, if drivers did not accept the proximity detection technology 
then its potential to prevent accidents may never be realised.  In field usage 
conditions, the original interface showed several negative behavioural responses, 
with some drivers admitted to turning down the sound and brightness of the 
computer screen, in order to avoid the system as much as possible.  With improved 
acceptance of the new interface it is anticipated that the drivers will be much less 
likely to try and avoid using the system. The underlying assumption behind this is 
that, because the operators are the experts, their acceptance is generally related to 
whether the technology aids them in driving the heavy mining vehicles.  As mine site 
accidents are extremely rare, testing the effectiveness of a proximity detection 
system in terms of incident rates is both difficult and, potentially, unethical.  
Therefore, it is recommended that carefully-used measures of technology 
acceptance are more widely used to provide a valuable intermediate measure. 
!
In conclusion, well designed in-vehicle technologies, including collision/proximity 
detection, can help produce significant safety benefits in mining situations where off-
road haulage is responsible for a significant number of fatalities (Groves, Kecojevic 
et al., 2007). Mining has the opportunity to learn from other domains such as road 
transport and aviation, and develop and implement technology from both a human-
centred and an operational need perspective.  Therefore, rather than being purely 
introduced because the technology is available, careful consideration must be given 
to how it will support the users’ tasks, and how it will be integrated with other existing 
technologies & management systems.  In fact, the methods should not be applied in 
order to maximise the effectiveness of a specific technology. Rather, human factors 
methods can assist in taking a more holistic problems based approach, limiting 
unnecessary and complicated interventions. 
!
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The research described here has shown that the application of human factors 
methods can lead to positive changes to the design of proximity detection systems 
and, more broadly, to develop effective mining vehicle technologies from a user-
centred perspective. This provides evidence that the involvement of both end-users 
and human factors engineers through all stages of the design lifecycle, from concept 
through to the deployment and evaluation, of a working system is the best way to 
achieve effective integration of such technologies in mining. 
!
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Chapter 5 
Overall Discussion, Conclusions and 
Recommendations for Future Work 
5.1 Summary of key findings and contributions to knowledge 
This thesis outlined three practical applications of human factors in the mining 
industry.  Each case study applied human factors methods to mining in a way can 
deliver insights to improve safety through design. In the chapter 1, a number of 
research questions were outlined for each chapter which represented the original 
contributions to knowledge. This section will revisit these research questions to 
summarise what has been learned. 
!
5.1.1 Research outcomes for Chapter 2 
In Chapter 2, injury narrative data obtained from surface coal mines in Australia were 
examined for human factors issues. The two research questions posed in that 
chapter are discussed below. 
!
What can be learnt about injuries associated with mobile mining equipment from 
recoding mining injury narratives with a focus of human tasks using the constant 
comparative method? 
!
From reviewing injury narratives a variety of  issues emerged.  The most specific 
issues emerging from this basic analysis included location on equipment and tasks 
being performed. Though there were some limitations, such as inclusion of injury 
severity, this single variable method revealed some tends for more detailed human 
factors analysis. For example, a main finding was that that a significant number of 
injuries occurred during mobile mining equipment maintenance. Other findings 
included the over-representation of bulldozers and the large proportion of injuries 
associated with access and egress. Analysis of this type should not only be standard 
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in incident analysis, but also the methods of recording incidents should be 
broadened to encourage richer narrative information to be collected to allow 
additional trends to emerge. 
!
What is revealed by transforming the recoded injury narratives as a search tool with 
a graphical output for specific areas of focus? 
!
Whilst the single variable analysis was revealing, the use of multivariable analysis 
gave a greater contribution to knowledge and revealed practical mitigation strategies. 
In this analysis, the visual representation of the data made it possible to identify key 
human factors issues that would allow for significantly greater targeting.  This 
targeting is key to the success of human factors methods in mining, because in order 
to thrive the application of methods should produce meaningful and practical results. 
Increasing the chance of finding important issues is therefore key to the ultimate 
acceptance of such analysis methods.  However, producing the visualisations 
individually was a time consuming process. For this method to thrive it would require 
a database fronted by a tool that allowed repeated queries and visual representation. 
This would prove a useful and persuasive tool for many human factors professionals, 
equipment designers, equipment procurers and mine site operators. 
5.1.2 Research outcomes for Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 documented the analysis of in-depth interviews of mining equipment 
operators using the Critical Decision Method (CDM). The decisions the operators 
made were placed on the decision tree to aid in determining design solutions. The 
two research questions for this chapter are discussed below. 
!
When the Critical Decision Method is used with mobile mining equipment operators, 
what does it reveal about incidents that were previously unknown? 
!
It was surprising that such a comparatively simple interview method was able to find 
issues not contained within original accident reports. The insights provided through 
the use of CDM would certainly help target design interventions at site. Perhaps the 
most useful insight for future researchers was from the modification of the method to 
include drawing the incident on a whiteboard. Once the operators were explaining 
!148
incidents including a diagram, the willingness of the operators to engage in 
discussion and the richness of information dramatically increased. If applied more 
widely in the industry they could provide insight that would help shape future designs 
of equipment, tasks and environments. 
!
What is learnt by using The Decision Ladder to represent the cognitive process of 
mobile mining equipment operators at the time they were involved in an incident that 
can be used to make design recommendations? 
!
The application of the decision ladder to the CDM generated data was revealing. All 
of the decisions made by the operators included a shortcutting a full decision making 
process.  This indicates that design solutions that address the immediate 
environment of the operator could prove more effective than interventions like 
knowledge-based retraining. However, although there is a meaningful academic 
contribution to knowledge through combining CDM with the decision ladder, in a 
practical sense the decision ladder did not offer much more for design solutions than 
may have been gained by a judicious application of the more common division 
between skill, rule and knowledge based behaviour. As such, there appears to be a 
fine line in the practical application of human factors methods between enough 
simplicity to be applied and enough richness to be accurate. This method was 
revealing for research, but through application it became obvious that it would be 
unlikely to be applied widely in mining, at least in the present incident investigation 
culture that emphasises obtaining results in as short a time period as possible. 
!
5.1.3 Research outcomes for Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 was the most holistic chapter of the thesis, because it provided the ability 
to change equipment in a real operating environment. This mine site access issue is 
something that has traditionally been very difficult to overcome in mining research. 
Three research questions relate to this case study. These are discussed below. 
!
!
!
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When human factors methods are applied to proximity detection systems in mobile 
mining equipment what design recommendations to prevent collisions emerge? 
!
The human factors methods applied in this study were able to broaden the scope of 
study to be about ‘collision prevention’ rather than purely a proximity detection 
system. Equally, the outcomes of the research provided practical solutions improve 
the in-cab interface. Examples of the recommendations included changing to an icon 
based interface, having most recently detected vehicles added first, turning off the 
system when on the surface because of spurious detection.  More complex 
recommendations included adding a directional element to the interface. With the 
more investigative task-based human factors tools, other recommendations also 
emerged. These included identifying many of the elements of the system that were 
preventing collisions and an understanding of the different types of environmental 
conditions that might emerge. So the primary lesson learned is that human factors 
methods that are not reductionist to a single element of the system, but rather force 
a holistic review including the intersection between operators, their task and the 
environment gives a richer understanding of the environment that gives greater 
scope for design interventions. 
!
What can below learnt about the accuracy and effectiveness of design 
recommendations to prevent collisions at mines by investigating a real collision? 
!
The above research question was not planned before research began. It only 
emerged because of the occurrence of an high potential accident that fortunately did 
not result in tragedy. This did provide a opportunity to assess the predictively powers 
of human factors methods being applied. Each of the barriers of protection and their 
modes of failure were uncovered in the previous research. Additionally, when 
applying the knowledge gained in this accident, design recommendations were found 
that apply not only to the interface, but also other elements of the equipment and 
operating environment. This is compelling evidence of the effectiveness of human 
factors methods in being able to identify additional risks in mining equipment 
operations. 
!
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When design changes in a proximity detection system for mobile mining equipment 
based on human factors methods are implemented, what can be learnt from 
investigating their acceptance by mobile mining equipment operators? 
!
The changes made to the system interface as a result of this research managed to 
increase operator acceptance of the revised system. This provides good evidence 
that human factors methods can lead to design interventions that are both noticeable 
and positive to experienced operators. Prior to these interventions drivers were 
found not to have an average positive acceptance of the system. As the original 
system interface was not ergonomically designed and had poor operator acceptance 
then it was likely to be not be effective and maybe even distracting. Therefore, this 
may lead to a hypothesis that the original system would actually increase the chance 
of a collision.  Though this hypothesis would be difficult to prove conclusively, the 
implicit finding is that a system designed to help a driver make better decisions but 
being developed and deployed without explicit human factors input can actually be 
harmful or at best irrelevant. Human factors methods may well therefore be viewed 
as enhancers to design. Though this is only a single case study, it provides at least 
one circumstance in which it appears that the methods are essential to ultimate 
success of the system. With the inability to actually run randomised trials for such 
equipment, such evidence is nearly as strong as is possible to be obtained in one 
case study for the use of human factors with mining equipment. 
5.2. Links to broader trends in mining human factors 
The research contained in this thesis has coincided with increased interest in human 
factors in mining, especially in Australia and the USA.  As part of an analysis of the 
broad trends in mining human factors, it is argued here that there are three streams 
of work that link to the research in this thesis.  These are, more targeted reviews of 
individual accidents using human factors methods, individual case studies of 
methods that could be widely applied, and prospective reviews of human factors 
issues for mining automation. 
5.2.1 Improving accident reporting to include more human factors 
Historically in mining, the use of human factors methods in accident investigations 
was mainly through individual applications by specialists following high-profile mining 
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disasters. It is certainly appropriate that complex human factors methods be applied 
in these circumstances. For example, the tragic events of underground explosion at 
Soma Mine in Turkey that killed 301 workers justify a large scale investigation that 
includes human factors issues (Korkmaz, 2014).   
!
Therefore, a trend in human factors research is to review collections of individual 
incidents that are harmful to often only one person at a time but can be cumulatively 
just as destructive as a major disaster. Specifically, the approach of re-analysing 
injury narratives with human factors elements, as presented in Chapter 2, is 
becoming more widespread. For example, similar reviews of have taken place of 
mining injuries in Kentucky (Evelyn, 2014), maintenance injuries in USA mining 
operations (Reardon, 2014) and mining and quarrying injuries in Finland (Reiman, 
2012). All of these reviews were able to make descriptive conclusions related to 
human factors, but all only do single variable analysis, meaning that more complex 
multifactorial issues were not fully explored. 
!
There were also a number of investigations into mining safety issues that either did 
not have a human factors focus or had insufficient information supplied in accident 
reports to draw conclusions. These reports provide even less focus for investigation. 
For example, a large review of mining incidents involving a worker being entangled 
in, struck by, or in contact with equipment was able to identify the likely equipment 
involved, but only that the tasks were ‘operation’ or ‘maintenance and repair’ (Ruff et. 
al., 2011). Similarly, a large review of injuries to contractors at American mine sites 
was able to determine that they had a greater chance of injury than direct 
employees, but offered very little to direct further research and nothing that would 
allow for more targeted interventions (Saehr et. al., 2013).  
!
The research contained within Chapter 2 represents a model for both recording and 
analysing injury statistics in the future. The goal for investigation of incidents should 
not be merely informative and descriptive. It should also provide directions that can 
help predict target interventions. Therefore, the research in this thesis is leading an 
emerging trend to record more precise account of accidents with greater human, 
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task and environment issues and then to use multivariable analysis target further 
research and interventions. 
!
5.2.2 A renewed focus on detailed case studies involving human factors 
There has been a noticeable increase in the publication of mining case studies 
involving human factors investigations and interventions involving mining equipment. 
In other industries case studies may sometimes been seen as a lesser form of 
publication compared to laboratory type trials. However, as noted by Horberry et al. 
(2013), the complexity of the mining industry does not easily lend itself to 
experimental evaluation, so research often tends to be case study based. Some of 
the reasons that case studies are prevalent has a scientific basis, namely that the 
variables at each mine site involving human tasks vary so much that controlling for 
them would be nearly impossible. However, most of the reasons are pragmatic such 
as the huge distances to remote sites, researcher access issues to mine sites, 
significant logistics and costs simply accessing equipment and tasks, and the long 
operational life of equipment. Taking the above into account, in-depth case studies 
that describe the processes employed, the successes and barriers to success may 
represent the best chance of designing out accidents (Horberry et al., 2013). This is 
especially true if the methods involved are adaptable to various circumstances. 
!
There was a significant drop off in published case studies in the 1990s caused by the 
demise of the British coal industry, once a major centre of human factors in mining 
research (Simpson et al., 2008). But a resurgent industry, especially the mining 
boom in Australia, Canada and USA, had brought a slight increase in funds to 
perform studies and a belief from individual companies that they will see tangible 
benefits from the research. One of the highest profile examples is the efforts 
surrounding the Earth Moving Equipment Safety Round Table (EMERST); a 
collective of global mining companies who aim to use their collective influence to 
improve the consideration of key safety issues in mining. Central to this focus was 
the development of the Operability and Maintainability Analysis Technique (OMAT); a 
tool that involves prioritised task analysis common in many industries (Horberry et al, 
2009).  The application of this tool at sites, largely lead by the author of this thesis, 
resulted in the ability to identify issues and generate solutions for issues related to 
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access and egress of mobile equipment (Cooke & Horberry, 2011; Cooke & 
Horberry, 2010). Mobile equipment manufacturers considered the tool as beneficial 
to positively addressed their current development blind-spots, especially if it involved 
being able to see the tasks being actually performed (Horberry & Cooke, 2012). The 
tool has subsequently been developed into EMESRT Design Evaluation for 
Equipment Procurement (EDEEP) and shown good promise in generating 
collaboration between mining equipment manufacturers and end users (Wester & 
Burgess-Limerick, 2013; Burgess-Limerick, Cooke, Joy and Horberry, 2012). 
!
This EMESRT-related work has much in common with the research presented in this 
thesis; namely that the methods involved are human-centred and mostly widely 
applicable to a variety of situations. It would be tempting, in an academic sense, to 
focus solely on individual issues with a more pure experimental design. However, 
what has been shown by these published case studies is that the industry is more 
likely to support research if it is widely applicable and creates actual design change. 
As mining is an industry where the ‘knowledge’ is not actively passed in academic 
papers, but through iterative design changes and the stories that go along with them, 
a case study style of research is likely to lead to the greatest contribution to change. 
5.2.3 The increase in automation and mines of the future 
One significant future path for human factors is mining equipment automation for the 
so-called ‘mines of the future’. A recent study of key figures in the Australian mining 
industry came to the conclusion that in advanced mining industries a gradual 
introduction of automation is already beginning, and will continue to include remotely 
operated equipment or even ‘people-less’ mines (Lynas & Horberry, 2011). The 
transition to automation in other industries has often been difficult. This is because 
as the scope of automation expands the complexity of the remaining human tasks, 
primarily of supervision, adjustment and maintenance become more crucial and 
complex, often limiting the projected effectiveness of the technology (Baxter et. al., 
2011). It is for this reason that some have concluded the push towards automation it 
will fail unless it systematically includes human factors methods and user-centred 
input (Lynas & Horberry, 2011). 
!
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The review of a proximity detection system provides good support for this claim. A 
relatively simple piece of technology compared to the ‘full automation’ that may 
arrive, it was unsuccessful without the application of human factors methods to 
support the system development and deployment process.  This impact is mirrored 
in a review of eight projects that implemented innovative mining equipment that 
concluded that human factors issues were poorly addressed and there was little or 
no reduction in the incidence of injuries (Bourreau-Trudel, 2014).  There is a very 
strong case that the role of human factors professionals must increase if future 
automation in mining is to be both safe and successful. 
5.3 Recommendations of Future Work 
Throughout this thesis, recommendations for future work have been proposed. Most 
of these recommendations have built upon the findings emerging from the three case 
studies, for example, use multivariable methods to analyse mining injury data, use 
the CDM to reveal additional insights or study the operational environment to help 
better design collision detection systems. 
!
However, aside from these specific issues, other broader avenues of future mining 
human factors research are possible. These include the following five areas:  
i) Additional research with equipment manufacturers to improve mobile 
 equipment design. Earlier in this thesis it was noted that there is often a  
 disconnect between designers and actual mine site operational conditions. As 
 mobile mining equipment such as haul trucks are frequently involved in  
 incidents then this may be a priority vehicle type to focus on. One possible 
 approach is the greater use of the ‘OMAT’ technique (a task-based, risk  
 assessment and design tool) (Cooke and Horberry, 2011). Additionally it  
 would be beneficial to discover what tools manufacturers actually use when 
 designing equipment, and what additional user-centred design assistance  
 they would they like. 
ii) Expand work human factors work into process plant maintenance and 
design. Little mining human factors work has been conducted examining 
minerals processing (Li et al, 2011), so extending the mobile mining 
equipment design methods to this domain might be beneficial. 
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iii) Focus on automation. As noted earlier in this thesis, mining automation is 
increasing. The research in this thesis with proximity detection systems has 
shown that human factors input can assist with this low level automation 
system. However, it is likely that there will be significant human factors 
challenges with full automation. These issues include: operator acceptance, 
skills retention, maintenance issues and abnormal operations (Lynas et al, 
2011). This is a huge area that human factors input has helped in other 
industries such as aviation or healthcare, so the mining industry learn 
valuable lessons from them. 
iv) A focus on performance, not just safety. Consider moving away from only 
addressing safety and into performance improvement. Most recent mining 
human factors work has emphasised safety, but a greater consideration of 
possible performance efficiency issues from the application of a user-centred 
focus may be extremely beneficial (Horberry et al, 2010). Similarly, moving the 
prevailing minerals industry mind-set to ‘reliability’ rather than safety may be 
advantageous. Safety culture is a related area where benefits can be 
obtained, but this does not preclude the basic need for fit-for purpose 
equipment, technologies, tasks and systems. A difficulty arises if a focus on 
safety culture results in a reduced focus on the design of equipment 
(Rollenhagen, 2010).  This is because the focus on safety culture, arguably, 
overlooks considering design directly.  Rather it favours strategies that focus 
on social and individual elements of the system such as beliefs, values and 
attitudes especially in situations where design changes are costly 
(Rollenhagen, 2010). 
v) Develop simple methods. As the mining industry is highly time constrained, 
then developing and applying simple methods that are widely applicable 
would be beneficial, rather than more complex methods that are not widely 
used (Cooke and Horberry, 2010). 
!
5.4 Conclusions 
The three studies described in this thesis have produced both academic 
contributions to knowledge and practical benefits. The research could be built on 
through the five further research areas mentioned above. In the past, human factors 
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work in the mining industry has often been ‘stop-start’ (Simpson et al., 2009). 
However, there is a nascent development whereby the mining industry is beginning 
to see the value of a user-centred approach (eg EMESRT). 
!
It is contended here that the research contained in this thesis can be seen as an 
early step for the widespread use of human factors-style approaches in the minerals 
industry. Difficulties such as obtaining continuing funding, obtaining mine site access 
and having a pool of experienced mining human factors researchers will always be 
challenges. However, the vision of a global minerals industry that has safe, effective 
and integrated operations involving equipment, systems and people is a worthy one 
to aspire towards. 
!
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Incident Analysis Findings linked to Chapter 4 
Appendix 1.1 Incident time-line 
The information gained from the CDM interviews was placed in the below table 
which shows: 
1. A sequence of events placed in chronological order, called a TIME CHUNK. 
2. The time chunks below from the perspectives of the LOADER OPERATOR 
the SERVICE VEHICLE OPERATOR and the LIGHT VEHICLE 
OPERATOR are displayed. 
3. A BARRIER FAILURE is shown when it occurs. A barrier is a layer of 
protection or risks control implemented or naturally existing that could have 
prevented a collision. 
4. The FAILURE MODES that occurred are noted. 
!
Table A1: Proximity Detection Incident Analysis 
TIME 
CHUNK
LOADER 
OPERATOR REPORT
SERVICE VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
LIGHT VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
1
Loader Operator called 
service truck and raised 
meeting at workshop (re-
fuelling).  Notified by service 
truck they would arrive in 
10-15 minutes.
Received call from bogger operator 
and notified them that they would be 
at the workshop in 10-15 minutes.
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2Asked water cart operator, who had 
just completed watering, if road to U/G 
was in okay condition. It can be 
slippery for the service vehicle 
following a watering.  Was informed 
that the road was okay.
3
Went to workshop and got 
there about 4-5 minutes 
before service truck. Timing 
confirmed by the proximity 
detection system log.  
4
Waits for service truck whilst 
filling out paperwork.  Truck 
was in idle.
Service truck travels UG and is calling 
levels on descent to meet loader 
operator
LV driver was coming up the 
Crown Decline and reportedly 
calling levels.
5
Heard the radio in the 
workshop (loud speaker) with 
a ‘chat’ type conversation.  
This prompted operator to 
check that his radio was on 
channel 1.  Reports that he 
clearly remembers his radio 
being on channel 1.
6
When approaching the level 
of workshop, reportedly 
called “LV 2019 up”.
TIME 
CHUNK
LOADER 
OPERATOR REPORT
SERVICE VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
LIGHT VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
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A
BARRIER FAILURE - RADIO CONTACT 
Call of LV Location was not heard, incorrectly interpreted or forgotten by Bogger operator.
7
Service vehicle calls location and 
direction at stockpile 10.  Stockpile 10 
is near the workshop and commonly 
the last level called before reaching 
the workshop.
LV driver heard service truck 
calling “Service Vehicle 10 
Down” indicating that they 
were going past stockpile 10.
8
Service truck arrives at the area and 
drives across workshop entry, to 
check if the loader is there.
9
Sees service truck arrive at 
workshop.  At this time a 
proximity detection alarm 
flashes on the screen and 
reportedly notices the alarm.  
The alarm is likely to be that 
recorded at 11:38:51am
B
BARRIER FAILURE – Proximity detection 
The proximity detection that went off when the service vehicle operator was 
in vision of the loader operator was not the service vehicle, which shows as 
LC449 on the screen.  !
The approaching light vehicle which shows as the similar which shows as 
LV685.   !
This incorrect interpretation was made further likely as the screen for the 
proximity detection screen is to the right of the driver and they look to the 
left to look over the bucket of the loader.
TIME 
CHUNK
LOADER 
OPERATOR REPORT
SERVICE VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
LIGHT VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
!
!  
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10
Notices loader is in workshop and 
halts because he needs to access the 
rear of the workshop area where there 
is a park up bay.
C
BARRIER FAILURE – VEHICLE SERERATION 
Workshop design forces loader to exit into the main decline if service vehicle arrives.
11
Communicates to loader driver 
visually & with hand signals that he 
will back up the decline to allow the 
loader operator to exit workshop.
D
BARRIER FAILURE – RADIO 
Service Vehicle Operator does not radio to loader operator which would have alerted light vehicle
12
Sees hand signals from service 
truck operator and indicates 
with hands that he understands 
(thumbs up).
E
BARRIER FAILURE – RADIO 
Loader operator does call that he is exiting the workshop.
13
Started reversing up decline to 
stop blocking workshop entrance 
and get out of road of loader 
operator
14
Raised bucket so that it does not scrape 
the ground when exiting the workshop 
and started to move loader forwards to 
exit the workshop.
TIME 
CHUNK
LOADER 
OPERATOR REPORT
SERVICE VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
LIGHT VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
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F15
Loader operator also had light 
on when exiting the workshop 
shining into the intersection 
and an already backlit 
powerbox.
TIME 
CHUNK
LOADER 
OPERATOR REPORT
SERVICE VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
LIGHT VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
BARRIER FAILURE – VISION 
With the bucket up operator could not see the light vehicle as shown in the below left image, where an LV is in 
the decline in the approximate position of collision.  The top of this LV can, just barely, be seen in the below 
middle image in the red box.  The below left image show the position of this LV in the images. 
!  !   
!
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G16
As the LV operator reached 
the workshop level saw the 
service truck.  Slowed to 
allow the Service Truck to 
enter the workshop.
17
Noticed the light vehicle was 
approaching and dimmed 
head light and reversed 
back up decline in order to 
move closer to wall and 
allow light vehicle to pass.
Light Vehicle Operator 
continues to roll towards 
workshop entrance slowly, 
still thinking that the service 
vehicle will enter the 
workshop.
H
BARRIER FAILURE – Lights 
The light vehicle operator did not see the lights of the loader coming out of the workshop.
TIME 
CHUNK
LOADER 
OPERATOR REPORT
SERVICE VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
LIGHT VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
BARRIER FAILURE -  LIGHTS 
A combination of the backlit power-box area and the loader lights mean that the lights of the LV were not seen 
by the loader operator. 
!
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18
As the loader operator is 
moving forwards towards this 
exit.  At or around this time the 
proximity detection alarm goes 
off and the screen flashes for 
the service vehicle but is not 
seen by the loader operator.
Noticed that the service truck 
had its park lights on (rather 
than full headlights) and was 
not moving forwards.
BARRIER FAILURE – Proximity Detection 
As the proximity detection goes off the driver could have been made aware that a second vehicle was in the 
proximity.  Even though he had misinterpreted the first vehicle.  However, the screen is mounted to the rear of 
the operator when travelling forwards and would not be seen.  The volume was turned down so would not be 
heard.  The operator may have seen the flash of the vehicle coming up in the windscreen but noted it is likely 
he would have continued to have interpret this as the service vehicle, as the flash continues.
19
The LV operator eventually 
pulled up approximately 3m 
from the intersection with the 
workshop.
I
BARRIER FAILURE – LV Position 
It is reported to be procedure that vehicles should pull up at least 10m before an intersection.  The LV 
operator pulled up much closer than this to the intersection.
20
Bucket of loader starts to exit 
workshop and loader operator 
turn down decline.
Immediately or very close 
recognising that something 
‘might’ be coming out of the 
workshop the LV operator 
notices the bucket of the 
bogger.
TIME 
CHUNK
LOADER 
OPERATOR REPORT
SERVICE VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
LIGHT VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
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JBARRIER FAILED – Lack of Pause at Intersection 
Rather than pausing when entering the main decline and dimming lights, (as normal) he continued.  A pause 
may have allowed the time for the operator to escape.
21
Hear service truck using the 
horn.  Loader operator thinks 
he looked back at the Service 
Truck but kept going. 
Used horn to try and alert operator
K
BARRIER FAILURE – Horn 
Loader operator did not interpret horn as a signal to stop, or at least had not interpreted it in time to prevent 
collision
22
Cannot remember hearing any 
radio calls from the service 
truck or the LV.
Tried to call driver on 2-way.
Tried to call driver on 2 way 
“Bogger! Bogger! Stop!  
Stop!”) and begins to reverse.  
– noted that his calls were 
L
BARRIER FAILURE – Radio 
Radio calls are not heard by or fail to reach Loader operator.  This would be possible if the radio was on the 
wrong station, the volume turned down or the radio transmission faulty.
23
The LV operator attempts to 
back away from loader but 
contacts the wall.
M
BARRIER FAILURE – Physical Intersection Design 
In many situations the LV operator could have continued to reverse away from the loader.  However, in this 
situation the LV operator did not have much time to react calmly to the loader approaching and contacted the 
wall.  The driver could, therefore, not continue to take evasive action.  If the road was straight around the 
workshop colliding with the wall would be much less likely.
TIME 
CHUNK
LOADER 
OPERATOR REPORT
SERVICE VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
LIGHT VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
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LOADER BUCKET CRASHES INTO THE HOOD OF THE LIGHT VEHICLE PUSHING IT AGAINST THE WALL
24
Felt impact of hitting LV – soft 
impact – and knew that it was 
not the wall – harder and 
common impact.
N
25
After collision paused and 
lowered the bucket.  Saw rear 
of  LV.
TIME 
CHUNK
LOADER 
OPERATOR REPORT
SERVICE VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
LIGHT VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
BARRIER SUCCEEDS – Bonnet of Ute 
Bonnet of ute is struck before passenger in LV.  This is the last physical control before the bucket of the loader 
had struck him. !
Had the bucket been raided approximately 300mm higher the first impact would have been with the 
windscreen of the LV.  The approximate impact point it highlighted in the below image. !
!
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!
(end of time-line) 
!
 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
26
Raised bucket and reversed 
away from light vehicle back 
into workshop
27
Saw that LV operator had 
exited the vehicle and dropped 
bucket.
LV operator gets out of 
vehicle and waves at loader 
operator.
28
Heard radio calls from LV 
operator notifying supervisors 
and surface
Called supervisors of surface 
to notify them of collision.
29
Approaches loader and 
loader operator, asks how he 
did not hear his radio calls.  
LV operator checks radios.
TIME 
CHUNK
LOADER 
OPERATOR REPORT
SERVICE VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
LIGHT VEHICLE 
OPERATOR REPORT
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Appendix 1.2 Analysis 
!
As can be seen in the above time sequence a large number of current barriers failed 
to allow this collision to occur.  Some types of barriers failed multiple times.  The 
primary barriers that failed, and recommendations for improvement are shown 
below: 
!
Barrier How Barrier Failed Recommendations
1
Radio Contact · Not calling exit of workshop. 
· Calls not heard by loader 
either through  
o Noise;  
o radio blackspots; 
o s e l e c t i o n o f t h e 
wrong channel; 
o or volume turned 
down.
· Reinforce calling, especially 
ca l l i ng when ex i t i ng the 
workshop.  Potentially install a 
sign to call as a reminder upon 
workshop exit. 
· Increase ease of visibility of 
radio volume.  A number of 
person on-site noted they have 
accidently left the volume down 
on their radios from time to 
time.
2
Lights up walls · Area was backlit. 
· Loader operator did not dim 
l i g h t s w h e n e x i t i n g 
intersection.
· Turn off power to powerbox.  The 
powerboxes were noted to be lit 
because they are usually on the 
side of the walls of the decline. 
This one is recessed into the 
wall and there does not appear 
to be a reason that it needs to 
be lit unless somebody is 
working in the area. 
· Reinforce practice of pausing 
and flicking lights down when 
approaching intersections.
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3Vision Driver had to drive fwds with bucket 
high
· Consider how vision could be 
increased.   
· A fwd facing camera may 
improved vision when the buck 
needs to be raised.
4
Intersection 
Design
The loader needed to go out into the 
decline in order to allow the service 
vehicle to the rear of the workshop. 
This, therefore, triggers the situation 
to occur.
Consider placing another ‘cut in the 
workshop for the service vehicle in 
front of where the loader goes.  This 
means that it may not matter if the 
service vehicle arrived after the 
loader, as it would simply choose 
the forwards parking bay.   It is 
noted this may not be financially 
feasible.
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5Proximity 
Detection
· Proximity detection system 
did not pick up vehicles 
consistently. 
· The second vehicle was 
missed. 
· It was noted in testing of the 
recreated position that the 
loader did not see the light 
vehicle used in recreating on 
the proximity screen until it 
was through the intersection 
on both sides.
· Consider placement of proximity 
system and place it where the 
driver will be facing with the 
m o s t c o m m o n v e h i c l e 
interactions. 
· Consider changing interface 
design so that light vehicles and 
service vehicles can be more 
easily distinguished (rather LV 
and LS). 
· Consider changing audible alarm 
f r o m c o n t i n u o u s u n t i l 
acknowledged to a shorter 
alarm that does not need to be 
acknowledged by touching the 
screen (eg. alarm for 5 second 
from detection and say vehicle 
type).  This will limit the 
temptation to turn down the 
volume. 
· Reinforce variability of proximity 
detection system. 
· Test the sensitivity of all mounted 
proximity detection tags onsite.
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